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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are a general purpose technology
- they constitute a fundamental infrastructure supporting economic and social activities
(OECD, 2013). Today, there may be no doubt about the importance of the Internet in our
society, which has transformed into a ubiquitous technology supporting all sectors across
the economy. The OECD (2012c, p. 20) even stresses that ”most policy makers in OECD
countries now consider the Internet a fundamental infrastructure, in much of the same
way as electricity, water and transportation networks”. The term Internet economy has
become a widely used expression in the recent years - a sign of the key economic role the
Internet now plays in our daily lives.
The development of mobile communications technologies, one of the youngest, most
dynamic and innovative ICT markets, has no doubt contributed to the way we use the
Internet today. The OECD (2012c) underlines that thanks to the development of mobile
technologies, especially to the explosive growth of new smartphones and portable devices
such as handheld computers and tablets, the Internet has reached its second stage of de-
velopment as it evolved to a broader network reaching a wide range of new devices. Due
to advances in mobile communications, in the past years there has been a significant shift
in available services and ways in which people use the Internet. As more users access
the Internet via mobile networks, applications such as social networking, location-based
services, user-created content and blogging continue to evolve (OECD, 2012c).
The ICT firm Ericsson estimates that by 2020, there will be 50 billion mobile wireless
devices connected to the Internet across the globe, and predicts that the total number of
devices connected to the Internet could reach 500 billion (OECD, 2012c). An OECD
estimate concluded in 2012 that a family with two teenagers may have 10 connected
devices. By 2017 this number could reach 25, and by 2022 it could reach 50 (OECD,
2013). Although different projections of the number of devices connected to the Internet
vary, all of them highlight the commonly held idea that the ”Internet of things” will have
significantly more connections than users (OECD, 2012c).
Obviously, both developed and developing countries benefit from the increasing role
of mobile communications technologies and many more possible applications are still to
be explored. The OECD (2013) stresses that policy makers that take advantage of the new
communication capabilities, could make substantial gains towards policy objectives, such
as promoting greater equity. In certain cases, the mobile Internet is even preferred to fixed
Internet. Notably, due to the fact that the rollout of mobile infrastructure is much faster
and cheaper than of fixed lines, the mobile communications sector is booming in many
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
developing countries that do not possess a well-developed fixed-line infrastructure. New
mobile services, such as the use of mobiles for making payments and providing services
to people without bank accounts in Kenya, address the large number of mobile users that
do not have access to banking and online facilities. As a result, mobile communications
can help overcome differences among countries and regions in the use of ICT, frequently
called the digital divide (Andonova, 2006). The increased use of mobile Internet will,
in turn, accelerate the diffusion of knowledge and strengthen the internationalisation of
economic relations (Welfens et al., 2005).
In order to discuss in depth the topics related to Internet economy and mobile com-
munications, we should first give definitions of the most commonly used terms related to
these technologies.
The term second generation (2G) mobile technologies refers to mobile technologies
based on the GSM (Global System for Mobile communication), originally designed for
operation in the 900 MHz band but adapted for 1800 MHz soon after its introduction.
GSM was designed principally for voice telephony (see ETSI (2014)).
Third generation (3G) mobile technologies is an umbrella term for a set of mobile
standards that comply with the International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-
2000) specifications by the International Telecommunication Union. In contrast to 2G,
3G enables mobile Internet access and includes for example UMTS (Universal Mobile
Telephony Standard) that is widely used in Europe and CDMA2000 (Code Division Mul-
tiple Access) that is largely used in Americas and some Asian countries.
The term fourth generation (4G) mobile technologies refers to the most recent LTE
(Long Term Evolution) standard, often marketed as 4G LTE. It enables high-speed data
transfer for mobile phones and data terminals.
The term 5G (fifth generation mobile networks) denotes the next major phase of mo-
bile telecommunications standards beyond the current 4G. The European Commission as
well as Korea are currently planning to invest into its development.
Today, there is no doubt about the high innovativeness of the mobile communication
market as we witness the transition from third generation (3G) to fourth generation (4G)
mobile technologies. 3G networks and 4G technology provide a platform for the con-
vergence of voice, SMS/MMS and data services over a single data connection, and LTE
offers even higher wireless Internet speeds. The ambitious goal is to achieve ubiquitous
Internet access anytime from anywhere - that is why fifth generation (5G) mobile tech-
nologies are already a subject of attention on the EU level (e.g. as a part of Horizon 2020
programme).
Another important trend in the mobile communications market is that new entrants,
for example, Free Mobile in France, made markets significantly more competitive and
encouraged new innovation (OECD, 2013). In addition, high prices for international mo-
bile roaming are increasingly recognised as a significant barrier to trade and travel in
OECD economies (ibid.) and in the future we should witness more efforts to improve the
situation (similar to the EU Roaming Regulation).
Furthermore, nowadays, smartphones and tablets are much more than devices to com-
municate and gather information. They enable home automation, smart vehicles and other
connected or smart devices. The (OECD, 2013) stresses that this area has tremendous po-
tential for OECD economies to increase efficiency and meet broader policy objectives in
fields such as health and energy.
Taken into consideration the immense potential of mobile communications technolo-
gies and their crucial role for the Internet economy, it is essential to conduct a continuous
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monitoring of recent trends in the international mobile communications market in combi-
nation with a detailed analysis of the achievements of and challenges faced by countries
in this sector, in order to develop adequate policy measures in support of mobile technolo-
gies when needed.
This PhD thesis aims to contribute to this important task by analysing the innovation
dynamics in the mobile communications market in the OECD countries. This work will
consist of five major parts. The first part will be devoted to the description of most im-
portant trends in the modern mobile communications market, with a special focus on LTE
deployment, smartphones’ success and innovative mobile digital services.
In the second, theoretical, part, we will consider the main theories that are applica-
ble to the mobile communications markets and our future analysis: theory of innovation
systems (on both national and sectoral levels) and theory of lead markets. As regards the
former approach, we will look in more detail at the history of development of the mobile
sectoral system of innovation. As regards the lead market approach, we will try to find out
if the conclusions based on 2G development are still valid for 3G. And in the related third
part, we will attempt to revise and update the case studies on the Swedish and Korean
national systems of innovation.
The fourth part is empirical and we will analyse the factors that might have contributed
to the diffusion of 3G mobile technologies in selected OECD countries. In the fifth part,
we will review most important EU policy measures aiming to improve the innovation ac-
tivity and support the development of mobile communications market in Europe. Finally,
taking into consideration the results of our analysis and existing policy measures, we will
draw policy recommendations for the further promotion of an innovative European mobile
communications market.
We hope that this work will contribute to a better understanding of current trends and
the innovation processes in the European mobile communications market, as well as to
promoting the further development of key mobile Internet technologies.
Olga Syraya 3
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Chapter 2
Current Trends in the Mobile
Communications Market
Mobile communications market comprises four major elements or sub-markets:
• Mobile network itself (e.g. GSM, UMTS, LTE),
• Handsets, most recently smartphones,
• Software innovation, for example Android OS and iOS for iPhone, so-called Apps
etc.,
• Innovative services, such as mobile cloud services, mobile TV, mobile VoIP, and
innovative marketing.
In this chapter we will look in more detail at the recent trends concerning these ele-
ments of the worldwide mobile communications market.
2.1 Network Development
2.1.1 Mobile Network
According to the OECD (2013), mobile access accounted for 65 per cent of the total
number of communication paths in the OECD area in 2011 (see Figure 2.1). Slower
growth rates - mobile subscriptions grew by 3.8 per cent in 2011 and by 3.39 per cent in
2010 - reflect maturity in mobile markets in the OECD countries. The OECD share of
the number of mobile subscriptions around the world has also been decreasing - while
in 1993 it was 85 per cent, in 2011 it dropped to just 23 per cent (ibid.). This reflects
the success of the prepaid model for mobile services and feature phones, as well as the
high growth rates of many emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia
and South Africa, which are now aiming to replicate the success of the prepaid model for
mobile devices capable of Internet access (ibid.).
Today, the bulk of growth in the wireless sector corresponds to mobile broadband ser-
vices enabled by 3G and, in the future, by 4G technologies (see Figure 2.2. The OECD
(2013) underlines that the uptake of 3G technologies combined with quickly growing
5
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MARKET
Figure 2.1: Access growth in the OECD, 1997-2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
smartphone penetration has contributed to the current increase in mobile broadband sub-
scriptions.
Figure 2.2: Cellular mobile subscriptions in OECD countries, 1997-2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
In 2011, the average mobile penetration rate in the OECD area was 109 per cent and
Finland was the OECD leader with total mobile subscriptions just under 170 per cent,
followed by Italy, Portugal and Austria with over 150 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
(see Figure 2.3). The OECD (2013) suggests that high subscription rates are usually
present in countries were prepaid mobile services are popular, such as Italy and Portugal.
6 Olga Syraya
2.1. NETWORK DEVELOPMENT
According to the OECD (2013), the share of 3G-enabled mobile subscriptions has grown
from 32.22 per cent in 2009 to 44.1 per cent in 2011, with a total number of just below
596 million. In 2011, for selected countries that were able to report data, 3G adoption
reached 100 per cent of mobile subscribership in Slovenia and Japan, while in Korea the
share of 3G subscriptions was 94.9 per cent of total mobile subscriptions (ibid.).
Figure 2.3: Cellular mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2011, 2G and 3G
Source: OECD, 2013.
According to the OECD (2013), the share of revenue generated by mobile commu-
nications services continues to increase across the OECD area - in the 13 years between
1998 and 2011 mobile revenues increased sixfold as they reached USD 651 billion in
2011. However, while the trend toward greater shares of mobile revenues is common
across the OECD area, there are some differences (see Figure 2.4). For example, in Japan
the mobile revenue share is as high as 84 per cent, almost 20 percentage points above the
next country, Austria. The OECD (2013) suggests that one possible factor is the pricing
patterns in Japan for mobile voice and data services, because mobile operators in Japan
promote flat-rate tariffs that are more competitive for customers using larger amounts of
data. This promotes fixed mobile substitution, especially for the Internet usage.
In Austria, the OECD (2013) argues, the high share of mobile revenue, relative to
the overall market, is also due to substitution. Because unlike most other countries, Aus-
trian authorities consider that for regulatory purposes, mobile networks can be viewed as
substitutable for fixed networks. On the other hand, the share of mobile revenues in the
United Kingdom, is among the lowest as a proportion of the total market in the OECD.
The OECD (2013) explains it in part by the presence of five mobile operators competing
strongly in this market until 2010, which led to some of the lowest prices in the OECD
area.
The use of innovative broadband services is possible thanks to the increasing deploy-
ment of faster 3G and 4G networks. According to the OECD (2013), the average mobile
broadband growth rate in 2011 was 29.1 per cent. However, some countries had grown
more than 100 per cent, such as the Czech Republic (324.8 per cent), Estonia (121.2 per
cent), Spain (135.9 per cent) and Turkey (343.3 per cent) in Europe, and Chile (114.0 per
Olga Syraya 7
CHAPTER 2. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
MARKET
Figure 2.4: Share of mobile revenue in total telecommunication revenue, 2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
cent) and Mexico (156.8 per cent) in Latin America, while only a few had grown below
10 per cent.
2.1.2 Mobile Internet
Wireless technologies such as mobile Internet has been gaining importance in the last
years and in 2008, the number of wireless Internet subscriptions in the OECD countries
overtook fixed broadband subscriptions (see Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Wireless Internet access overtaking fixed broadband subscriptions, 1997-2011
Source: OECD, 2012c.
Mobile Internet providers are increasingly advertising broadband speeds at levels
much closer to those of fixed broadband offers in some countries. For example, the OECD
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median speed for September 2012 for mobile broadband (12 Mbps) is not far from the
fixed broadband median speed in 2010 (15.4 Mbps) (OECD, 2013). In September 2012,
Denmark had the fastest advertised mobile broadband speed among OECD countries (see
Figure 2.5). The OECD (2013) suggests that the early adoption of LTE technology in
Denmark has contributed to a sharp increase in advertised speeds. According to this
OECD ranking, the second-fastest country is Korea (75 Mbps median speed), followed
by Greece (42.2 Mbps), Canada and Poland (both 42.0 Mbps).
Figure 2.6: Average and median advertised mobile download speeds, September 2012
Source: OECD, 2013.
2.1.3 Commercial LTE Deployment
Currently, the fourth generation mobile network is being deployed all over the world and
is expected to become ”the next step in user experience” (GSA, 2012). Commercial
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deployment of Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology has begun with the initial launch
by TeliaSonera in Stockholm (Sweden) and Oslo (Norway) in December 2009.
In Korea, LG UPlus was the first player in the mobile market to introduce LTE. It
launched in July 2011 and completed the first national LTE network in March 2012. These
efforts by Koreas smallest operator (by number of subscriptions) saw the company gain
around 5 million LTE subscriptions as of December 2011. SK Telecom, the largest mo-
bile operator in Korea, launched LTE at the same time and has acquired 6 million LTE
customers over the same period, while KT had 2 million LTE customers in August 2012.
In Japan, NTT Docomo has led the market since launching its LTE service Xi in Decem-
ber 2010, gaining 4 million users over the first 20 months. The Verizon Wireless 4G LTE
network, also launched in 2010, offers 4G LTE coverage to more than 245 million people
in the United States approximately four out of five people. The company gained more
than 10 million subscriptions in the first two years.
Its advertised expected download speed is up to 150 Mbps (HSPA speed can theoreti-
cally reach 42.2 Mbps). LTE has received tremendous support, for example, the European
Union had funded research on LTE with 32 million USD between 2004 and 2007 and also
supports further research on the enhancement of LTE with investments of 23 million USD
from 2010 OECD (2010). According to GSA (2014), as of 31 March 2014, 576 opera-
tors were investing in LTE in 157 countries and 279 commercial networks were already
launched in 101 countries (see Figure 2.7). The fact that as of 5 January 2012 there
were only 49 networks in 29 countries shows the enormous progress of LTE in the past
two years, and this rapid expansion still continues globally. GSA (2014) forecasts over
350 commercial LTE networks by the end 2014 and it has confirmed LTE as ”the fastest
developing mobile system technology ever” and as a ”global success”.
Figure 2.7: Worldwide commercial deployment of LTE networks, 2014
Source: GSA, February 2014.
The success of LTE is largely due to its technical advantages over its predecessors.
This next generation of mobile broadband networks is expected to be an all-IP based,
flat and simplified network, which will enable higher-speed, larger-capacity and lower-
latency wireless access in a more spectrum efficient and a cost effective manner (OECD,
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2010). These technology advancements open three major potential benefits from mobile
broad-band networks:
1. High-speed access
As already mentioned, the fourth generation of mobile broadband networks will
achieve higher speed access than current mobile services. It is even expected to be
comparable to the bandwidth of some entry-level fixed broadband services (OECD,
2010). This, in turn, will improve the end user experience, for example, by offering
higher-quality streaming of music and higher-definition video streaming than cur-
rently possible. With the increase of download speeds, a richer variety of content,
such as online gaming or movies, can become more accessible. In addition, the
increased uplink data rate will enable uploading higher quality video content with
lower latency. For instance, users may be able to share with friends their location in
real time by using their mobile handsets. According to the OECD (2010), the new
high-speed mobile network also has a great potential for business use, for example,
sending and receiving large data files with smartphones can boost productivity by
enabling employees to work away from their office. The possible increase in live
video conferencing will help avoid high travel costs and generate environmental
benefits.
2. User-friendliness
The boom of smartphones with touch screen interface shows that mobile users
expect more user-friendly handsets (OECD, 2010). Not only traditional mobile
phones, but also other devices may be capable of functioning as user-friendly ter-
minals, for example tablet devices, e-book readers and even vehicles and home
appliances with built-in functionality. User-friendly services may directly connect
user handsets with home automation and security systems in order to manage en-
ergy control systems such as lighting and heating, or to monitor home security
cameras with streaming video (ibid.).
3. Global and seamless mobility
The OECD (2010) suggests that global standardisation of the new mobile tech-
nology facilitates seamless mobility, interoperability and may assist in providing
economies of scale. However, these features may also have a downside. For in-
stance, in the case of international roaming switching between different access
systems or networks and frequency bands may be unfavourable and confusing for
users. Users may face unexpectedly high bills while roaming internationally, even
when they subscribe to a flat-rate data plan in their home network. According to the
OECD (2010), another challenge arises from the handover between different access
technologies, such as in areas where LTE is not available yet. Although handsets
with multi-mode chipset are capable of handovers from other radio access systems,
chipset vendors may not supply them if the market is not large enough and they
cannot benefit from economies of scale. In that case, multi-mode handsets will not
be available or will be very expensive.
The OECD (2010) names five main drivers of the remarkably active and fast global
development of 4G (LTE) networks:
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1. Availability of ”smarter” devices and applications.
With the 3G rollout, mobile communications have become available through a wide
range of user devices, such as mobile handsets, PC cards, USB modems, netbooks,
smartphones, e-book readers and even vehicles. Modern mobile handsets boast a
large number of default applications, from calculators, stopwatches and calendars
to location services, music and movie players, gaming and other entertainment.
Smartphone growth in the last few years, especially due to the launch of iPhone and
later Android smartphones, provides easy wireless Internet access and stimulates
the use of wireless data services. However, with the increasing data traffic, new
faster and more efficient mobile networks have become necessary.
2. Tariff trends for mobile data.
The introduction of new tariff plans in recent years, that include a specified amount
of data a user can download, has had an increasing impact on mobile usage trends.
Often such plans are advertised as ”flat-rate”, although they still have some sort of
download cap. If users exceed their monthly data limit, they are either allowed to
continue using the connection by paying an additional (usually rather high) fee, or
they have a limited connection speed for the rest of the month. The OECD (2010)
suggests that download caps or other forms of tariff management may help opera-
tors avoid network congestion in areas of high usage, make better use of bandwidth
during peak periods, and maintain the quality of service. Flat-rate pricing is so
at-tractive for both users and operators because of its simplicity (McKnight and
Boroumand, 2000). Users often view flat monthly subscription fees as being trans-
parent and as a way to help them avoid paying more than they expect. For operators,
predictable fees reduce their administrative costs of tracking and billing for usage.
Some operators have even started recently to offer unlimited data services without
data caps. It must also be mentioned that the prices of data and so-called complete
tariffs (including voice, SMS and mobile Internet) have decreased significantly over
the last years. Users can count on even lower prices in the future if mobile operators
in other countries follow the example of the French Free Mobile.
3. Traffic growth on mobile network.
Increased usage of advanced devices, applications and new services, as well as more
competitive pricing, have generated significant increases in mobile network traffic
over recent years. For example, it is estimated that an e-book reader creates as much
traffic as two basic phones, used for voice and SMS, and a smartphone generates
as much traffic as ten basic phones used only for these traditional services (OECD,
2010). Many mobile network operators in the OECD countries have experienced
unprecedented traffic growth in recent years. Thus, as stated by the OECD (2010),
this need to handle the high growth in data traffic is one of the key drivers for the
development of mobile broadband network technology.
4. Financial pressure on network providers.
The OECD (2010) underlines that data services have become an increasingly im-
portant revenue source. Also, the proportion of revenue attributable to data is ex-
pected to increase significantly in the future. Hence the mobile network operators’
desire to reduce network operating costs. Operating costs of 3G networks currently
account for almost one-third of the total operating expense of network providers
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(OECD, 2010). Next generation mobile broadband networks promise to be very
attractive in terms of cost-efficiency and quality of service because they have sim-
ple, flat and less hierarchical network architectures requiring less cost of network
operations, which results in lower cost per bit than existing mobile networks.
5. Demand side perspective.
Consumer demand for mobile broadband services increases as innovative devices
and applications appear on the market. For example, geographic-based applica-
tions, including GPS capability, help users find information about restaurants, shops
and so forth in the particular geographic area where they are located. The speed
with which LTE networks are deployed and launched worldwide proves that mo-
bile network providers realise their immense importance for the future of mobile
communications. Although much more investments and work must be done for 4G
mobile technologies to be available to everyone in the OECD countries (in Ger-
many, for example, the LTE deployment first started in the so-called ”white spots”
- rural areas where there were no DSL, cable Internet or UMTS available but now
covers most of its surface), one can already foresee their tremendous potential and
the new user experience they will bring. However, the good coverage itself does
not guarantee that the actual usage of LTE will be as intensive as expected. Thus,
mobile providers should also implement adequate pricing strategies because too ex-
pansive tariffs may hinder the adoption of LTE technologies among the population.
2.2 Pricing Issues
According to the OECD (2013), offering mobile broadband services with data allowances
is a common practice among mobile providers in OECD countries. When the data cap is
reached, users may either be given the option of purchasing extra data for a given price
(overage charge) or their speeds are ”throttled”, reducing it to levels such as 64 Kbps or
128 Kbps. Sometimes, the consumer’s price plan may be automatically upgraded to the
next higher layer, which involves a higher data allowance and a higher monthly price. In
very rare cases, the mobile service could be disrupted when the maximum data allowance
for a billing period is reached (ibid.).
There were also some exceptions to this general pricing trend - unlimited flat-rate
offers without data caps sold by some operators in a few countries. For example, in 2012,
KDDI au in Japan advertised an unlimited service with a maximum download speed of 40
Mbps, which utilised both 3G and WiMAX technologies. In Finland, the mobile operator
Elisa offers 4G unlimited data with a maximum advertised speed of 80 Mbps. However,
OECD (2013) stresses that generous data caps such as these are extremely rare in OECD
countries.
After the launch of LTE, a number of operators in OECD countries have introduced
4G (LTE) plans to meet customer demand for increased data usage. The associated tariffs
in some cases are similar to those offered by fixed networks (OECD, 2013). For example,
some operators of LTE networks have developed tariffs based on access speeds rather than
data caps, such as the tariffs of the Swiss incumbent operator Swisscom introduced in mid-
2012 that all have unlimited data (see Figure 2.8). Others are offering shared data plans
across multiple users. The OECD (2013) mentions that this is similar in some respects
to the way in which users treat a fixed broadband connection for a single household. The
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major current trend is the bundling of voice and SMS with data into a single service, billed
by data usage with caps or at flat rates irrespective of the application generating the data.
Figure 2.8: Swisscom plans for mobile services
Source: OECD, 2013.
Figure 2.9 shows the OECD mobile basket with the lowest usage of data - 30 call
mobile basket, complemented by 100 MB of wireless broadband data, which costs on
average USD 19.74 PPP per month. Japan’s mobile basket is the most expensive offer
(over USD 60) with Chile, Hungary and the United States following (around USD 30
PPP). Since mobile broadband plans in Japan focus particularly on higher usage with an
overall adoption of flat-rate plans, the prices for small mobile baskets like this one are
comparatively high. Three countries, Austria, Estonia and the United Kingdom, had the
least expensive offers in 2012 (all under USD 10).
2.3 Trends in Handsets
In 2014, Apple celebrates the seventh anniversary of the launch of the iPhone. While not
the first smartphone, it represented a fundamental shift in the relationship between mobile
operators and customers (OECD, 2013). The success of the whole ecosystem (including
”apps” and the principle of an ”App Store”) pioneered around the iPhone spread quickly
across the industry, first in the United States then worldwide. In 2008, at the time of
launch of Apples ”App Store”, approximately 20 per cent of operating systems were
headquartered in the United States and 80 per cent offshore. By 2012, this figure had
been reversed, primarily by Apple (IOS) and Google (Android) (ibid.).
The OECD (2013) stresses that the diffusion of smartphones has been extremely rapid
- on average in the EU5 (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) their
share jumped from 22 per cent in 2009 to 44 per cent at the end of 2011. The OECD
(2013) suggests that the popularity of smartphones, in turn, has stimulated greater use of
mobile broadband access. For example, in 2012, smartphones, which by some estimations
consume 35 times more data than feature phones, were used by more than half of the
population in Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and the United States (ibid.).
Also, after the Apples release of its iPad in 2010, there has also been extraordinary growth
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Figure 2.9: OECD 30 calls + 100 MB mobile basket, August 2012, VAT included
Source: OECD, 2013.
in the usage of Wi-Fi, 3G and now 4G-enabled tablets. The OECD (2013) points out
that along with traditional manufacturers, such as LG, Samsung and Sony, convergence
has occurred among large firms such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft, now marketing
tablets under their own brands. As a result of this trend, the average subscription rate of
mobile Internet access in the OECD area rose to 56.6 per cent in June 2012, up from just
30.7 per cent in 2009 (ibid.).
According to Gartner (2014), in 2013 worldwide sales of smartphones to end users
totaled 968 million units, an increase of 42.3 percent from 2012. Sales of smartphones
accounted for 53.6 per cent (55 per cent according to Vision Mobile (2014b)) of overall
mobile phone sales in 2013, exceeding annual sales of feature phones for the first time
(see Figure 2.10). Gartner (2014) stresses that the increasing contribution of smartphones
was led by growth in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, Asia/Pacific and Eastern
Europe. For example, in China smartphone sales grew 86.3 percent in 2013. Moreover,
as stated by Vision Mobile (2014b), in developing countries all over the world, USD
50 Android handsets are replacing feature phones and opening up new opportunities for
innovation in business, commerce and education. On the other hand, according to Gartner
(2014), ”mature markets face limited growth potential as the markets are saturated with
smartphone sales, leaving little room for growth with declining feature phone market and
a longer replacement cycle”. Due to ”lack of compelling hardware innovation” in 2013,
consumers in high-income countries do not find enough reasons to upgrade.
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Figure 2.10: Global sales: smartphones vs. non-smartphones, 2009-2013
Source: VisionMobile, February 2014.
As Figure 2.11 shows, Samsung was the leading smartphone producer in 2013, fol-
lowed by Apple. Gartner (2014) suggests that it is important for Samsung to continue
to build on its technology leadership at the high end, while at the same time building a
clearer value proposition around its midrange smartphones. As regards Apple’s market
position, it enjoyed strong sales of the iPhone 5s and continued strong demand for the 4s
in emerging markets.
Figure 2.11: Worldwide smartphone sales to end users by vendor in 2013, %
Source: Gartner, February 2014.
In 2013, worldwide mobile phone sales to end users totaled 1.8 billion units, an in-
crease of 3.5 per cent from 2012 (Gartner, 2014), with Samsung as a leader, followed
by Nokia (see Figure 2.12). However, Gartner (2014) stresses that the collective mar-
ket share of the three leading mobile phone manufacturers fell in 2013 as Chinese and
regional brands continue to raise their share.
In 2014, Gartner (2014) expects smartphones to continue to drive overall sales. How-
ever, it predicts that an increasing number of manufacturers will realign their portfolios
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to focus on the low-cost smartphone segment, because of decreasing sales of high-end
smartphones in high-income countries and increasing sales of low- and mid-price smart-
phones in high-growth emerging markets.
Figure 2.12: Worldwide mobile phone sales to end users by vendor in 2013, %
Source: Gartner, February 2014.
2.4 Software and Mobile Digital Services
2.4.1 Platform Competition
According to Gartner (2014), in the smartphone OS market, Android (originally launched
by Google) remained the leader as its share grew 12 percentage points to reach 78.4 per
cent in 2013 (see Figure 2.13). In 2014, Gartner (2014) expects the sales of Android
phones to approach the billion mark.
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Figure 2.13: Worldwide smartphone sales to end users by operating system in 2013, %
Source: Gartner, February 2014.
Vision Mobile (2014b) states that in 2013, the Android/iOS duopoly on the mobile
OS market did not leave any doubt. As Figure 2.14 shows, Android continues to dom-
inate Developer Mindshare with 71 per cent of developers that target mobile platforms,
developing for Android. For digital (but not only) businesses targeting mass markets,
having a presence on Android platform is becoming a must. Even if the financial rewards
from direct downloads are still lagging behind iOS, Android’s massive user base is a good
enough reason to justify the investment in the platform (ibid.).
Figure 2.14: Mobile developer mindshare, Q1 2014, percentage of developers using each
mobile platform
Source: VisionMobile, February 2014.
As depicted in Figure 2.15, Android and iOS dominate every single country, but
while iOS leads in North America and Western Europe, Android wins in every other
(less wealthy) region. The difference is most pronounced in Asia where 46 per cent of
mobile developers prioritise Android against 28 per cent for iOS.
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Figure 2.15: Priority platform by country
Source: VisionMobile, February 2014.
Figure 2.16 shows that in 2012, in most OECD and selected countries, operating sys-
tems were led by Apple (iOS) and Google (Android). In some countries, a third operating
system held a significant market share. Symbian (Nokia) had a share of 43 per cent in
Finland, 32 per cent in China, 25 per cent in Italy and 21 per cent in Spain. Meanwhile,
Blackberry (RIM), had 25 per cent market share in Mexico and 23 per cent market share
in Canada and the United Kingdom.
Figure 2.16: Smartphone and operating systems penetration in selected countries, Q1
2012
Source: OECD, 2013.
2.4.2 Mobile Digital Services and Apps
Development of new mobile services is driven by different factors. For example, as net-
work operators are undertaking initiatives to meet the rapidly increasing demand for mo-
bile data. One approach is to offload traffic from wireless networks onto fixed networks
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by using Wi-Fi access points, femtocells, picocells and other microcells (OECD, 2013).
The selection of appropriate ”small cells” in each particular case depends on availability,
reliability and costs of the different technologies. The most commonly used technique
to offload mobile traffic onto fixed networks is Wi-Fi and most major mobile network
operators across OECD countries have strategies in place to expand their use of Wi-Fi
(ibid.). For instance, in France, at the beginning of 2012, Iliad launched ”Free Mobile” as
a new market entrant with a reported 5 million Wi-Fi hotspots across the country (some
25 per cent market share). The operator’s fixed network subscribers share their bandwidth
via Wi-Fi-enabled routers connected to DSL or fibre loops (i.e. the so-called Freebox),
thus creating the hotspots. Free’s Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for GSM
Subscriber Identity Module (EAP-SIM) enables their mobile customers to use those five
million hotspots without individually authenticating access as they enter the area served
by Wi-Fi. From the customer’s perspective this is seamless. Data uploaded and down-
loaded does not count towards fair use caps and, depending on mobile network conditions,
may provide better quality of service than mobile network, therefore providing incentives
to seek out hotspots. As a result, Free can offer its customers better service as well as
increased flexibility in pricing.
Mobile communications market continues to impress us with its innovativeness and
novel digital services. For example, in 2012, in Japan, NTT DoCoMo became the first
mobile company in the world to offer real-time telephony translation (OECD, 2013). The
mobile provider’s customer can make a call in Japanese and be heard in English, Man-
darin or Korean. The recipient can speak in any of these languages and have their words
translated back to the caller in Japanese. This innovative service operates by accessing
the cloud and would have obvious advantages for international roaming if it is competitive
with local substitutes (ibid.).
Another interesting development is the popularity of over-the-top (OTT) applications
(i.e. applications and services providing a product over the Internet and bypassing tradi-
tional distribution) like Skype or WhatsApp (which offers substitutes for voice and text).
These services were initially resisted and even banned by some mobile providers but sur-
vived due to high market demand. The OECD (2013) underlines that these developments
were the outcome of a competitive market rather than the implementation of functional or
structural separation.
Smartphone Usage
In Europe, mobile devices are increasingly used to access the Internet - more than one
third of individuals in seven countries did this in 2011, with greatest use found in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see Figure 2.17).
20 Olga Syraya
2.4. SOFTWARE AND MOBILE DIGITAL SERVICES
Figure 2.17: Individuals using their mobile phone (or smartphone) to access the Internet
(away from home or work) in selected OECD countries, 2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
As depicted in Figure 2.18, primary use of smartphones in all analysed countries, with
the possible exception of the Netherlands, was found to be browsing the Web (Google,
2012), possibly because users can download alternative Web browsers as apps. Not all
smartphone users use applications equally intensively - while the use of applications is
widespread for around three quarters of all smartphone users in Denmark, Sweden and
Switzerland, apps are used only by half of users in Finland, Italy, Mexico or Spain. In
selected countries, smartphones contained an average of 25 apps of which 9 were used
during the last 30 days and 10 were purchased in apps stores (Google, 2012).
Figure 2.18: Internet browsing, apps and m-commerce with smartphones, Q1 2012
Source: OECD, 2013.
Especially m-commerce is an area where smartphones are expected to have increasing
utility, as a variety of applications allow users to compare prices or complete purchases.
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In confirmation, eBay’s m-commerce revenue went from USD 2 billion in 2010 to USD
5 billion in 2011. In 2011, m-commerce accounted for 7 per cent of eBay’s total revenue
for that year. Google (2012) has found that smartphone usage for m-commerce is already
significantly high in China and to a lesser extent in Australia, the United States and in
some European countries (Denmark, Ireland and Norway) (see Figure 2.18).
The comparison by the OECD (2013) shows that in France, Japan and the United
States usage of smartphones and feature phones differs, especially for Internet-related
activities, such as Internet access, web browsing, reading/sending email, downloading
apps, using social media or viewing online videos (see Figures 2.19, 2.20, 2.21). The fact
that in these three countries smartphones are preferred to classic mobile phones must be
due to the better user experience they offer (such as bigger touch-screens). Notably, even
for established activities pioneered on feature phones, such as SMS or taking photographs,
smartphones are associated with greater use. In Japan, tablets are more widely used that
smartphones for most activities.
Figure 2.19: Differences between mobile phone and smartphone activities in France, 2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
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Figure 2.20: Differences between mobile phone and smartphone activities in the U.S.,
2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
Figure 2.21: Differences between PC, mobile phone, smartphone and tablet activities in
Japan, 2011
Source: OECD, 2013.
The App Economy
It is obvious that mobile apps revolutionised the way we use mobile phones and mobile
Internet. Nielsen (2014) analysed the American consumers’ behaviour and found out that
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smartphone users use mobile apps 89 per cent of their time spent on smartphones (see
Figure 2.22).
Figure 2.22: Monthly usage of app and mobile web, Q4 2013 and Q4 2012
Source: Nielsen, March 2014.
The analysis by comScore (2014) shows that Facebook ranked as the top smartphone
app among U.S. users in January 2014, reaching 77.6 per cent of the app audience, fol-
lowed by Google Play (52.4 per cent), YouTube (49.7 per cent) and Google Search (48.9
per cent) (see Figure 2.23).
Figure 2.23: Top 15 smartphone apps, January 2014, total U.S. smartphone mobile media
users, age 18+ (iOS and Android platforms)
Source: comScore, March 2014.
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Connected Cars
A recent trend are also connected cars and the development of car app market. Especially
the introduction of 4G brings about a new generation of automobiles that are constantly
connected to mobile Internet at high speed. These cars are able to provide video in the
back seat, stream audio in front, and up-to-the-second information on surrounding traffic
conditions for the driver.
As smartphone growth rates slow down, the world’s biggest technology companies are
turning their design efforts to connected cars. The market for technology that links cars
and smartphones was worth 18 USD billion in 2012 and will increase more than threefold
in 2018, according to GSMA. For example, Bloomberg (2014) says that BlackBerry’s
QNX operating system, used to power its BlackBerry 10 phones, has become the technol-
ogy of choice for mapping, communication and entertainment systems in cars from Ford
Motor Co. to luxury German brands Porsche and BMW. In March 2014, Apple introduced
the CarPlay platform at a car show in Geneva, where Fiat SpA’s Ferrari unit, Daimler AG’s
Mercedes-Benz and Volvo Car Group showcased technology enabling hands-free use of
an iPhone (ibid.). Interestingly, inside the car, Apple and BlackBerry are collaborators
rather than rivals, as QNX software allows CarPlay to recreate the iPhone experience on
the console’s screen, with icons familiar to iPhone users.
Apps for cars are developed in four different ways (see Figure 2.24): they are devel-
oped either on the head unit or via a smartphone link, and the user can access vehicle data
and interact with the car via a remote API or using a Bluetooth OBD-II dongle.
Figure 2.24: Four ways to develop apps for cars
Source: Vision Mobile, March 2014.
First, as regards apps on the head unit, the market leader in IVI (In-Vehicle Infotain-
ment) platforms is BlackBerry’s QNX CAR1 platform with 53 per cent market share,
followed by Microsoft’s Windows Embedded Automotive with 27 per cent market share
(Vision Mobile, 2014a).
As a second approach, much of the connected car activity shifted to integrating cars
with smartphones in recent years. The goal of this approach is also to provide safe, valu-
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able and up-to-date infotainment in the car. However, apps run primarily on the smart-
phone instead of in the car’s IVI system. Here, smartphone apps interact with the car
through a strictly defined API (application programming interface). As a result, the car
becomes a smartphone accessory in a similar way as a Smart Watch would be (Vision
Mobile, 2014a). The integration between the car and the smartphone might take several
forms:
1. The steering wheel controls and built-in voice recognition can be used to control
smartphone apps.
2. Smartphone voice recognition (e.g. Apple’s Siri or Google Now) can be used to
control IVI apps.
3. The built-in infotainment system becomes a second display for smartphone apps,
using APIs, or by mirroring the smartphone app on the in-car display.
The innovator in this approach among car manufacturers is Ford, who recently open-
sourced its AppLink system as SmartDeviceLink. It competes with Mirrorlink (roots
in Nokia), a standard driven by the Car Connectivity Consortium (CCC). Recently, two
main smartphone platforms have joined: Apple with CarPlay and Google with the Open
Automotive Alliance (OAA).
Third, as regards the option of remote access to the vehicle through an API, modern
examples of services include (see Vision Mobile (2014a)):
• Remotely lock your car by smartphone app.
• Locate your car in a parking lot by horning or flashing the lights.
• Automatically adjust your car setting (e.g. seat positions) based on driver profiles
stored on a smartphone.
• Pre-heat or pre-cool the car (depending on where you live) before you leave.
• Integrations with home automation or other Internet of Things systems.
Vision Mobile (2014a) suggests that in the near future, vehicle APIs can be used to
actively control the car remotely enabling a new range of use cases. Notably, vehicle
remote control enables car sharing services. This might lead to an entirely new way to
approach car usage and ownership, leading to a fundamental change in industry structure.
And in the fourth approach, the application typically does not run ”in the car” at all,
but on a smartphone, in the cloud, on a computer, or on another device entirely. On-
Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) ports generally do not provide a possibility to control the
car, limiting the capabilities of over-the-top systems relative to OEM-driven ones.
2.4.3 Conclusions
The data show that mobile communications is a very dynamic and innovative market, and
the popularity of mobile Internet services is constantly increasing, also due to the intro-
duction of smartphones and tablets, a well as apps. These have revolutionised the user
experience, and introduced mobile communications into even more areas of our lives, for
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example through connected cars. Wireless Internet has already overtaken fixed broad-
band in terms of subscriptions in OECD countries and its role will become even more
important as more users benefit from high 4G (LTE) speeds. Intelligent mobile tariffs
(such as pricing by mobile Internet speeds rather than data volume), when adopted by a
wider number of mobile operators in more countries, should render high-speed mobile
Internet even more attractive for mobile users and contribute to the development of the
truly ubiquitous Internet.
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Chapter 3
Innovation Theory: Traditional
Approaches and New Developments
3.1 The Nature of Innovation and Innovative Process
Before starting a detailed discussion of national and international innovation policy issues
in the mobile communications market, it is crucial to understand what lies behind the
term of innovation, to analyse its properties as well as to outline briefly main stages of the
innovation process.
3.1.1 Typology of Innovation
Edquist and Hommen (2008, p. 8), based on Schumpeter (1911), define innovations as
”new creations of economic significance, primarily carried out by firms (but not in iso-
lation)”. They exist as product or process innovations. Product innovations are new or
improved material goods as well as new intangible services - in this case what is produced
is important (Edquist and Hommen, 2008). Process innovations are defined by Edquist
and Hommen (2008) as new ways (technological or organisational) of producing goods
and services - it is a matter of how things are produced.
Three types of innovation can be distinguished based on the degree of novelty of the
product: incremental, standard and radical innovation (Grupp and Maital, 2001). This
approach focuses on product features, i.e. that a product, service or process is defined as
a finite collection of characteristics or attributes, all of the measurable in either physical
or ordinal units. In this case any product X can be represented simply as a vector of
attributes:
X = [x1, x2, ..., xn]. (3.1)
In an incremental innovation a new version of an existing product has some or all of
its existing attributes improved. Then the product vector would look as follows:
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X∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n], all x
∗
i = ci · xi, some ci 6= 1, (3.2)
where x∗i is the new value of attribute i and ci is a vector of scalars, showing the
proportion of change in each product feature. An example of this type of innovation can
be a mobile phone for seniors with bigger keys and display signs.
A standard innovation differs from an incremental innovation in a way that one ad-
ditional attribute that did not previously exist is added to the product, while existing at-
tributes my or may not be improved. Thus, it has the following vector of attributes:
X ′ = [x′1, x
′
2, ..., x
′
n, x
′
n+1], x
′
i = ci · xi, (3.3)
where xn+1 represents a new product attribute that did not exist before. A standard
innovation would be for instance the addition of a photo camera to a mobile phone.
In a radical innovation k significant new attributes which did not exist are added (k ≥
2), therefore creating a completely new product:
Xo = [xo1, x
o
2, ..., x
o
n, x
o
n+1, x
o
n+2, x
o
n+3, ..., x
o
n+k], x
o
i = ci · xi. (3.4)
An example for this kind of innovation would be the launch of iPhone featuring
the unique design, multi-touch screen and a previously unknown system of applications.
These attributes were not comparable to the existing attributes of ordinary mobile phones.
R&D programmes aiming to produce a radical innovation are usually much more
costly and risky than the incremental-innovation R&D because they often require in-
troduction of new technologies while at the same time the reaction of the market to a
completely new product is hardly predictable. This reasoning will play an important role
later on when we will be developing suitable innovation policy options for the mobile
communications market.
Also, often a distinction is made between ”creation” and ”diffusion” of innovations,
based on a distinction between innovations that are ”new to the market” (globally new)
and innovations that are ”new to the firm” (being diffused to additional firms, countries or
regions)(Edquist and Hommen, 2008, p. 8). According to Edquist and Hommen (2008,
p. 8), these ”new-to-the-firm” innovations are used as a measure of innovation diffusion,
which for many small countries is more important than the creation of completely new
innovations.
3.1.2 Innovative Process
For a deeper understanding of the innovation it is also essential to consider it as a process
involving many actors and interdependences between them. This complex construction
can be best represented by the ”stages” model of the innovation process of Grupp and
Maital (2001, p. 171), in which, first, economic inputs (e.g. R&D spending) generate
science and technology outputs (such as publications, citations, and patents), and second,
these science and technology outputs in turn serve as inputs generating knowledge-based
exports (see Figure 3.1). This model further defines six different phases or functions of
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the product development: theory and model development, technical realisation, industrial
development, innovation and imitation, diffusion and finally utilisation. Each stage of
the model is characterised by inputs and outputs. It is important to stress that the model
is highly recursive because the outputs of one stage become the inputs of the following
stages. Moreover, this model suggests indicators to measure the success of each stage of
the process.
Figure 3.1: Stages of research, development and innovation, and corresponding science
and technology indicators
Source: Grupp, 1997, p. 145; Grupp and Maital, 2001, p. 171.
The initial stage of the innovative process, theory and model development uses R&D
spending as its input. This stage, which also belongs to the fundamental and partially to
applied research, generates scientific outputs in the form of publications and citations of
publications. The next two stages, involving the development of a technical and a product
design, build on scientific expertise, as expressed in scientific publications and citations,
to generate patent applications. Both publications and patent applications are widely used
as R&D results indicators and data are available for different fields of science and different
groups of products. As argued by Grupp and Schmoch (1999), patent data can provide a
researcher with extremely useful information, for instance if a product is intended for a
domestic or international market. However, the data should always be treated carefully
and the aim of the analysis must be taken in to the consideration.
At the innovation and imitation stages, technology (as expressed in patents) is used to
generate products, processes and services. The quality of these results can be measured
by the ”technometric” approach (Grupp, 1997). Finally, at the diffusion and exploitation
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stage, the product and process quality is transformed into the indicators of export sales and
global market share. Detailed data on exports are also usually available allowing assess-
ment and comparison of the innovation performance of countries in different economic
sectors. Grupp and Maital (2001) emphasise that this model is not necessary linear nor
rigidly sequential, which means that some stages may be skipped for some products and
processes while for others the sequence may differ from the one described (e.g. patents
may precede publications and citations).
3.1.3 Properties of Innovation
Nowadays, the interest towards innovation and its role in the economic development is
tremendous. Although we have already given several definitions of innovation, one should
not forget that its properties and characteristics change over time reflecting the current
knowledge base as well as the technological change in the society. Therefore, the in-
novation in the time of Leonardo da Vinci was in some aspects very different from the
innovation at our age of information economy. Dosi (1988) defines five major properties
of contemporary innovation. First, innovation always involves a fundamental element of
”uncertainty” meaning that innovative activities must involve certain unexploited techni-
cal and economic opportunities. Of course, these opportunities can under circumstances
turn into threats because when an innovation is introduced to the market it is impossible
to precisely trace all consequences, positive as well as negative.
Second, modern innovation increasingly relies on advances in scientific knowledge.
Indeed, 20th century technological innovation has been increasingly profiting from the ad-
vances in basic research. For example, the development of quantum physics has brought
about computers, optic cables, lasers and the Internet. Moreover, scientists are now work-
ing on a quantum computer that in the case of success would mean a whole new era of
data processing at currently unimaginable speeds. Third, the nature of research activities
themselves has changed over the 20th century: research and innovative activities have
become more complex and therefore require formal organisations, such as firms’ R&D
laboratories, government laboratories and universities, instead of individual innovators.
The forth major feature of innovative activities is the fact that today a significant
amount of innovations originates through ”learning-by-doing” and ”learning-by-using”
(Rosenberg, 1976, 1982). It means that people and firms now tend to learn how to use, im-
prove or produce things through ”informal” activities rather than through formal search
activities in R&D laboratories (OECD, 1999a). However, the ratio between formal R&D
and ”learning-by-doing” can vary from sector to sector.
Last but not least, Dosi (1988, p. 223) argues that technical change cannot be de-
scribed as simple reactions to changes in market conditions, because the directions of
technical change often seem to be defined by the level of technologies already in use.
Besides, quite often it is the nature of technologies that defines ”the range within which
products and processes can adjust to changing economic conditions” and the probabil-
ity of making technological advances in firms, organisations or countries is among other
things ”a function of the technological levels already achieved by them”. All this leads to
a conclusion that technical change is a ”cumulative activity”.
In addition to these five features of innovation we can define several more. The first
aspect is that, as stressed by OECD (2005), innovation should not be regarded as a purely
technological phenomenon because it involves both technological and non-technological
changes influencing economic and social development. It is especially true if one takes
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into consideration the phenomenon of ”tertiarisation” (i.e. the increasing role of the ser-
vice sector of economy) that enhances the role of non-technological innovation (Klodt
et al., 1997). In the new conditions knowledge is regarded as a central resource. This
approach changes the innovation process it becomes a process of knowledge acquisition
allowing its economic utilisation (Hipp and Grupp, 2005). Typical feature of service in-
novations is for example the fact that the innovation process is very rapid. At the same
time service innovations are more easily copied, which requires a continuous innovation
process. This trend affects mobile communications in two ways: on the one hand the
specifics of service innovations apply also to mobile digital services and should be taken
into consideration when developing innovation policy options in this sector; on the other
hand, mobile communications technologies themselves play an important role in the in-
novation process of service companies.
We can also add briefly - it will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters - that
innovation is an interactive process involving both market (e.g. firms) and non-market
(such as education establishments and state regulatory agencies) institutions (OECD,
2005). Even more crucial is an observation that purely market mechanisms often do not
suffice for efficient innovative process because, as it was mentioned before, innovation
involves an element of ”uncertainty” and private companies might in some cases prefer
not to invest in innovation if it seems too risky. In such cases incentives created in the
context of the state innovation policy are especially important in promoting innovation
activities.
3.2 The Role of Innovation System in the Knowledge Econ-
omy
The term ”knowledge economy” Klodt (2003, p. 10) also refers to it as the ”new econ-
omy”) is used to describe the new economic environment in which knowledge and inno-
vation replace capital as the primary factor of production. This leads to the increasing
role of information generation, processing and distribution, and hence, augments the sig-
nificance of information and communication technologies. In fact, the creation and use of
knowledge is not only focused on high-technology sectors (e.g. electronics or pharmaceu-
tics), but also is getting increasingly important in traditional sectors such as agriculture
(Goel et al., 2004). In order to stay competitive on the international level, each coun-
try should manage this transition towards the knowledge-based economy. According to
Goel et al. (2004), here is where the national innovation system comes into play because
knowledge is transformed into goods and services through the innovation system. There-
fore, national innovation system can be regarded as an important criterion when it comes
to the comparison of countries’ innovative performance, and as the first policy target if
the innovative performance needs to be improved. Further we will explain the concept of
innovation system in more detail.
The conception of innovation system (IS) emerged in the late 1980s and started to
diffuse more rapidly in the early 1990s. Its development has largely been the work of
economists who adhere to an evolutionary theory of economic growth (Freeman and
Perez, 1988; Lundvall, 1988, 1992; Nelson, 1988, 1993; Carlsson, 1995; Edquist, 1997b;
Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Nelson and Nelson, 2002). Nelson and Nelson (2002, p. 265)
stress that the innovation system idea is an ”institutional conception”, in which insti-
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tutional structure plays an important role in supporting and shaping efforts to advance
technology. Moreover, Freeman and Perez (1988) and Freeman and Louca (2001) have
proposed that the key technologies of different eras require different sets of supporting
institutions. It suggests that the successful countries of each era either already have the
appropriate institutions in place when they are needed or manage to build the required
new institutions quickly and well (Nelson, 2008).
Edquist (1997a) and Edquist and Hommen (1999) point out nine characteristics of
innovation systems approaches:
1. Innovation and learning process are placed in the middle of focus. Here technolog-
ical innovation is regarded as a matter of producing new knowledge or combining
existing elements of knowledge in new ways.
2. These approaches adopt a holistic (i.e. encompassing a wide array of the deter-
minants of innovation) and interdisciplinary (i.e. besides economic, they include
organisational, political and social factors) perspective.
3. They employ historical perspectives because innovation processes develop over
time and include the influence of many factors and feedback processes.
4. The differences between national innovation systems rather then the optimality of
these systems is stressed. This means that these approaches do not try to develop
an ideal or optimal innovation system to compare the real systems with, but rather
directly compare existing innovation systems of different countries.
5. Interdependence and non-linearity are stressed. This is based on the opinion that
firms almost never innovate in isolation but rather interact with other organisations
in the context of established institutions such as laws, rules, regulations, norms, and
cultural habits (Edquist and Johnson, 1997).
6. They enclose product technologies and organisational innovations (i.e. the concept
of innovation is not restricted to the conventional focus on process innovations of a
technical nature).
7. The central role of institutions is emphasised.
8. These concepts are still rather diffuse and require clearer specification (Edquist,
2004).
9. They are ”conceptual framework” rather than ”formal theories”, which means that
at the current stage of development, the concepts of innovation systems are not yet
capable of formal theorising and thus the empirically based ”appreciative” theoris-
ing is accentuated (Edquist and Hommen, 1999, p. 66).
Since the concept of innovation system is quite young, there is still no one single
definition of the term ”innovation system” and different economists suggest different ap-
proaches. As discussed elsewhere (e.g. in Edquist, 1997b), the term ”national innovation
system” emerged first when it was first used in published form by Freeman (1987). Ac-
cording to his definition, national system of innovation is ”the network of institutions in
the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, and dif-
fuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1987, p. 1). Later, Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, p. 4)
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understand the concept of IS as ”a set of institutional actors that, together, plays the ma-
jor role in influencing innovative performance”, while Lundvall (1992, p. 10) argues that
”the structure of production” and ”the institutional set-up” are the two most important
dimensions that ”jointly define a system of innovation”. In this context certain authors
(e.g. Edquist and Hommen, 2008; Gu and Lundvall, 2006) distinguish between ”narrow”
and ”broad” IS approach - the ”narrow” perspective including only the actors taking
part in research and development and the ”broad” perspective considering all the com-
plex socio-economic system, such as infrastructure, international conditions and policy
that are not directly connected to R&D (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: A scheme of innovation systems: a broad and narrow perspective
Source: Adapted from OECD, 1999, p. 23; Gu and Lundvall, 2006, p. 294.
However, this division into ”narrow” and ”broad” approach seems quite artificial be-
cause although Edquist and Hommen (2008, p. 5) suggest that Nelson (1993) ”advanced
a more narrow approach, focusing on national R&D systems and organisations support-
ing R&D as the main source of innovation”, Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, p. 5) underline
that the ”broad concept of innovation” that they have adopted has forced them ”to con-
sider much more than simply the actors doing research and development”. Because it is
extremely important to consider all the possible actors influencing the innovation process,
I prefer the ”broad” concept suggested by Edquist and Johnson (1997, p. 14) where a
system of innovation includes ”all important economic, social, political, organisational,
institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and use of inno-
vations”. This view corresponds also to the ”broad” perspective depicted in Figure 3.2.
Initially, a national perspective dominated the systems of innovation approach (Lund-
vall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). However, already Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, p. 5) start to
reflect whether the concept of ”national” system is not too broad in the age of globalisa-
tion when a number of institutions are or act transnational (e.g. multinational companies,
EU regulations etc.). That is why regional and sectoral innovation systems have sub-
Olga Syraya 35
CHAPTER 3. INNOVATION THEORY: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES AND NEW
DEVELOPMENTS
sequently gained attention of researchers (e.g. Edquist, 2003). I adhere to the opinion
of Edquist (2003, p. 2) that ”national, regional and sectoral systems of innovation co-
exist and complement one another”. For future analysis it is important to understand
that innovation systems may be supranational, national or subnational (regional or lo-
cal), and simultaneously they may be sectoral within any of these geographical demarca-
tions (Edquist, 2003). Indeed, on the one hand, institutions supporting innovation in one
field, say in pharmaceutics, may very little overlap with those supporting innovation in
telecommunications here in certain cases a sectoral approach is required. On the other
hand, regardless of the increasing internationalisation, national governments still prefer
to keep control over certain domains and even if those fields are not directly connected
to innovation, they still may influence the innovation process (think about the ”broad” SI
perspective).
After giving definition of innovation system, we should have a closer look at its ele-
ments. Edquist (2003, p. 2) and Edquist and Hommen (2008, p. 7) see different organ-
isations and institutions as main ”components” or ”elements” of systems of innovation.
Organisations are defined as formal structures that are consciously created and have an
explicit purpose they are players or actors (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Edquist, 2003;
Edquist and Hommen, 2008). Organisations are for example companies, universities,
R&D institutes and public innovation policy agencies. Under institutions Edquist and
Johnson (1997) understand sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules
or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals, groups and organ-
isations. Examples of these ”rules of the game” are patent laws and rules influencing the
relations between universities and firms (Edquist, 2003, p. 2).
Organisation are strongly influenced and shaped by institutions they can be said to
be ”embedded” in an institutional environment consisting of norms, standards, etc. On
the other hand, since there are firm-specific practices (e.g. bookkeeping or management
structure), one can suggest that certain institutions also develop inside firms, meaning
that institutions may be in turn embedded inside organisations. This leads to very com-
plex relations between organisations and institutions that are often characterised by ”reci-
procity” (Edquist, 2003, p. 4).
Another important aspect is interactions between different organisations within the
innovation system because obviously firms do not innovate in isolation but rather interact
with other organisations (e.g. universities, R&D laboratories). These interactions are cru-
cial for the development of innovations because they enable knowledge and information
transfer from one actor to another. Edquist (2003) underlines that the relations between
organisations may be of a market and non-market kind, which means that purely mar-
kets mechanisms often do not suffice for establishing efficient knowledge transfer. This
implies the importance of stimulation of non-market collaboration as a part of national
innovation policy.
The most valuable feature of the systems of innovation approach is that it has direct
implications for the innovation policy on the national, sectoral or any other of the de-
scribed levels. Here is the list of its general policy implications as suggested by Edquist
(2001):
1. Organisational actors and/or institutional rules might need to be created, redesigned
or abolished.
2. Innovation policy should focus not only on the elements of the innovation system,
but also on the relations between them.
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3. Innovation policy should ensure that negative lock-in situations (i.e. when inno-
vation process of an organisation becomes dependant on one particular actor) are
avoided.
4. Changes in the production structure should be facilitated.
5. Innovation policy should support structural changes in the direction of production
sectors dominated by product innovations rather than process innovations.
6. Innovation policy should be proactive, supporting emergence of new product areas
and new sectoral systems of innovation.
7. Innovation policy should focus on the early stages in the development of product
innovations and new sectoral IS.
The main or ”overall” function of innovation system is to pursue innovation: to de-
velop, diffuse and use innovations (Edquist, 2003; Edquist and Hommen, 2008). For
further analysis and comparison of national innovation systems it makes sense to adapt
the ”activities-based” approach as discussed in Edquist (2004), Edquist and Chaminade
(2006) and Edquist and Hommen (2008, p. 7), where under ”activities” they understand
”factors that influence the development and diffusion of innovations”. This approach uses
more dynamic perspective because it focuses strongly on what happens in the system
rather than only on its constituents, and as we have already seen earlier the interactions
between organisations are very important for the innovation process. A hypothetical list
of ten activities is described in more detail in Edquist and Chaminade (2006):
I Provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process
1 Provision of R&D and, therefore, creation of new knowledge.
2 Competence building through educating and training the labour force for innova-
tion and R&D activities.
II Demand-side activities
3 Formation of new product markets.
4 Expressing quality requirements emanating from the demand side with regard to
new products.
III Provision of constituents of innovation system
5 Creating and changing organisations needed for development of new fields of in-
novation (e.g. enhancing entrepreneurship, creating new research organisations
and policy agencies etc.).
6 Networking through markets and other mechanisms, which implies integrating
new knowledge elements developed in different spheres of IS.
7 Creating and changing institutions (e.g. patent and tax laws, environment and
safety regulations, R&D investment routines
IV Support services for innovating firms
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8 Incubation activities such as providing access to facilities and administrative sup-
port for innovating efforts.
9 Financing of innovation processes and other activities facilitating commercialisa-
tion of knowledge and its adoption.
10 Provision of consultancy services relevant for innovation processes, for instance
technology transfer, commercial information and legal advice.
It should be mentioned that these activities are not ranked in the order of importance and
the list is structured in four thematic categories.
3.3 Sectoral System of Innovation for Mobile Communi-
cations
3.3.1 Definition and Framework
Sectoral innovation system (SIS) can be defined as a ”system (group) of firms active in
developing and making a sectors products and in generating and utilising a sectors tech-
nologies” (Breschi and Malerba, 1997, p. 131). According to a broader definition sug-
gested by Malerba (2002, p. 250), a sectoral system of innovation is ”a set of new and
established products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market and non-
market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products”. Edquist
(2003) suggests that the boundaries of every SIS are defined by specific technologies or
product areas.
According to Malerba (2002) the basic elements of a SIS are:
1. Products.
2. Agents: firms and non-firms organisations (e.g. universities, financial institutions,
central government, local authorities), individuals.
3. Knowledge and learning processes it is based on the understanding that the knowl-
edge base of innovative activities differs across sectors and greatly affects the inno-
vative activities.
4. Basic technologies, inputs, demand and the related links and complementarities.
5. Mechanisms of interactions both within firms and outside firms there are both
market and non-market interactions between actors.
6. Processes of competition and selection.
7. Institutions (i.e. standards, regulations, labour markets etc.).
In a sectoral system of innovation, the purpose of agents (organisations) is to perform
certain functions in order to ensure that all the system works smoothly and efficiently.
Edquist (2003b) specifies the following most important functions in the mobile commu-
nications sectoral system of innovation:
1. Developing equipment.
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2. Conducting R&D relevant for the further development of the SIS.
3. Providing relevant education and training.
4. Creating standards and other regulations that are important for the SIS.
5. Providing access (i.e. mobile telecommunications subscriptions).
6. Developing new services (e.g. mobile commerce, navigation services).
7. Providing consulting services.
As already mentioned above, these functions are carried out by organisations: certain
organisations can carry out several functions but also one and the same function can be
carried out by different organisations. The functions and corresponding organisations are
summarised in the list suggested by Edquist (2003):
1. The development of equipment (today it is increasingly of a software kind) is done
by telecommunications equipment producing firms, e.g. Motorola, Ericsson, HTC
and Samsung.
2. These companies also carry out a large part of the R&D. Some R&D is carried out
by universities and special research organisations.
3. Education is largely carried out by publicly controlled and funded organisations.
Besides, firms also sponsor education and provide training. Additionally, learning-
by-using and learning-by-doing are gaining importance.
4. There are organisations (mostly public) that create standards and regulations in or-
der to decrease the degree of uncertainty for equipment producers and to coordinate
their relations with other actors in the mobile communications SIS.
5. Access is provided by mobile system operators including incumbent mobile telecom-
munications operators (e.g. Telekom and Vodafone in Germany and NTT DoCoMo
in Japan) and new entrant telecommunications operators (such as 1&1 or Congstar
in the German market).
6. Access providers may also provide content to be transported by the systems, but
there are also specialised content providers that own content but do not provide
mobile Internet access (such as online magazines and newspapers, mobile games,
music and video download, online shops etc.).
7. Finally, there are consultancy firms that offer various services related to the mo-
bile telecommunications, for instance web design, development of platforms for
electronic and mobile commerce etc.
Edquist (2003) stresses that that last twenty years have been characterised by increas-
ing functional differentiation and organisational diversity in the mobile communications
SIS, for example, monopolistic access providers no longer perform regulatory functions
and new regulatory agencies were created. In addition, digitalisation has provided tech-
nological basis for separation between infrastructure, access and content services.
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3.3.2 From NMT to LTE: The Way to Worldwide Success
NMT - Nordic Mobile Telephony Standard
The modern cellular telecommunications were born with the introduction of NMT 450,
i.e. the Nordic mobile telephony standard based on the 450 MHz bandwidth (Edquist,
2003). This first generation standard began to be specified in January 1970 by the NMT
group, in which the Nordic public telephone operators (PTOs), and particularly the Swedish
PTO, played the leading role. NMT 450 was a fully automatic analogue standard with a
roaming function within the Nordic countries.
The technical specifications were finalised between 1975 and 1978 and the implemen-
tation phase of the project began in 1977-1978 (McKelvey et al., 1998). As an instrument
to initiate the development of equipment the mechanism of public technology procure-
ment was used. It was Sweden’s Ericsson who won the order to deliver switches to Swe-
den, Norway, Denmark and Finland. Due to the fact that NMT 450 was very specific, a
network operator could buy components from different producers and put them together
(Edquist, 2003). As mentioned by Edquist (2003), all in all it took ten years to specify
this first mobile communications standard and get it functioning: NMT 450 was imple-
mented in Sweden in October 1980 and in Denmark, Finland and Norway in early 1981.
It is interesting to note that the very first country to implement this standard was actually
Saudi Arabia in August 1980 (McKelvey et al., 1998).
Since the NMT 450 became much more successful than expected with more sub-
scribers joining than the standard could technically handle, the Nordic PTOs developed
and added the NMT 900 (900 MHz) standard in 1986 (Edquist, 2003). This system was
developed as an intermediary system between the NMT 450 and the GSM (originally
from Groupe Spe´cial Mobile, now Global System for Mobile Communications) (McK-
elvey et al., 1998). The success of NMT 900 in Sweden was even bigger (see Figure 3.3)
and already during the NMT era the Nordic countries had the highest mobile penetration
rates 7 per cent in Sweden in 1992 against 2 per cent in the UK in 1990 despite its more
extensive market liberalisation (Edquist, 2003). Edquist (2003, p. 22) suggests that the
rapid penetration in Sweden was ”largely due to the consolidation of a strong market for
mobile telecommunications via concerted action by the Nordic public telephone compa-
nies in defining the first-generation NMT standard and through low prices”. For instance,
the fixed subscription rates in Sweden were much lower than in the UK and Sweden’s call
charges were half of the call charges in the UK.
In the context of the sectoral systems of innovation approach, NMT 450 can be con-
sidered as an institution, i.e. it is a set of rules that decreased the uncertainty and risk for
equipment suppliers and provided a cradle for the future development of pan-European
mobile communications. Edquist (2003) underlines that when this institution was cre-
ated it ”pulled” the whole development of the new mobile communications technologies.
Moreover, the development and implementation of NMT shows the importance of user-
producer relation in innovation processes. According to Edquist (2003), the fact that
the Nordic equipment producers Ericsson and Nokia were involved into the innovation
process from the very beginning contributed greatly to their leading role in mobile com-
munications equipment production nowadays.
It should also be mentioned that NMT was not the only mobile communications tech-
nology in 1983 the advanced mobile phone system (AMPS) developed by Illinois Bell
Telephone, Bell Labs and Motorola was launched in the Americas. This standard was
quite successful: it was diffused to a larger number of countries and had a larger number
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Figure 3.3: Number of terminals sold in Sweden, 1982-1999
Source: MobilTeleBranschen 1999 and 2001 (as cited in Hommen and Manninen, 2003, p 114).
of subscribers worldwide (Funk, 2002). Nevertheless, NMT in Nordic countries had the
highest penetration rates in the world and was the basis for the GSM development, which
became globally dominant in second-generation mobile communications (Lindmark and
Granstrand, 1995; Edquist, 2003).
GSM - Global System for Mobile Communications
The GSM standard, operating in the 900 and 1800 MHz bands, was introduced in Europe
in 1991 and soon became very popular all around the world. From the very beginning it
was conceived as a ”pan-European standard intended to cover many countries” (Edquist,
2003, p. 23). And the statistics of America’s Network (1996) show that it really became
a big success: first launched in 15 European countries, by 1996 GSM had over 21 million
subscribers in 133 networks operating in over 105 countries in Europe, Africa, Australasia
and the Middle East (as citet in Hommen and Manninen, 2003).
In the context of the sectoral system of innovation approach, the GSM standard is also
an institution (Edquist, 2003). Its development occurred within the formal organisational
framework provided by two European standards development organisations: CEPT (Con-
ference on European Post and Telecommunications) and ETSI (the European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute). Since roaming that allows calls between the countries
was one of the principal characteristics of GSM, its development required the involve-
ment of greater number of national organisations than the NMT standard and a greater
complexity in the relations among them.
Although monopolistic national PTOs had been dominant actors in the GSM devel-
opment process the 1980s, by 1990s it became obvious that in order to achieve success
in this complex project the cooperation of manufacturers was also of great importance
(Hommen and Manninen, 2003). Hommen and Manninen (2003) suggests that this in
turn leads to another important feature of the GSM standard: due to the fact that it was an
”open” standard allowing producers to configure communications between the system’s
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components in different ways, the responsibility for system configuration shifted from
network operators to equipment producers. In this development process Nordic equip-
ment producers Ericsson (developed and tested the first prototype of a GSM system) and
Nokia (produced the standards´ base stations and switches) together with the Swedish
PTO Televerket/Telia were very active, forming a ”Nordic coalition”. Edquist (2003, p.
25) states that this ”contributed significantly to increasing impressive advantages already
enjoyed by Ericsson, Nokia and other Nordic firms” in comparison to other equipment
manufacturers.
It is interesting to note that the GSM system was actually based on technologies of
non-Nordic origin - at least 82 per cent of the patents for the GSM standard belonged to
non-Swedish firms (Motorola held 50 per cent, AT&T 16 per cent and Bull and Philips
claimed 8 per cent each). A question arises why Motorola did not push its technology
in the US. Hommen (2002) and Hommen and Manninen (2003) suggest that Motorola,
first, felt unable to compete with European equipment producers in Europe and, second,
perceived GSM as a European standard that would not necessarily develop into a world
standard. By conditioning exclusive cross-licensing agreements with European equip-
ment manufacturers Motorola gained significant revenue from the growth of GSM market
(Bekkers et al., 2000; Hommen and Manninen, 2003). At the same time, the European
cross-licensees benefited from this arrangement by becoming major suppliers for GSM
(see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Estimated suppliers’ market share of the 33 largest GSM networks in Europe
(December 1996) and worldwide market share of GSM terminals in 1996
Supplier Score
switching
Market
share
switching
Score base
stations
Market
share base
stations
Market
share
mobile
terminals
(worldwide)
Ericsson 10 297 48% 7 978 37% 25%
Siemens 4 426 21% 325 2% 9%
Nokia 3 086 14% 4 617 22% 24%
Alcatel 2 228 10% 2 084 10% 6%
Source: Bekkers and Liotard, 1999, Table 3 (as citet in Hommen and Manninen, 2003, p. 101).
The most important technical difference between the first and the second generation
of mobile communications is that within the GSM standard digital technology was fully
implemented, which created possibilities not only for voice but also for data transmission.
The original data transmission rate was 9.6 Kbps but the introduction of GPRS (General
Packet Radio Service) in the year 2000/2001 made possible data transmission at rates up
to 115 Kbps. Data transmission within GSM was first introduced through SMS (Short
Messaging Service) that became unexpectedly popular. Moreover, Internet access was
also possible due to the development of WAP (Wireless Internet Protocol). The digital-
isation of the second generation mobile communications also had significant impact on
the development of new mobile services because it created a possibility of ”decoupling
services provision from transmission” (Pisjak, 1994, p. 292).
GSM had three main rival standards that have different technical specifications but
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similar functions: the US-based D-AMPS (Digital Advanced Mobile Phone System) and
CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) and the Japanese PDC (Pacific Digital Cellular)
standard. D-AMPS was introduced by the US Cellular Telephone Industry Association
(CTIA) , which represented manufacturers of mobile telecommunications equipment, net-
work operators and other users. Its compatibility with the first-generation analogue stan-
dard was supposed to facilitate the gradual shift from first- to second-generation technolo-
gies (Hommen and Manninen, 2003).
In contrast to the European telecommunications organisations, another relevant US
regulatory agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) , decided there would
be no national digital standard for the US as a whole and the operators were free to adopt
any standard (Edquist, 2003). As a result, another digital standard CDMA emerged sev-
eral years later attracting more operators. These two standards were not directly compat-
ible with each other and both diffused relatively slowly in the US according to Edquist
(2003), in 1997 the US mobile penetration rate was 20 per cent as opposed to 40-50 per
cent in the Nordic countries. Edquist (2003, p. 26) argues that ”the slower diffusion
of digital systems in the US was due to the presence of several standards and a weaker
migration from the first generation to the second because of backwards compatibility”.
Additional factors slowing down the diffusion of the standards were roaming issues and
the receiver pays principle adopted in the US (Hommen, 2002). For instance, the fact
that the receiver has traditionally been charged in the US created an incentive for users
to switch off the handsets and a disincentive to give out mobile numbers (Edquist, 2003).
The diffusion of these two main US digital standards outside the country (in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia) was limited and they never became serious competitors to the European
GSM on the international level (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: International competition among major second generation and other mobile
communications standards: regions and market shares
Europe North
America
Latin
America
Asia Africa
GSM 89% 4% 1% 35% 88%
D-AMPS 27% 39% 3%
CDMA 9% 9% 14%
Analogue 11% 60% 51% 48% 1 12%
1 48% includes PDC and PHS Japanese digital cellular standards.
Source: ITU World Communications Database (as citet in Hommen and Manninen, 2003, p. 89).
The Japanese second generation digital standard PDC never diffused outside Japan
and was incompatible with other standards. The PDC system was first introduced in
Tokyo in 1993 by NTT DoCoMo. Due to the introduction of two further large digital
cellular networks and high market competition in Japan, the prices for the PDC terminals
and monthly call fees dropped considerably in 1995 (Hommen and Manninen, 2003). As
a result, ”by the end of the year there were nearly nine million subscribers, with 60 per
cent of them connected to digital networks” (Garrard, 1998, p. 363).
As already mentioned before, the emergence of the GSM standard in Europe was
marked by a much greater number of public actors, in contrast to the development of rival
standards in the US and Japan. The biggest players were CEPT, which initiated the stan-
dard, and ETSI, which saw the standard through its completion (Hommen and Manninen,
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2003). Hommen and Manninen (2003, pp. 90-91) stress that the creation of ETSI in 1988
marked ”a decisive shift from a closed to an open approach to developing standards”.
This period was also the beginning of the telecom liberalisation in Europe the formerly
closed national markets were open to the international competition and the PTOs lost their
monopoly privileges. As a part of the reformation process, separate regulatory authorities
were created and new service providers emerged. Alliances between public- and private-
sector actors became prevalent. According to Hommen and Manninen (2003), one of
the important developments was the increasing role of public research organisation such
as universities and research institutes, i.e. telecommunications equipment manufacturers
began joint R&D with universities and research institutes rather than exclusively with
PTOs. NUTEK (1997) suggests that equipment manufacturers such as Ericsson benefited
from building up the competences of the universities because such cooperation allowed
the recruitment of engineers (as citet in Hommen and Manninen, 2003).
In conclusion, Europe can be considered as a ”clear leader” in the second-generation
mobile telephony due to ”its success in defining standards” (Hommen and Manninen,
2003, p. 123). However, despite the big success of the GSM standard there remained large
disparities in subscriber penetration rates throughout Europe (see Figure 3.4). While the
Nordic countries in 1997 attained remarkable penetration rates of 35.8 to 45.6 mobile sub-
scribers per 100 inhabitants, some of the largest European economies, such as Germany
and France, were well below the OECD average of 15.6 (OECD, 1999b). Hommen and
Manninen (2003, p. 113), suggest several factors contributing to the rapid market growth
in Sweden in comparison to other European countries. First, the initial penetration rate of
the first-generation mobile communications (NMT) was much higher in Sweden. Second,
the basic subscription rates in Sweden were much lower than in other European countries,
which helped ”expand the market quickly to a size where it could ”naturally” sustain
lower pricing”. And finally, the increased competition in the Swedish mobile commu-
nications market, instead of reducing already low subscription prices, helped ”reorient
strategies for marketing services towards consumers and non-business users”.
It can be stated that GSM was able to become a truly global mobile communications
standard due to the close initial cooperation among numerous European and international
actors. In contrast to the US with several competing technologies none of which could
match the huge subscriber base of GSM, GSM was developed as a pan-European standard
thereby securing a large initial market (Hommen and Manninen, 2003). In turn, the liber-
alisation of European telecommunications market and higher competition contributed to
closer cooperation among public and private actors and to internationalisation of R&D.
As suggested by Hommen and Manninen (2003), due to the complex technologies used in
GSM, firms such as Ericsson started to pose much greater demand on national education
systems for an adequate supply of skilled personnel. Because of their high involvement
in the GSM development (it began already in the NMT era), both Nordic telecommunica-
tions equipment manufacturers Ericsson and Nokia became leading equipment producers
for the GSM standard.
UMTS - Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
Although UMTS was first conceived in the late 1980s, Garrard (1998, p. 478) states that
during the early 1990s ”progress on UMTS continued slowly and somewhat theoretically
and was largely ignored by most of the cellular operators”, who were more interested in
growing their subscriber bases profitably within the 2G market (as citet in Hommen and
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Figure 3.4: Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 1997
Source: OECD, 1999b, p. 68.
Manninen, 2003). The UMTS standard was officially approved by ETSI in 1998 and as
its basis was taken the NTT DoCoMo’s (i.e. Japanese) W-CDMA (Wireless Code Di-
vision Multiple Access) technology. According to Funk (2002), W-CDMA was chosen
because the standard was believed to offer greater capabilities than an enhanced version
of GSM (as citet in Hommen and Manninen, 2003). Hommen and Manninen (2003, p.
130) suggests that in contrast to GSM, the development of UMTS ”was not driven pri-
marily by the need to accommodate unexpectedly rapid growth in the number of mobile
telephone subscriptions”, but rather by the convergence of information and communica-
tion technologies, which created opportunities for new applications (e.g. mobile Internet)
in mobile communications. Obviously, the adoption of W-CDMA as a UMTS basis was
a major victory for Japanese manufacturers and its two European supporters Ericsson and
Nokia. This and the official recognition by the ITU (International Telecommunications
Union) made UMTS a global standard.
In comparison with the second generation technology, UMTS combines several im-
portant technical advances. First, it uses broadband instead of narrowband radio fre-
quencies (in Europe mostly 2100 MHz); second, it fully integrates voice and data com-
munications; third, it fully integrates fixed and mobile networks; and finally, it provides
”seamless” global roaming (Hommen and Manninen, 2003; Edquist, 2003). UMTS peak
downlink data rates of 384 Kbps (with low mobility even up to 2 Mbps) allow much
faster data transfer in comparison to GSM and GPRS. As to the new handsets, accord-
ing to Samukic(1998), they were supposed to have dual-band capabilities, enabling them
to operate with both GSM and UMTS bandwidths (as citet in Hommen and Manninen,
2003). Another novelty was the evolution of SMS into MMS (Multimedia Messaging
Service) allowing transfer of photos, graphics, animations etc.
A UMTS network was first put into operation by NTT DoCoMo in Japan in October
2001. In Europe, auctions for UMTS licences were held in many countries in 2000, during
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Figure 3.5: Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 2007
Note: Portugal’s 2G data include both 2G and 3G subscriptions.
Source: OECD, 2009, p. 103.
which some operators agreed to pay enormous fees. Hommen and Manninen (2003) and
OECD (2007)suggest that this has created lack of capital financing to build-out networks
and was one of the obstacles to the diffusion of UMTS in Europe. The first European
commercial UMTS network was launched in Norway in December 2001. However, the
deployment of UMTS in Europe was not smooth compared to GSM and recent data from
the OECD (2009) on penetration rates show that in the third generation mobile communi-
cations Japan and Korea (with a rival technology CDMA2000) have taken over leadership
(see Figures 3.5 and 3.6). Partially, it can be explained by the fact that Japanese mobile
users were familiar with mobile data services before the introduction of UMTS due to the
operation of i-mode mobile Internet system (2.5G) since February 1999. Nevertheless, it
does not explain why mobile data services (which were the reason for UMTS launch) per
se are so much more popular in Japan than in Europe. According to Funk (2007), many
Western analysts attributed the success of the Japanese mobile Internet to unique ”cul-
tural” aspects of the Japanese market such as the low PC Internet usage in Japan and the
greater use of public transportation in Japan than in Europe. Funk (2007, p. 25), argues
that ”the early success of SMS in countries with high PC Internet usage like Scandinavia
suggests that mobile Internet usage in Japan has little to do with low PC Internet usage
and commuting by trains”.
In order to explain the Japanese and Korean phenomenon, it might be helpful to have
a closer look at the actors of mobile SSI . Interactions among the participants of the mo-
bile communications market seem indeed to play an important role for the use of mobile
technologies, as revised in detail by Syraya (2008). Indeed, Tee (2007) underlines that
in this context relationships between the operator and other actors involved in the mo-
bile telephony network (vertical network relationships) are of greatest relevance. Besides
the network operator, there are two other organisations that can be part of the network:
handset and equipment manufacturers (also known as vendors) and content providers.
As regards the mobile telephony network structure, in Europe the number of operators
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Figure 3.6: 3G cellular mobile adoption: 3G subscribers as a percentage of total mobile
subscribers, 2007
Note: Korea’s 100 per cent penetration rate is due to the fact that Korea’s early mobile
technology, CDMA2000, was recognised as an official IMT-2000 (3G) technology by the
ITU.
Source: OECD, 2009, p. 104.
greatly outnumbers the number of vendors (approximately 50 operators and about 6 ven-
dors), whereas Japan has only three operators compared to a high number (more than
10) of handset manufacturers (Tee, 2007). In Japan, this ratio has favoured the operator
in terms of bargaining power and, therefore, the Japanese operator can be thought of as
a central organisation in the mobile telephony network. Firstly, it chooses the handsets
to be released from the suppliers. Secondly, it can also set the technical requirements
to which the phones must comply, which helps ensure that the phones’ characteristics
correspond to the data services provided. Thirdly, the operator has a degree of control
over content providers, for instance through introduction of the micro-payment system
that enables users to pay for services in a standardised, fairly secure way (Tee, 2007).
Due to their central position in the mobile telephony network, ”the Japanese and Korean
providers were able to obtain phones that display content in a consistent manner because
unlike Western service providers, they have always dictated phone specifications to the
phone manufacturers” (Funk, 2007, p. 15). Besides, the Japanese operators still maintain
large research and development labs and consequently, they are well aware of technical
possibilities which allows them to use these more efficiently (Tee, 2007).
Tee (2007) argues that in contrast to the Japanese mobile telephony network, Euro-
pean vendors work very much independently from the wishes of operators and innovations
done by vendor do not necessarily correspond with the interests of the operator. As the
result, the take up of mobile data services has been much slower in Europe than in Japan
and South Korea. Funk (2007) indicates several barriers to growth in the Western mobile
Internet content market. Firstly, European manufacturers are still learning how to cus-
tomise phones for the service providers and are still more likely to customise them for
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large than small service providers. Secondly, while Japanese and Korean providers give
more than 80 per cent of the content revenues to content providers thus creating greater
incentives for content providers to develop content, few European service providers give
more than 50 per cent of revenues to content providers. Third, Funk (2007, p. 26) argues
that ”the high prices and profits from SMS have been a barrier to the implementation
of push-based Internet mail and the promotion of access to general Internet sites”. For
example, at the end of 2003, the average price of SMS in Europe was about 15 times the
price of receiving Internet mail in Japan and analysts have argued that the profit margins
exceed 80 per cent on such messages even when fixed costs are included. Funk (2007, p.
18) also stresses that most European mobile service providers initially ignored low end
users such as young people and their applications including SMS, entertainment content
and push-based Internet mail and instead focused on high-end business users, which also
leads to a slow development of mobile Internet services in Europe.
3.4 Innovation Diffusion in Mobile Communications: A
Lead Market Approach
The lead market theory is quite different from the system of innovation approach as it fo-
cuses on international diffusion of innovation rather than on its generation. This will allow
us to broaden our overview of innovation theories applicable for mobile communications.
3.4.1 Lead Market Advantages
Beise (2004), Beise and Cleff (2004) and Beise (2006) define lead markets as regional
markets with specific attributes that increase the probability that a locally preferred inno-
vation design becomes internationally successful. It is also stressed that lead market is the
country where a globally successful design first took off and not the country where it was
invented, as one might think. For example, the principle of cellular mobile telephony was
invented in the US by engineers of Bell Labs but the mass market emerged in Scandinavia.
Other countries that adopt an innovation design later are defined as lag markets.
Beise (2004) and Beise and Cleff (2004) suggest the global diffusion of an innovation
is usually accompanied by the competition of alternative innovations designs, each pre-
ferred by different countries (see Figure 3.7). For example before fax machine emerged
in Japan, telex was adopted in many countries. Different designs are characterised as al-
ternatives for the same need or function, and they therefore compete against each other
on the world market. For instance, an IBM and an Apple computer are different designs
of a personal computer.
As Figure 3.7 shows, over time, the innovation design B from the lead market pushes
out the rival design A from the lag markets and becomes an internationally dominant
design. Beise and Cleff (2004) stress that the lead market is not necessarily the most
innovative market. Rather, a country is a lead market because its technology choice is
followed by other countries. Hence, contrary to the technocentric discussion suggesting
that it is the technical superiority of an innovation design that makes it successful, Beise
(2006) argues that the society is one of the factors shaping the technological path through
its preferences.
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Figure 3.7: A generalised pattern of the international diffusion of innovations with com-
peting designs
Source: Beise, 2004, p. 1000.
The lead market approach has an important implication for a company’s innovation
strategy because lead markets can serve as a ”forecasting laboratory of the world market”,
as a ”source of new global innovation ideas” (Beise, 2004, p. 1012). Thus, companies
that develop an innovation to satisfy the demand of a lead market have more chances to
succeed. And vice versa, manufactures who have initially focused on a ”wrong” inno-
vation design will be forced to leave the market or to change to the lead market design
(Beise, 2006). This leads a company to an important task - identifying lead markets for a
specific product or technology.
Beise (2004), Beise and Cleff (2004) and Beise (2006) argue that lead markets can be
characterised by five groups of lead market advantages, i.e. nation specific attributes that
contribute to the leading role of the country. These five groups include:
1. Price and cost advantages:
Here, two possibilities exist. Either the price of the lead market design is initially
lower in the lead market than in the lag market or the prices for an innovation
design are the same in all markets, but still lower than the price of a rival design.
Alternatively, a change in factor costs, e.g. labour, can contribute to a leading role
of a country in a particular field. These advantages are expected to be one of the
most important lead market drivers.
2. Demand advantages:
Countries at the forefront of an international trend anticipate demand that will later
spread worldwide. Earlier, income level was an important contribution to the de-
mand advantage. Today, complementary assets such as credit cards might play
a role. However, it is often difficult to determine the general trend and demand
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advantages are therefore considered to play a less important role than other lead
market factors.
3. Transfer advantages:
It is the ability of a country to shape the preferences of other countries, which
means that adoption of one innovation design in one country lowers the uncertainty
associated with the innovation and stimulates the lag country users to adopt the
same innovation. For example, the reputation and sophistication of users in one
country can give a signal for the quality of an innovation design to users in other
countries. Alternatively, an innovation design can be transferred from a lead market
to other countries by its businessmen, tourists etc.
4. Export advantages:
Beise (2004) and Beise and Cleff (2004) suggest that certain local market conditions
increase the exportability of innovation design. The three contributing factors are:
first, when local market conditions are similar to those of foreign market; second,
when domestic demand is sensitive to the needs of foreign countries, and, third,
when local participants (e.g. institutions or users) put pressure on companies to
develop exportable products.
5. Market structure advantages:
Beise (2004) stresses that more competition between domestic companies increases
the likelihood that the local market will identify customers’ preferences and a valu-
able innovation design that appeals globally because of its technical superiority,
practicability or superior cost-benefit relation. Additionally, competition pushes
costs down and makes a technology more price competitive against other innova-
tion designs.
When it comes to determining lead markets for existing products, Beise (2004, p.
1013) suggests that they ”can be formally identified by gathering data on diffusion curves
of an innovation in several countries”. It is also argued that ”existing lead markets are
likely to be lead markets for the next product generation as well” (Beise, 2004, p. 1014).
For totally new innovation ideas, Beise (2004) argues, it should be established if lead
markets are possible and what country (or group of countries) has the highest lead market
potential. Beise (2004, p. 1014) stresses that ”lead markets can be expected in industries
in which the internationalisation mechanisms are potentially large enough to overcome
differences in preferences from country to country”.
In order to assess whether lead markets exist and what countries are most likely to
be lead markets, one should turn to the model of lead market analysis depicted in Figure
3.8, which is based on the five-factor scheme derived above. High values of lead mar-
ket advantages would signal that lead markets are possible and the country with a much
higher lead market potential than all other countries can be expected to be the lead market
(Beise, 2004). Beise and Cleff (2004, p. 465) also note that ”lead market factors are
all relative and not absolute variables, because the lead market potential results from the
relative advantage of one country compared to other countries”. The main task of the
lead market analysis would be to find data for the exogenous variables that approximate
the lead market factors for a specific innovation project (Beise, 2004; Beise and Cleff,
2004).
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Figure 3.8: Structural and empirical model of the lead market analysis
Source: Beise, 2004, p. 1015.
First, for the demand advantage one should identify a trend and a trend variable that
can quantify how far each country is positioned within the trend. Second, the price ad-
vantage is marked by cost reduction effects, which can be approximated by market size
and the anticipatory factor price effect. Beise (2004) suggests that for the latter, factor
cost trends related to the innovation have to be identified, e.g. labour costs are frequently
related to innovation in automation, and innovations that increase energy efficiency are
related to the price of energy. In a case of a decreasing factor price trend, the country
with the lowest factor price is the country with the highest lead effect (ibid.). Third, Beise
(2004) argues that in order to quantify the export advantage variables, the export orienta-
tion of a country has to be found. Here, the export share of customer or supplier industries
of a country can be an indicator of the pressure on companies to develop exportable in-
novations. Fourth, as regards the market structure effect, one can use indicators of the
degree of competition such as concentration ratios or entry barriers (ibid.). Finally, Beise
(2004) notes that the transfer advantage is most difficult to quantify because while the
transfer effect of multinational firms can be approximated by data on direct investment,
data on the reputation and attention a country receives world-wide is limited. In such
cases asking experts or conducting special consumer surveys become necessary in order
to estimate the factor for each country.
In order to derive a single index for the lead market potential of countries (the endoge-
nous side of the model in Figure 3.8), the value of all indicators for each country must be
aggregated. Beise (2004) stresses that there is no theoretically correct aggregation method
and it is therefore advisable to use several methods and compare the resulting ranking of
countries according to their lead market potential. The country that consistently obtains
the largest value for lead market potential is most likely to become the lead market for a
selected innovation (ibid.).
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3.4.2 Defining Lead Markets in Mobile Communications
According to Beise (2004, p. 1007), ”the global success of cellular mobile telephony
has the typical characteristics of a lead market model”. Beise (2004) and Beise (2006)
suggest that Nordic countries are lead markets for cellular mobile communications. In-
deed, although mobile cellular communication was invented in principle in the 1940s and
realised in the 1970s by Bell Laboratories in the United States, we have already estab-
lished that the first generation network (NMT) that built on this pioneering work was first
launched in Sweden. It enjoyed tremendous success and penetration rates in Nordic coun-
tries were much higher than elsewhere. After the launch of the second generation mobile
network (GSM) Nordic countries have also attained highest penetration rates (see Figure
3.4). Finally, the diffusion curves in Figure 3.9 clearly show the leading role of Sweden
and Finland in mobile telephony adoption between 1980 and 2002.
Figure 3.9: Diffusion of cellular mobile telephony in several countries, 1980-2002
Source: Beise, 2004, p. 1007.
Beise (2006) argues that cellular mobile telephony did not result from a straightfor-
ward development of mobile technologies. Rather, it managed to prevail over rival inno-
vation designs, such as pagers, satellite telephony and cordless telephones. Figure 3.10
depicts the international competition of pagers (passive receivers of messages) and mo-
bile telephony - over time, even in Hong Kong and Japan where pagers were originally
preferred to mobile phones, cellular mobile telephony managed to push out the rival tech-
nology from the market. On the other hand, in Finland, where mobile telephony was very
popular from its very beginning, pagers have never managed to achieve wide adoption.
Beise (2004) suggests that the lead market role of Nordic countries in the case of
mobile telephony can be explained by the following lead market advantages:
1. Price advantages:
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Figure 3.10: Number of subscribers to pager and cellular services in Finland, Hong Kong
and Japan 1980-1999
Source: Beise, 2004, p. 1008.
(Beise, 2006) stresses that competition among telecom providers in Nordic coun-
tries was high from the very beginning. This resulted (as confirmed by Edquist
(2003)) in the lowest prices for mobile telephony in Nordic countries, which in turn
contributed to the emergence of a mass market. In contrast, mobile network oper-
ators in other countries aimed at a more exclusive market segment with high sub-
scription and call rates. The emergence of a mass market offered cost advantages
and rapid market growth in Nordic countries and paved the way for international
success of the European GSM technology.
2. Demand advantages:
Beise (2004) argues that while global trends are responsible for the international-
isation of a number of global innovations, a demand trend is not really necessary
for the international success of innovations because there are other possible interna-
tionalisation mechanisms. In the case of mobile cellular technologies Beise (2004)
is not sure which international trend led to their tremendous success in the 1990s
and if there was such a trend at all.
3. Transfer advantages:
According to Beise (2004), in the case of cellular mobile telephony three transfer
advantages can be observed: first, the maturity of a standard reduces the risk of
adoption for other countries, second, domestic users transfer demand for a specific
mobile service abroad and, third, a non-proprietary standard increases the benefit
for telecom firms abroad. As regards the first advantage in the case of GSM tech-
nology, the fact that GSM standard was from the very beginning conceived as a
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pan-European one and that GSM service was commercially available in 1992 and
was accepted by a rapidly growing subscriber base has increased the reliability of
the standard for other countries. The second transfer advantage of the GSM stan-
dard is its technical feature of international roaming, which facilitated the transfer
of GSM technology abroad as businessmen and tourists from Europe were ready
to pay more for this technical feature than the domestic subscribers. And third, as
suggested by Paetsch (1993, p. 287), the non-proprietary status of GSM standard
ensured higher competition in the telecom sector because several (and even small)
equipment manufacturers could participate in the GSM components market (as citet
in Beise, 2004).
4. Export advantages:
Beise (2004) argues that one of the export advantages of Nordic countries is their
traditional export orientation: since their domestic markets are rather small, exports
are necessary in industries requiring larger R&D and capital investments. Second
export advantage arises from the fact that average population density is crucial for
the cell size. Since population density of Nordic countries lies between the ex-
tremes of conditions in the US and densely populated Japan, the NMT and GSM
technologies preferred by these ”average” countries can be more easily adopted in
other countries as well (Beise, 2004). Third, the fact that GSM was conceived as a
pan-European standard resulted in the inclusion of a variety of features required in
different European countries. Thus, from the very beginning GSM was an interna-
tional standard that could be easily adopted outside Europe as well.
5. Market structure advantages:
According to Beise (2004), an essential market structure advantage of Nordic coun-
tries is that competition in their mobile communications markets was originally
higher than elsewhere in Europe. For instance, Sweden was the first country where
two competitors (Telecom Sweden and Comvic) offered mobile telephone service.
Competition drove down the prices of calls and phones and facilitated the discovery
of new services and applications for mobile telephony. This, in turn, attracted new
consumer segments. As a result, competition in Nordic countries enabled mass-
market suitability of cellular telephony through lower prices.
3.4.3 Future Lead Markets for Mobile Communications
While there are no doubts as to the leading role of Nordic countries in the case of the
first and second generation mobile technologies, third generation mobile communications
(UMTS) pose a bigger challenge. Although Beise (2004) assumes that lead markets usu-
ally are likely to keep their leading role also for next generation products, more recent
data on 3G penetration rates suggest otherwise. As previously discussed, the first UMTS
commercial network was actually launched in Japan. In 2007, 3G cellular mobile adop-
tion in Europe was still rather poor in comparison with Japan and Korea - 22 per cent of
all mobile subscribers in Sweden against 82 per cent in Japan and 100 per cent in Korea
(although the latter has adopted CDMA2000 technology instead of UMTS) (see Figure
3.6). If we look at the 3G adoption rates in 2009 in Figure 3.11, the results are even
more striking: Slovenia became a clear leader, followed by Korea and Japan, with other
European countries far behind.
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Figure 3.11: 3G cellular mobile adoption, as a percentage of total subscriptions, 2009
Source: OECD, 2011a, p. 132.
To establish 3G penetration rate (OECD (2013) gave only the absolute number of 3G
subscriptions), I have made my own calculation based on the most recent OECD data (3G
cellular mobile subscriptions divided by population in respective years) in order to deter-
mine 3G cellular mobile penetration rates from 2001 (the launch year of UMTS) till 2011
(the last year for which data were available). For this analysis were taken three Nordic
countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark), two OECD leaders Japan and South Korea as
well as the new leader Slovenia along with three other Eastern European countries with
relatively strong positions in mobile communications. The goal was to compare the devel-
opment of third generation mobile communications in Nordic countries (supposedly lead
markets) with their development in Japan and Korea that have both become actual leaders
in 3G technologies, and with the development of these technologies in the emerging and
most promising economies in Eastern Europe.
The results of calculations presented in Figure 3.12 are quite astonishing and unex-
pected, if we rely solely on reflections of Beise (2004) or Beise (2006). Judging by the
data in the first years after UMTS launch, it is clear that Sweden and Finland have not
only lost worldwide leadership to Japan and Korea, but they were also by far overtaken
by Slovenia, a small but apparently auspicious new EU member state.
This analysis suggests that at least in the case of 3G mobile technologies there has
been a shift of power: instead of Nordic countries, new players such as Korea and Slove-
nia have emerged. However, it is not easy to make conclusions based only on these data
because it is not clear yet if these countries are true lead markets or only early adopters.
Only judging by the 3G penetration curves, as Beise (2004) suggests for existing inno-
vation designs (see Figure 3.9), we cannot assume that Slovenia, Japan and Korea have
become new lead markets for 3G mobile communications. Because although Korea with
its successful electronics industry (e.g. Samsung) has indeed the potential of a lead mar-
ket, Slovenia was so far unremarkable in this respect. On the other hand, the fact that
EION Wireless, a Canadian manufacturer of broadband wireless products, established its
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Figure 3.12: 3G mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in selected OECD countries,
2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD, 2013.
European subsidiary in Slovenia in November 2011 that is responsible for ”developing
and testing the company’s next generation 4G wireless product platforms” suggests that
Slovenian market is considered an important testing ground for these wireless technolo-
gies (EION Wireless, 2011).
That is why it is important to conduct detailed case studies on Korean and Slovenian
mobile communications markets to find explanations for their success in 3G adoption
and to establish if they are true lead markets. But even if one of them or both are merely
early adopters and not lead markets as defined by Beise (2004), the results of this research
which might be very useful for defining new policy measures in other countries wishing to
improve their performance in mobile communications. Furthermore, additional research
is required in order to establish why old lead markets (Nordic countries) have been so
slow in adopting 3G. I also suggest that both approaches, sectoral systems of innovation
and lead markets, are very useful in explaining such phenomena and can complement
each other.
Finally, with the commercial LTE launch in 2009, a new and even more challenging
task emerges - defining lead markets for this mobile technology of the future. It is too
early yet and detailed international statistics on LTE penetration are available, but the
launch of the first commercial LTE network in Sweden and in Norway might be a sign
that Nordic countries are regaining their lead market role. Further research in this di-
rection should help find answers to these questions and make an important contribution
to the development of the lead market theory because, if there are indeed new lead mar-
kets in mobile communications, it will show that the lead market concept is much more
dynamic than previously thought. If, further, it can be established which lead market
characteristics are crucial and can be changed by adequate policy measures, it will help
other (European) countries define key policy measures that can be undertaken in order to
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improve the performance of their mobile communications market.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have mainly discussed two theories that apply to innovation in mobile
communications: system of innovation approach and theory of lead markets. While the
former mostly deals with generation and diffusion of innovation on the national and sec-
toral levels by considering the influence of ten main activities of the innovation system
on the innovation process, the latter focuses on international diffusion of already existing
innovation and puts forward the factors contributing to the lead market role of a particular
country in a particular field.
As regards the innovation system approach, we have first conducted a detailed analysis
of the sectoral system of innovation for cellular mobile communications from the begin
of specification of its first generation standard (NMT 450) in 1970 to the launch of its
third generation (UMTS) in the first half of 2000s. We came to a conclusion that it was
the close cooperation in development of GSM standard among numerous European and
international actors that has contributed to its international dominance. Furthermore, the
early involvement of Nordic equipment manufacturers has ensured their leading role in
the international mobile communications market. In the case of UMTS, the particularities
of the Japanese sectoral system of innovation might have contributed to a much more
rapid uptake of 3G mobile technologies than in Europe.
Finally, we have added an international perspective to our understanding of innovation
processes in mobile communications by introducing the lead market theory. Although we
have established that Nordic countries played the lead market role for GSM, transferring
these conclusions to the next generations of mobile technologies (3G and 4G) presents
certain difficulties because, based on 3G penetration curves, we have new (unexpected)
candidates for lead markets. Further research should help to shed light on this important
question contributing to the further development of the lead market theory and of adequate
policy measures.
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Chapter 4
Case Studies: Swedish and Korean
National Systems of Innovation
In this chapter we will discuss in more detail the national systems of innovation (NSI)
of Sweden and Korea. The country choice is explained by the fact that the former was
a leader in the first generation mobile communications whereas the latter boasted the
highest 3G penetration rates in 2007.
The structure of the case studies is based on Edquist and Hommen (2008) and will look
as follows: first, after a short introduction we will outline the main trends in the history
of the NSI; second, we will address the innovation intensity (propensity to innovate) of
the NSI; third, we will try to identify factors (or ”activities”) that influence innovation
process in the NSI; further, we will discuss the influence of globalisation on the NSI;
and finally, we will consider innovation policies (those historically pursued in selected
countries and those proposed for the future) that (might) influence the performance of the
NSI.
4.1 The ”Swedish Paradox”: High R&D Input and Low
Innovation
According to Bitard et al. (2008), recent innovation policy discussion in Sweden has paid
much attention to the notion of a ”Swedish paradox”, meaning that despite high R&D in-
tensity in Sweden, the share of high-tech products in its manufacturing is low as compared
to other OECD countries. Or, as Andersson et al. (2002) put it, although the investments
in R&D in Sweden are very large, its economic growth and competitiveness are not very
impressive (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Similarly, already in 1993 Edquist and Lund-
vall (1993, p. 286, Table 8.8) pointed out ”a weak export specialisation in R&D-intensive
products”, despite its very major efforts in R&D.
Edquist (2002) names three hypothesis that were suggested by different studies in or-
der to explain this paradox (as cited in Bitard et al., 2008). One possible explanation is
that the knowledge resulting from R&D remains in the R&D sphere (e.g. in universities
or corporate research units) and therefore is not transformed into innovations. Another
proposition is that the paradox can be explained by sectoral allocation of R&D invest-
ments in Sweden. A third hypothesis suggests that due to stronger internationalisation of
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production than of R&D, R&D carried out in Sweden results in innovations elsewhere,
for example in subsidiaries of Swedish multinational enterprises. We will further conduct
a detailed analysis of the Swedish NSI and, among other things, will try to establish if
there is any support for this paradox.
This part is largely based on the detailed analysis of the Swedish NSI conducted by
Bitard et al. (2008) and the statistics in many cases turn out to be not very recent. Where
possible, I have completed the analysis with more recent data but their complete update
would be too time consuming (if at all possible) in the frame of this dissertation.
4.1.1 Main Historical Trends
According to Bitard et al. (2008), in the second half of the nineteenth century Sweden’s
exports were dominated by products from agriculture and the mining and forest indus-
tries. However, after the mid-nineteenth century new production processes allowed the
export of refined products from these industries - machinery products and pulp and paper
respectively. The Swedish engineering industry expanded rapidly from 3 per cent of total
exports in 1880 to 10.5 per cent in 1910-1911, and reached over 20 per cent in 1950 (that
year it was surpassed only by the USA among OECD countries). Edquist and Lundvall
(1993, p. 272) argue that an important outcome of the process of industrialisation in Swe-
den was ”the combination of exports based on refined and processed raw materials on
the one hand and the multinational engineering firms on the other”. However, Jacobsson
and Philipsson (1996) stress that throughout its history the Swedish economy has been
strongly specialised in low-growth (low-tech) sectors, while Ohlsson and Vinell (1987)
suggest that before 1990s more R&D-intensive growth sectors were relatively underde-
veloped (as cited in Bitard et al., 2008).
According to NUTEK (2000, pp. 41-43) during 1980-1984 there was a general in-
crease in service sector employment relative to manufacturing employment, but the in-
crease in the share of employment held by the knowledge-intensive service sectors was
rather modest (as cited in Bitard et al., 2008). NUTEK (2000, pp. 47-52) also suggests
that in the period from 1980 to 1996 Sweden has significantly increased its export spe-
cialisation in high-technology manufacturing (as cited in Bitard et al., 2008). Moreover,
NUTEK (2000, Table 3.2) points out that Swedish production of high-tech products has
increased from 8.8 per cent of all manufacturing production in 1993 to 12.5 per cent in
1996 - largely due to rapid growth in telecommunications equipment and pharmaceuti-
cal products sectors, in which Sweden was already specialised (as cited in Bitard et al.,
2008). In this context, Edquist and Lundvall (1993, p. 272) argue that in the Swedish NSI
a decisive role is played by a ”small number of multinational firms in the engineering
industry”.
4.1.2 Innovation Intensity
In order to revisit the ”Swedish paradox”, Bitard et al. (2008) compare the performance
of Swedish economy with other small open European economies, i.e. the other Nordic
countries, the Netherlands and Ireland, from two periods - 1994-1996 and 1998-2000. As
input measures they consider R&D intensity and innovation intensity; on the output side,
they analyse the proportion of innovating firms, the share of all firms that have introduced
new processes as well as four indicators related to product innovations.
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As regards the input measures, Bitard et al. (2008) come to a conclusion that R&D
intensity of Swedish firms is very high compared to other countries from the group - in
1994-1996 Swedish firms invested 4 per cent of their turnover in R&D, compared to the
group average of 2.3 per cent. Sweden ranked first for this indicator and none of other
countries invested above average. Moreover, Sweden also ranked first for innovation
intensity - 6.7 per cent in 1994-1996 compared to the average of 4.1 per cent.
It is interesting to note, however, that for SMEs Sweden ranks only second with regard
to innovation intensity (after Denmark): while Swedish SMEs spent 2.7 per cent of their
turnover on innovation, Danish ones spent 4.9 per cent (Bitard et al., 2008). Bitard et al.
(2008, p. 241) stress that ”while in most countries SMEs spend less on innovation than
large firms, Sweden has the greatest difference in this respect”.
As to the output side, the first indicator is the share of innovating firms that have
introduced either a product or a process innovation. For this indicator, Swedish firms
ranked only fourth for both periods (1994-1996 and 1998-2000) with a performance only
slightly above average (Bitard et al., 2008). For the second indicator, the share of all firms
that have introduced new processes during a three-year period, Sweden ranked fourth
(out of six) in 1994-1996 and fifth (out of five) in 1998-2000 with a performance 14 per
cent below the average (Bitard et al., 2008). However, on both indicators Swedish firms
performed somewhat better in services than in manufacturing.
Third, Bitard et al. (2008, pp. 241-242) have analysed four indicators related to prod-
uct innovations. On the indicator ”introduction of new-to-the-firm products” (the share
of firms that during a three-year period introduced products that were new to them), Swe-
den ranked fourth (out of six) for 1994-1996 and fourth (out of five) for 1998-2000. On
the indicator ”introduction of new-to-the-market products” (the share of firms that during
a three-year period introduced products that were new to the ”world”), Sweden ranked
fourth (out of five). Again, Sweden’s performance was better in services than in manu-
facturing. On the indicator ”turnover due to new-to-the-firm products” (turnover due to
the new-to-the-firm products introduced during a certain period, divided by total turnover
at the end of the period), Sweden had a much better performance ranking first. Finally, on
the indicator ”turnover due to new-to-the-market products” (the ratio of turnover due to
new products or significantly improved products introduced in 1998-2000, divided by the
total turnover in 2000) Sweden is below the average ranking third (out of four). Bitard
et al. (2008, p. 242) note that small firms performed much better on this indicator than
large ones, which leads them to a conclusion that ”the overall performance of all firms
[...] can be explained by the domination of large firms in the Swedish NSI”.
As the comparison has shown, the input indicators for Swedish firms are high whereas
the output indicators all indicators are quite low comparing to other small open European
economies. This leads to a conclusion that the productivity (or efficiency) of the Swedish
NSI is not high - it is not ”as capable as some other small industrialised countries of
transforming the very large resources invested in R&D and innovation activities on the
input side into correspondingly large outputs of product and process innovations on the
output side” (Bitard et al., 2008, pp. 242-243). Thus, the Swedish paradox is confirmed.
Bitard et al. (2008) suggest that the underlying problem may reside with the large firms
dominating the Swedish NSI, which perform poorly in innovation outputs.
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4.1.3 Activities that Influence Innovation
The analysis in this section is based on ten activities of IS as described by Edquist (2004)
and will contribute to assessing the validity of three hypothesis (introduced at the begin-
ning of this part) trying to explain the Swedish paradox.
I Knowledge inputs to innovation
1 R&D activities
In 2011, Sweden spent more than 1.4 times the OECD average on R&D (mea-
sured by gross domestic R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP) figuring in
the top-5 among the OECD countries (see Figure 4.1). However, Figure 4.1 also
depicts that although Sweden has strongly increased its R&D spending between
1991 and 2001, from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 4.1 per cent in 2001 (it was
then surpassed only by Israel), in the last decade its performance on this indicator
actually worsened. The European Commission (2003) data suggest that Sweden’s
scientific output (as measured by publication) is high (it accounts for 1.75 per cent
of world publications), and its technological output (as measured by patents) is
well above the EU average (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008).
Figure 4.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP, 1991-
2011
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators database.
According to European Commission (2003), Sweden’s scientific specialisation lies
within life sciences, food science and agriculture, environmental sciences, civil
engineering and materials science. In contrast, as regards Sweden’s technologi-
cal specialisation (as measured by patenting across major technology fields), its
relative strengths are in pharmaceuticals, telecoms, materials and analysis control.
This mismatch might be a sign of a problem in transferring scientific knowledge
into industrial needs in Sweden (Bitard et al., 2008).
Bitard et al. (2008) argue that in contrast to many other OECD countries, the
Swedish business sector accounts for a major share of R&D activity, and within
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business sector large firms (with 500 employees or more) account for 83 per cent
of R&D. In non-business R&D, the higher education sector plays a major role.
2 Competence building
As measured by the share of spending on education as a proportion of GDP, Swe-
den has long belonged to the world leading countries: in 1994, it ranked first in
the world (OECD, 1998, p. 37); and in 1999, with the share of 6.7 per cent, it was
slightly below the leader, Korea, at 6.8 per cent, and well above the OECD aver-
age of 5.8 per cent (OECD, 2002, Table B2.1a). However, as Figure 4.2 shows,
more recently, other OECD countries have overtaken Sweden on this indicator - in
2009, it ranked only eighth among the OECD countries (with 6.7 per cent), again
surpassed by Korea with 8 per cent.
Figure 4.2: Trends in education expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 2000 and 2009
Source: OECD, 2012a, Table B2.1.
As regards the qualifications of the Swedish labour force, the situation has also
worsened at the beginning of the 21st century. While in 1995 Sweden was well
above the OECD average with first time graduation rate from university-level ed-
ucation of 24 per cent, in 2010, despite the general increase up to 37 per cent,
Sweden was somewhat below the OECD average and ranked only 17th among the
OECD countries (see Figure 4.3). Aspgren (2002) and Jacobsson et al. (2001)
suggest that Sweden has improved its graduation rates of natural scientists and en-
gineers that became comparative to those of competitor countries (as citet in Bitard
et al., 2008). The Swedish educational system remains under Swedish control, but
after decentralisation reforms, its tertiary education has improved its flexibility and
became more market-responsive (Bitard et al., 2008).
II Demand-side activities (include activities 3 and 4)
Bitard et al. (2008) suggests that Sweden’s accession to the EU resulted in a shift in
Swedish innovation policy: instead of utilising mainly domestic demand, it now re-
lies more upon international demand to stimulate its industrial and technological de-
velopment. While public technology procurement has been earlier an important inno-
vation policy instrument in Sweden (Edquist and Hommen, 2000), its EU accession
was accompanied by liberalisation reforms resulting in dismantling of many state
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Figure 4.3: First-time graduation rates at tertiary-type A and B education, 1995 and 2010
Notes:
1. Year of reference 2000 instead of 1995.
2. Year of reference 2009 instead of 2010.
3. Break in the series between 2008 and 2009 due to a partial reallocation of vocational
programmes into ISCED 2 and ISCED 5B.
Source: OECD, 2012a, p. 63.
agencies an the privatisation of many state-owned companies. More recently, the
Swedish innovation policy has replaced purely demand-side measures with public-
private partnerships combining demand- and supply-side measures (Bitard et al.,
2008). Also, Glimstedt (2000) argues that product market regulation has shaped
several important Swedish industries, such as mobile telecommunications (as citet in
Bitard et al., 2008). Indeed, as discussed earlier, standard setting contributed to Er-
icsson’s leadership in mobile communications equipment. However, standard setting
has become increasingly internationalised and private actors, especially producers,
are now playing a dominant role in the development of standards (Hommen and
Manninen, 2003).
III Provision of constituents
5 Provision of organisations
Bitard et al. (2008, p. 249) argue that ”Sweden lags in creation of new firms
and their contribution to industrial renewal” - Sweden’s birth rate of new firms
is comparatively low, for instance, in 2001, the population of new firms was only
7.4 per cent of all companies. Moreover, according to ITPS (2002), two-thirds of
the new firms are one-person companies, and few of large international companies
created in Sweden were founded in the last three decades (as citet in Bitard et al.,
2008). This relative lack of growth may be a partial explanation to the lack of
innovation in Sweden. However, Sweden boasts rather high survival rates of new
firms, for example, a study by Na˚s et al. (2004) showed that 63 per cent of the high-
tech spin-offs established in 1996 passed the four year survival limit (as citet in
Bitard et al., 2008). On the positive side, Bitard et al. (2008) suggest that Swedish
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universities and large firms play an important in creating and developing innovative
technology-based spin-offs. Also, Sweden’s innovative firms are now increasingly
located in services rather than manufacturing.
6 Networking, interactive learning and knowledge integration
According to Bitard et al. (2008, p. 249), ”empirical data indicate that innovative
collaboration and networking seem to develop organically among Swedish actors
and between Swedish and foreign actors”. For example, Sandstro¨m (2002) sug-
gests that Swedish research often involves collaborations between researchers in
firms and in universities or institutes (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). For example,
27 per cent of all Swedish publications are co-published with a national partner
and 39 per cent - with a foreign partner (with preference for Nordic partners, but
collaboration with US actors is also very important) (European Commission, 2003,
Figure 5.4.2). As regards university-industry relations, they are also important in
certain sectors, for example, according to VINNOVA (2001), in biotechnology (as
citet in Bitard et al., 2008). However, Swedish companies finance fewer activities
in universities or research institutes than do firms in other EU countries (European
Commission, 2003, Figures 3.1.4-5). As regards partnerships among firms in Swe-
den, according to Bitard et al. (2008), in 1998-2000, two thirds of large Swedish
firms cooperated, but only one third of SMEs. A conclusion of this analysis was
that ”there is need to enhance collaboration and learning over organisational bor-
ders” (Bitard et al., 2008, p. 251).
7 Provision of institutions
Andersson et al. (2002) and Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) point to insufficient
incentives for academic entrepreneurship, with consequently poor performance in
commercialising research via new technology based firms including university-
based start-ups (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). According to OECD (1995), in
1995, Sweden had the lowest wages for experienced teachers in lower secondary
education among the leading OECD countries. In 2010 the situation has not be-
come much better - Sweden was still below the OECD average on this indicator
(well behind Germany, the USA, Korea and Japan) (OECD, 2012a). Espring-
Andersen (1990) argues that initially Sweden’s postwar social-democratic welfare
state favoured large firms and strong trade unions (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008).
Thus, according to Benner (1997, p. 202), initially the ”core institution” gov-
erning economic growth and industrial change was ”labour market regulation”;
while later, by the 1990s, pubic companies, investment planning and R&D policy
became more important (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). However, Andersson et
al. (2002) suggest that extensive social security has been confined to large manu-
facturing firms and the public sector, encouraging a lock-in, which can potentially
lower the impact of public investments in R&D and education (as citet in Bitard
et al., 2008). Bitard et al. (2008) argues that these developments might account
for the much higher innovation expenditure of large firms relative to the SMEs in
Sweden, as well as Sweden’s poor performance with regard to the introduction of
new-to-the market products.
Researchers also argue that the ”university teachers’ exemption” granting fac-
ulty at Swedish universities complete ownership of research results (Sellenthin,
2004) along with ”anti-entrepreneurial peer pressure” within university depart-
ments (SOU, 1996, p. 70) may have contributed to the underdevelopment of new
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technology-based firms (NTBFs) in Sweden and may help to explain the low in-
novation expenditure of SMEs compared to large firms (as citet in Bitard et al.,
2008).
As a part of EU accession preparations, Sweden liberalised domestic air travel
(1992), telecommunications (1993), banking, finance, postal services (1993) and
electricity (1996). These reforms aimed first of all the creation of new entrepreneurial
arenas and innovation opportunities in Sweden and the EU (Bitard et al., 2008).
IV Support services for innovating firms
8 Incubating activities
Sweden’s division of labour in initiating, financing and operating science parks
and incubators includes government-supported non-profit units, university-driven
units, public-private partnerships and private initiatives in corporate incubators
(Bitard et al., 2008). Bitard et al. (2008) argue that Swedish policy makers see
incubation as an important innovation policy tool, and university-related incuba-
tors have most often received public funding. According to Bengtsson (2003),
Sweden’s incubation activities began in 1983 with the Ideon Science Park in Lund
and between 1983 and 1989 additional 15 parks were established (as citet in Bitard
et al., 2008). However, as demonstrated by Ferguson (1998), Lindelo¨f and Lo¨fsten
(1999) and Lo¨fsten and Lindelo¨f (2002), the positive results on innovation activity
were not as strong or direct as expected (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). According
to VINNOVA (2002), this led to a systematic review, in which science parks were
seen as only one of the instruments in an innovation environment (as citet in Bitard
et al., 2008).
Bitard et al. (2008) suggest that today, most large universities in Sweden have
some form of unit for handling patent and licensing issues, as well as promoting
entrepreneurial and cooperative activities. Nevertheless, there is still much to be
done. For example, although academic researchers own the right to their inven-
tions, other supports for commercial activity (i.e. incentives, time, suitable career
structure, financial resources, role models and experience) are often missing.
9 Financing
Bitard et al. (2008) argue that in comparison to other EU countries, Sweden is in
a good situation as regards venture capital (VC) market, with growing financial
options for firm formation and expansion. For example, Sweden has been often
pointed out as having an impressive level of venture capital activity, and according
to Eurostat (2003) data, the percentage of GDP devoted to venture capital was well
above the EU average in 2003 (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Bitard et al. (2008)
underline that between 1998 and 2002, the number of actors tripled (from 50 to
150 firms) and the funds managed quadrupled (from SEK 45 to 190 billion). In
addition, Bitard et al. (2008) point out a visible internationalisation of the venture
capital market in Sweden.
However, Karao¨merlioglu and Jacobsson (2000) and European Commission (2003)
stress that many developed EU countries have been ahead of Sweden for many
years and that Sweden has yet to develop a fully competent venture capital mar-
ket with experienced actors and sufficient institutional support (as citet in Bitard
et al., 2008). For example, in a comparative study by EVAC (2004) analysing the
regulatory environment for venture capital, Sweden was ranked below average in
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Europe (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). As positive features of the Swedish venture
capital market were mentioned the fund structure, the company tax rate, the ease of
registering a new company, and the regulation for reorganisation and bankruptcy
of a company. One the negative side there are the strict regulation of mergers, the
lack of a special tax rate for SMEs, the income and capital gain taxes for individ-
uals, the lack of tax incentives for individuals, and the lack of fiscal incentives for
interfirm cooperation.
In addition, as regards the phases of development which are VC-financed, Bitard
et al. (2008) state the lack of early-stage financing, while a relatively large share
of the funds has been allocated over time to late-stage development. Indeed, ac-
cording to EVAC (2001) survey data, 30-50 per cent of the funds managed by the
Swedish venture capital firms are invested in any of the phases from seed to ex-
pansion, and the rest in buyouts (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Another concern
is that, according to the European Commission (2003) data, only 28 per cent of
the total equity capital in Sweden is allocated to high-tech sectors - this is below
both the EU average of 38 per cent and the impressive US figure of 79 per cent
(as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Bitard et al. (2008) argue that these shortcomings
of the Swedish venture capital market might contribute to explaining the Swedish
paradox.
10 Provision of consultancy services
As suggested by Bitard et al. (2008), almost all Sweden’s private consultancies
are located in the knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) sector, which is
not especially large. For example, according to Marklund et al. (2004, Figure
4.4), Sweden ranks seventh (out of nine countries, the others are Austria, Ger-
many, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway and the USA) in the proportion
of total services belonging to KIBS, and sixth in the percentage of the total labour
force employed in KIBS (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). However, recently this
sector has expanded rapidly in Sweden and it also boasts a high level of innovative
activity (Bitard et al., 2008). For instance, according to Na¨hlinder and Hommen
(2002, p. 11, Table 2), a high proportion of innovative firms (well above the ser-
vice sector average of 36 per cent) were found in the financial intermediation (59
per cent) and KIBS (51 per cent) sectors. Another independent survey (Na¨hlinder,
2003), suggests that 82 per cent of Swedish KIBS firms have a large level of in-
novation intensity in terms of the employment of qualified personnel, and some
82 per cent of this population of firms conducted some form of innovation in the
period from 2000 to 2002 (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Bitard et al. (2008) note
that these high levels of knowledge intensity of KIBS firms might help to explain
why Swedish firms are currently more innovative in some service sectors, notably
finance and trade, as compared to manufacturing.
4.1.4 Consequences of Innovation and Globalisation
The analysis conducted by Bitard et al. (2008) for 1994-96 and 1998-2000 periods showed
that the most successful Swedish firms (as measured by turnover increases) are likely to be
those investing most in innovation. These results must be interpreted with caution because
the causality is not clear here - it might be that more successful firms are more likely to
invest in innovation. Bitard et al. (2008) also came to a conclusion that generally the most
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innovative sectors in Sweden (as measured by the share of turnover due to new products)
also experience the smallest increases in value-added. However, Bitard et al. (2008, pp.
258-260, Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1) note that between 1993 and 2000, the sector with the
most dramatic growth in value-added (191.83 per cent, as measured by the variation of
the share of the value-added of the different sectors in the grand total) - ”computer and
related activities” - has also undergone the strongest growth in R&D expenditures (from
index 20 in 1995 to nearly index 120 in 2001). This example illustrates positive impact
of innovations on firms’ value-added. Finally, Bitard et al. (2008, p. 261, Figure 7.2)
also demonstrate that Sweden’s labour productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked
between 1979 and 2001, has not increased and remained at a high level - slightly above
80 per cent of the US level of labour productivity.
Globalisation has had a significant impact on the Swedish NSI through the extremely
important role played by multinational enterprises (MNEs) that, according to Brauner-
hjelm (1998), accounted for as much as 70 per cent of the total private sector R&D in the
late twentieth century (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Already in 1989, in a report to the
1989 congress of the Swedish Metal Workers Union (Solidarsk arbetspolitik, 1989, p. 93)
the following account of the problems arising from increasing firms’ internationalisation
was given:
The problem today is that these multinationals do not any longer need Swe-
den, but the Swedish economy needs them. (as citet in Edquist and Lundvall,
1993, p. 292)
As discussed later by Bitard et al. (2008, p. 262), ”the dominance of of domestic MNEs
has contributed to the Swedish paradox by diminishing commercialisation of research
results and maintaining a disproportionally high allocation of R&D resources to low-
and medium-technology sectors with little potential for growth”. However, although the
production in Sweden is now highly internationalised and the increasing share of large
firms’ production is located abroad, these firms, as of 2003 (based on data from ITPS
(2003a)), continued to invest strongly in R&D within Sweden. Moreover, Marklund et al.
(2004, pp. 13 and 32, Figure 9.3) argue that foreign subsidiaries still relied strongly upon
exports from Sweden and Sweden still had a positive trade balance in high-tech products
(as citet in Bitard et al., 2008). Thus, as argued by Bitard et al. (2008, p. 262), the Swedish
paradox may at least in part be explained by globalisation, ”in the sense that R&D carried
out in Sweden increasingly bears fruit in terms of innovation in other countries”.
4.1.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of NSI
The previous analysis leads to a conclusion that the Swedish NSI is generally strong on
the input side (e.g. high R&D investment) but weak on the output side (i.e. it has rather
low innovation performance) (Bitard et al., 2008). One exception to the overall pattern
is that SMEs innovation expenditures are not especially high, which, as suggested by
Bitard et al. (2008), can also be considered as a strength if it leads to a high innovation
output. However, it was established that Swedish firms were more innovative in some
service sectors than in manufacturing, and performance was also better for new (to the
firm) products than for process innovations (ibid.).
As regards the new-to-the-market product innovations, Sweden performed very poorly,
although the performance was much better for small firms than for large ones, i.e. ”small
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firms are much more ”creative” than large ones” (Bitard et al., 2008, p. 264). Hence,
Bitard et al. (2008) argue that the overall poor performance of the Swedish NSI might be
due to the dominance of large firms. The fact that, according to the analysis, small firms
spend considerably less than large ones on innovation, while at the same time performing
well above the average with regard to turnover due to new-to-the-market products, can
be considered as ”a great strength of small firms within the Swedish NSI” (Bitard et al.,
2008, p. 264). Moreover, the analysis of indicators discussed previously suggests that, in
general, Swedish firms are rather good at imitating products, but are less good at new-to-
the-world innovations, which suggests that ”the Swedish NSI is not creative in a profound
way” (ibid.).
Turning to the activities, the analysis by Bitard et al. (2008) suggests that Sweden
is strong in R&D and competence building, but weak in support services for innovating
firms, however improving more recently. On the negative side, the volume of new forma-
tion in Sweden is too low, and demand-side activities are underdeveloped, having largely
been reduced to ”seeking global markets through internationalisation and restructuring
domestic markets through liberalisation” (Bitard et al., 2008, p. 264). Also, shortcom-
ings in the institutional structure, such as rigidities in S&T employment and uncertainties
related to IPR legislation, may, according to Bitard et al. (2008) have contributed to low
rates of firm creation. Finally, because large firms conducting outward FDI remain cen-
tral for the Swedish NSI, ”much of the return on Sweden’s R&D investment is captured
abroad, rather than domestically” (Bitard et al., 2008, p. 265).
4.1.6 Innovation Policies
The analysis conducted by Bitard et al. (2008) confirmed the existence of the Swedish
paradox and found support for all three hypotheses trying to explain this paradox: ob-
stacles to technology transfer from the R&D sphere to the commercial sphere, problem-
atic sectoral allocation of R&D, and the internationalisation of production meaning that
Swedish R&D is increasingly exploited abroad. Bitard et al. (2008, p. 269) argue that
a common element in all three explanations is ”the dominance of incumbent large man-
ufacturing firms (MNEs)” and argue that the underlying problem concerns the apparent
inability of of these large firms to translate innovation inputs into outputs domestically.
Thus, as a first measure, Bitard et al. (2008) suggest to address the overwhelming
domination of business sector R&D by large firms. This especially makes sense because
small firms have proved to be more efficient innovators than large ones, while innova-
tion expenditures and resources available are much lower for SMEs than for large firms.
Therefore, the aim of the Swedish innovation policy should be to increase R&D and inno-
vation expenditures and efforts in SMEs in advanced sectors. In this context, Bitard et al.
(2008) mention several instruments that would lead to the establishment of more new in-
novation based firms. One of them is to strengthen regional clusters and collaboration
in strategic R&D and innovation including SMEs, another is to facilitate the spin-off of
new firms from large firms when the latter do not commercialise results from R&D and
innovation efforts to a sufficient extent.
Second, as regards the problematic sectoral allocation of R&D, Bitard et al. (2008)
urge to stimulate the development of new knowledge-intensive industries, firstly, by en-
couraging large firms to diversify into them, secondly, by assisting the birth and growth
of new innovation-based firms in new sectors, and, finally, by attracting foreign firms in
advanced sectors. As argued by Edquist (2002, pp. 53-54) and Arvidsson et al. (2007,
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pp. 9-18), contrary to the widely adopted policy, well-established (”traditional” sectors)
in Sweden should receive less policy effort and fewer public resources, while radically
new areas of technical development with large uncertainty need stronger, more focused
interventions (as citet in Bitard et al., 2008).
Third, a solution to the Sweden’s failure to capture returns on R&D investment within
domestic economy that arise from the internationalisation of production is not an easy
one. Bitard et al. (2008) argue that Sweden should exploit more effectively the positive
effect of this trend - the development of Sweden into a global centre of R&D activities
and services. Here, public policy should, among other measures, create a strong labour
market for natural scientists and engineers (NSEs) and other R&D personnel. Besides, in-
terfirm networks of innovation in Sweden, which have a strong ”vertical character” due
to the dominance of large firms, could be enhanced by measures supporting collaboration
and learning over organisational borders (Bitard et al., 2008, p. 271). Also, according
to Bitard et al. (2008, p. 271), increasing firms’ ”collaboration with customers through
diversification” should significantly improve Sweden’s poor performance in product in-
novations.
Fourth, because Sweden’s lack of attention to the demand side was reflected by its
poor performance in new-to-the-market product innovations, Bitard et al. (2008) stress
that Sweden needs new initiatives in demand-side policies, such as new forms of PPPs
and new combinations of supply and demand-side measures. Fifth, in order to stimulate
translation of research results from universities into innovations in firms, Sweden should
improve both financing and additional support services for innovating firms, especially
those formed to exploit academic research results (Bitard et al., 2008). Sixth, in the light
of a general need to stimulate product innovation in Sweden, Bitard et al. (2008, p. 272)
suggest that, because newer and smaller firms seem to be more creative than the older and
larger ones, the former should be the main focus of the Swedish innovation policy, along
with ”efforts to alter the production structure towards stronger representation of high-
technology sectors”. Finally, as Bitard et al. (2008) put it, the combination of many of
the policy measures discussed would enable a shift towards a more knowledge-intensive
structure of production leading to an increase in productivity, economic growth and em-
ployment.
4.2 Korea: Towards Knowledge Generation
South Korea has undergone a successful industrialisation process from a subsistent agri-
cultural country exploited by Japanese colonisation and subsequently devastated by the
Korean War (Kim, 1993; Lim, 2008). According to Lim (2008), Korean NSI is mid-sized
and typical of a catching up country, in which it undergoes a shift from one of technology
import to one of technology generation and effective use of emerging technology oppor-
tunities from abroad. Until the mid-1980s it was the government that led the industrialisa-
tion process, which was then taken over by the private sector. During this transformation,
Korean firms accumulated the capabilities that allowed them not only to improve produc-
tion processes, but also to develop imitative products and, later on, even some original
products based on those technologies (Lim, 2008). Lim (2008) suggests that today Korea
displays a mix of advanced and developing country features: its private sector includes
large advanced manufacturing firms as well as small manufacturing and service firms that
are still classed as laggard. On the other hand, Korea’s education and financial systems
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are classed as laggard by advanced country standards, and the knowledge base of Ko-
rean universities and government research institutes (GRIs) is weak (ibid.). According to
Lim (2008, p. 114), there has been a growing concern that, although Korea’s ”intensity of
R&D investment is one of the highest in the world, it is not being matched by performance
at the national level”.
The aim of this analysis largely based on Lim (2008) is to identify the features of
Korean NSI facing challenges from globalisation and to suggest policy measures that
Korea will have to pursue in order to become one of the advanced economies. Clearly, in
many cases statistics might not be very recent, and they were updated as much as it was
possible in the frame of this research project.
4.2.1 Main Historical Trends
Korea belongs to those ex-colonised countries, such as Taiwan and Finland, that showed
remarkable industrial growth after the Second World War (Lim, 2008). The Japanese
colonial rule in Korea has provided a capitalist institutional base and introduced such new
infrastructures as railway, posts, roads and irrigation systems (ibid.). However, Korea’s
industrial base was mostly situated in the northern part (Kim, 1993) and was not very ex-
tensive because the Japanese wanted Korea to remain an agricultural country (Lim, 2008).
The majority of industrial and infrastructure facilities were destroyed in the Korean war
of 1950-1953, but the war also had a certain positive effect by ”completely transforming
a traditional rigid society into a highly mobile one by forcing geographical mobility” and
also by contributing to ”the rapid formation of basic skills among the male labour force”
(Kim, 1993, p. 358).
After the period of reconstruction with US aid between 1953 and 1960, Korea enjoyed
a period of rapid economic growth until 1979, when the government’s export policy stim-
ulated firms to export production from labour intensive industries, such as footwear or
textiles (Lim, 2008). By contrast, already in the 1980s, the policy encouraged exports of
semiconductors and automobiles (ibid.). Kim (1993) argues that the dynamic growth in
Korea in this period, where FDI was less important than in Singapore or Taiwan, was fa-
cilitated by the aggressive creation and accumulation of technical capabilities by domestic
firms and that Korean workers improved their skills through hard work and investment in
learning.
According to Lim (2008), chaebol group firms created and accumulated technologi-
cal capability through capital investment and R&D investment as well as organisational
learning. Because large chaebol firms were ”close”, both economically and politically, to
the ruling regime, they had access to financial and human resources under advantageous
conditions not enjoyed by small firms (Lim, 2008). That is how the dual system of strong
large firms and weak small firms emerged in Korea, becoming a chronic problem for its
economy (ibid.).
In the late 1980s, first characterised by a nationwide phenomenon of asset speculation
(by chaebol groups) and the labour and democratisation movement, Korea’s economic
system progressively became more open and liberalised under pressure from the USA
and international organisations such as the WTO (Lim, 2008). After the financial crisis of
1997 (provoked by the instability of the economic system due to liberalisation), Korea un-
derwent major reforms (ibid.) Nevertheless, Lim (2008, p. 117) suggests that despite the
unstable environment, ”some Korean large firms emerged as world-class manufacturers
whose success in the world market was based on their technological capabilities”.
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4.2.2 Innovation Intensity
According to the innovation survey conducted in Korea in 2002 (modelled on the Com-
munity Innovation Survey), the share of innovative manufacturing firms with at least one
successful innovation over the previous two years (2000 and 2001) was 33 per cent. The
gap of over 10 per cent between Korea and European firms (for European countries this
share was 44 per cent over 1998, 1999 and 2000) clearly shows that Korean firms were
less likely to innovate in that period (Lim, 2008).
As measured by triadic patent families per million population, Korean firms’ propen-
sity to innovate has improved significantly in the last years - from only 7.7 in 1998, well
below the OECD average of 36.2 (OECD, 2003, p. 178), to 40 in 2007-2009, above the
OECD average of 38 (OECD, 2011b, p. 45). Thus, in 2007-2009, Korea was just behind
the USA with 46, but still well behind Germany with 72, Sweden with 100 and Japan with
107 patents per million population (OECD, 2011b, p. 45).
Lim (2008, p. 118, Figure 4.3) also shows that, according to the innovation survey
by European Commission (2004) and Um and Choi (2004), in Korea large firms in the
manufacturing sector were the most innovative - 75.5 per cent of them were innovators,
compared to 53.7 per cent of medium-sized and 28.8 per cent of small firms. The results of
this innovation survey demonstrate that the gap between the share of ”large” and ”small”
innovative firms is larger in Korea than in Europe - 48 percentage point in Korea against 35
in Sweden and 41 in Finland. In addition, the same survey showed that the innovativeness
of service sector firms in Korea is below its manufacturing sector (22 per cent share of
innovative firms in service against 33 per cent in manufacturing), which is also much
lower than for the service sector in Sweden (40 per cent of innovative firms) and the EU
average of 36 per cent.
As expected, the prevailing pattern of innovation in Korea is ”imitative innovation
relying on foreign technology” - among the product-innovating firms in the manufacturing
sector only 6.8 per cent produced ”new-to-the-world” product innovations, while most
innovations were ”new to the firm” or ”new to Korea” (Lim, 2008, p. 119). Korean firms
named ”purchasing the right to use invention or technological licensing from foreign
firms” as the most useful way of technology acquisition (out of the nine methods listed)
(ibid.).
4.2.3 Activities that Influence Innovation
Here we will also revisit ten main activities that shape the Korean national system of
innovation.
I Knowledge inputs to innovation
1 R&D activities
R&D intensity is high in Korea - as measured by the gross domestic expenditure
on R&D as a percentage of GDP, Korea’s performance has improved significantly
over the last years. Figure 4.1 shows that while in 2001 Korea’s GERD as per-
centage of GDP was 2.5 per cent, in 2011 it went up to almost 4 per cent and
Korea ranked second among the OECD countries. This impressive performance is
largely due to intensive R&D activity of Korea’s business sector - in 2011 the R&D
expenditure of Korean industry accounted for 71.8 per cent of its gross domestic
expenditure on R&D (among the OECD countries, Korea was surpassed only by
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Japan on this indicator) (OECD, 2012b, Table 13). Lim (2008) argues that in this
respect Korea is similar to Sweden where large firms also play an important role.
However, there was also an increase of small firms’ share in the business sector
R&D in Korea: according to Suh (2004), the share of small firms in the business
sector R&D doubled from 11.4 per cent of total business R&D expenditure in 1995
to 23.6 per cent in 2001 (as citet in Lim, 2008).
Lim (2008) stresses that university R&D is poorly developed in Korea - as mea-
sured by the percentage of gross domestic expenditure on R&D performed by the
higher education sector in 2010, Korea with only 10.8 per cent was well below the
OECD average of 18.7 per cent (OECD, 2012b, p. 37, Table 18).
Lim (2008) underlines that Korea’s intensive R&D resulted partly from its in-
creased specialisation in ICT - in 2007-2009 Korea ranked fourth among the OECD
countries in terms of specialisation in ICT (OECD, 2011b, p. 182). Finally, Lim
(2008) argues that the Korean NSI is less open globally than that of small advanced
EU countries - in 2008, R&D funds from abroad (as a percentage of business en-
terprise R&D) were only 0.25 per cent in Korea, compared to 12.23 per cent in
Sweden and 20.76 in Ireland in 2009 (OECD, 2011b, p. 92).
2 Competence building
In 2012, Korea’s total spending on education (as percentage of its national income)
of 8 per cent was second highest in the OECD area after Iceland (see Figure 4.2).
However, while the Korean education system up to secondary level is regarded as
very successful and in 2010 Korea ranked first among the OECD countries as mea-
sured by population that has attained tertiary education (see Figure 4.4), poor R&D
capabilities in Korean universities lead to poorly qualified new researchers that do
not satisfy the needs of large firms (Lim, 2008). Nevertheless, recent data show
that Korea has undertaken serious measures in recent years in order to improve
this situation - it boasted the second largest increase in expenditure per student in
tertiary education between 2000 and 2009 (OECD, 2012a, Table B1.5b).
Figure 4.4: Population that has attained tertiary education, 2010
Notes:
1. Year of reference 2002.
2. Year of reference 2009.
3. Year of reference 2000.
Source: OECD, 2012a, p. 26.
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In part due to their need to upgrade the quality of graduates from the Korean educa-
tion system (and also because they are obliged by law to make such investments),
Korean firms actively invest in training (Lim, 2008). Indeed, the OECD (2012a,
Table B2.3) data show that Korea has the highest share (1.9 per cent) of private
expenditure in tertiary education among the OECD countries. According to Lim
(2008), reforms of Korean educational system aiming to improve the quality of
its provision as well as the increase in number of overseas trained doctoral grad-
uates who return to Korea contributed to positive changes in competence building
in Korea.
II Demand-side activities (include activities 3 and 4)
As argued by Lim (2008), Korea’s ICT policies is a prominent example of demand-
side activities directed to market creation. For instance, government policies in the
1990s focusing on rapid diffusion of ADSL (including competition policy, policies of
early commitment to the promotion of the Internet and the cyber building certificate
system) were responsible for the commercial success of broadband Internet (ibid.).
As a result, Korea was one of the first OECD countries (together with Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) where the DSL coverage reached 100 per cent in
2004 (OECD, 2011a, p. 165, Table 4.14).
Moreover, Lim (2008) suggests that the adoption of CDMA as the national standard
for mobile communications by Korean government in the early 1990s (Korea was
the first country to adopt CDMA as a national standard) led to the creation of a huge
market for CDMA telecommunications equipment in Korea. As a result of intelligent
policy, some of the largest Korean firms such as Samsung Electronics today have a
world class ”brand power” and belong to the leading telecommunications equipment
manufacturers (ibid.).
III Provision of constituents
5 Provision of organisations
Lim (2008) points out that Korea has been aggressive in generating new organisa-
tions in order to capture opportunities from new technologies. For example, after
the financial crisis of 1997, the Korean government encouraged venture businesses
in order to revitalise the economy by offering them tax incentives and providing
them with attractive environment, including the IT infrastructure. These policies
contributed to an increase of newly established venture businesses from 422 in
1996 to 878 in 1999 (OECD, 2000, p. 150). Lim (2008, p. 131) argues that the in-
flux of venture businesses, in turn, has led to increase in number of new firms, and
that all in all there has been ”a positive change in the business environment and in
the attitude towards launching new firms”. According to the Small and Medium
Business Administration (2003), the venture business firms (i.e. excluding venture
capital firms) invested heavily in R&D for innovation and contributed greatly to
the dynamic growth of the Korean industry (as citet in Lim, 2008). Lim (2008)
suggests that despite their sometimes poor performance, venture businesses are
undoubtedly influential actors in the the new industries such as ICT and biotech-
nology - according to OECD (2000, p. 152), 40 per cent of the venture businesses
created between 1995 and 1999 were in computer and telecommunication equip-
ment sectors
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6 Networking, interactive learning and knowledge integration
Lim (2008) argues that since historically Korean firms relied heavily on success-
ful adoption and assimilation of foreign technology, interaction among domestic
firms was generally less important for learning than interaction with firms in the
advances countries. As a result, networking among domestic firms in Korea was
not very well developed, but in the last years domestic sources of knowledge has
become more important.
Lim (2008) suggests that one of the key characteristics of the Korean NSI is the
existence of strong chaebol-led networks with vertical linkages among firms in
the major industry sectors. In such networks, large firms belonging to chaebol
groups have subcontracting relationships with their affiliated firms and with other
not-affiliated small firms. Further, as discussed by Lim (2008), cooperative R&D
activities are becoming more common partly due to the Korea’s innovation pol-
icy - when it comes to governmental funding, proposals for collaborative research
projects between government research institutes, firms and universities receive pri-
ority.
As regards interactive learning, there are some barriers in Korea because, for in-
stance, firms from different chaebol groups might often be reluctant to interact
(Lim, 2008). Also, the traditional dual structure with weaker small firms and
strong large firms impedes interactive learning between smaller and larger firms
(ibid.).
7 Provision of institutions
According to Lim (2008, p. 137), ”Korean government policies in the past were
based upon a bureaucratic, top-down approach”, whereas ”over the 1990s there
was a trend towards a more interactive, bottom up approach”. Lim (2008) sug-
gests that the Korean central government has always traditionally been the regula-
tor and driver of Korean S&T policy, but while in the 1960s-70s its intervention
was direct, from 1980 to 2000 (and especially after extensive deregulation con-
ducted from 1992 to 2002) direct intervention was superseded by market mecha-
nisms.
After the financial crisis of 1997, the Korean government became the driver of
reforms in corporate governance (large firms were forced to focus on profitability
and shareholders’ interests rather than increased size), labour relationships (e.g.
through policy for enhancing flexibility of labour markets), the financial system
and the government sector (ibid.). An important policy focus was also on en-
hancing market competition, including trade liberalisation (e.g. abolishment of
non-tariff barriers), reforms of FDI policy in order to attract foreign investors, and
strengthening of fair trade policy.
Moreover, Lim (2008) argues that as the share of Korean-owned patents registered
in Korea increased (from 11.4 per cent in 1980 to 32.9 per cent in 1990), the
Korean government realised the importance of strengthening of IPR for protecting
not only foreign investors, but also domestic inventors. As a result, in 1987, the
patent law was amended to protect IPR in computer software and materials, and a
product patent system was introduced.
IV Support services for innovating firms
8 Incubating activities
Olga Syraya 75
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES: SWEDISH AND KOREAN NATIONAL SYSTEMS
OF INNOVATION
According to Kim and Lee (2005), the main focus of Korean policy initiatives
aimed at stimulating new firms has been on providing physical facilities and fa-
cilitating the flow of investment towards new small firms (as citet in Lim, 2008).
As stated by Jeong (2005), these measures included tax incentives, provision of
services, relaxation of the requisites for establishing a corporation, and granting
temporary leave to university and other R&D institute professors and researchers
to establish venture businesses (as citet in Lim, 2008).
The first business incubator in Korea was established in 1993, and the majority of
them (242 out of 291 approved in 2005 - 83.2 per cent) are located in universi-
ties (Lim, 2008). However, Kim and Lee (2005) and Yang (2004) underline that
although Korea has a similar number of incubators to other advanced countries,
they do not perform well in terms of providing services that satisfy the demands
of firms due to the lack of experts (as citet in Lim, 2008).
9 Financing
As suggested by Lim (2008), the Korean financial system is based mainly on the
banking system and banks are the most important financing source for firms. Pre-
viously, financial organisations were controlled by the government, but from the
latter 1980s, regulation of financial organisation was eased and the Korean finan-
cial market was opened to foreign firms (ibid.). After the financial crisis of 1997,
reforms of the Korean financial system were conducted including a loosening of
financial sector regulation on foreign investments, which led to the increase of the
share of foreign ownership in the banking sector from only 7 per cent in 1997
to 27 per cent in 2002 (ibid.). In addition, Lim (2008) argues that as a result of
the crisis, the financial organisations in Korea tightened their conditions for lend-
ing money to firms and have been learning to build their own lending systems on
the basis of credit information and estimated risks. According to Cho (2004) and
Jeong (2004), this resulted in reduced monetary flows and low investment in the
economy, because financial organisations have been reluctant to assume the risks
involved in lending money (as citet in Lim, 2008).
After 1997, the number of venture capital firms in Korea increased dramatically -
111 firms were established between 1998 and 2002 (Lim, 2008). Korean govern-
ment also contributed to the establishment of investment funds and as venture busi-
nesses began to decline, it even increased its investment in venture capital funds
from 15.3 per cent in 1999 to 39 per cent in 2004 (ibid.). As the venture business
boom in the late 1990 resulted in increasing role of financial organisations in fund-
ing NTBFs, a number of policies for supporting the financing activities for NTBFs
were introduced, including, for example, a policy for supporting funds for start-up
companies with less than three-year history (ibid.).
10 Provision of consultancy services
Lim (2008) argues that consulting services that are considered to be important
for the innovation process are poorly developed in Korea. Indeed, as measured
by the annual rate of increase in sales in the 1996-2000 period, traditional KIBS
activities directly relevant to innovation - R&D services (8.2 per cent), business
services (5.7 per cent) and technical services (-1.5 per cent) - have been growing
relatively slowly, in contrast to the fast-growing (35.5 per cent) computer-related
services (ibid.).
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4.2.4 Consequences of Innovation and Globalisation
In a study by Lee and Kim (2003) on the relationship between R&D and labour produc-
tivity in Korea, a 1 per cent increase in R&D investment (stock of R&D investment) is
estimated to have increased labour productivity (per labour hour) by an average of 0.13
per cent over the 1980s-90s (as citet in Lim, 2008). In addition, Lim (2008, p. 142) argues
that ”patenting activity, as an approximate measure of innovation activity, has an impact
on total factor productivity (TFP)”. For example, as estimated by Youn et al. (2003)
using data from 1964-2000, a 1 per cent increase in patenting application in any one year
produces an increase in TFP of 0.11 per cent in the subsequent five years (as citet in Lim,
2008). Thus, as summarised by Lim (2008), over the 1980s-90s, R&D activities became
increasingly important for enhancing productivity in Korea.
However, on the output side, Korea‘s relatively high R&D intensity is not matched
by its economic performance - while its R&D intensity is high, Kaitila (2003) stresses
that Korean labour productivity per hour worked in total manufacturing (as studied in the
European Science Foundation project) is the lowest among the ten selected countries (as
citet in Lim, 2008). In addition, as measured by GDP per hour worked in 2002, Korea was
at only 37 per cent of the US level, compared to 101 per cent in Germany (Lim, 2008).
This mismatch indicates ”possible problems in the Korean NSI” (Lim, 2008, p. 142).
Globalisation has had a significant positive impact on the Korean NSI as Korean firms
have enhanced their technical capabilities by accessing foreign firms via, among oth-
ers, technical licensing arrangements, import of capital goods and components and, more
recently, original design manufacture and own brand-name arrangements (Lim, 2008).
Korea’s large firms that have become multinational companies have foreign subsidiaries
and branch offices for production, R&D and marketing (ibid.). Nevertheless, Lim (2008)
underlines that Korea’s R&D network is less well connected than its production network.
Korea has a poor record in co-authorship of scientific articles and on international collab-
oration on innovation - in 2005-2007, only 1.3 per cent of Korea’s innovative firms were
involved in international collaboration, compared to 8.3 per cent in Germany and 27.1 per
cent in Sweden (OECD, 2011b, p. 106).
Lim (2008, p. 144) argues that it was the financial crisis of 1997 that ”provided the
momentum for opening up the Korean NSI for foreign actors” - the Foreign Investment
Act of 1998 ”provided a basis for tax exemptions and incentives for foreign investment”.
These measures led to the dramatic expansion of the FDI influx in the period from 1998
to 2002, which, in turn, resulted in increase in R&D activities of foreign firms in Korea
(ibid.).
The Korea’s pattern of catching up that we have described can be referred to as ”catch-
ing up by specializing in new industries” - that is, in the ICT industries (Lim, 2008, p.
145). As discussed by Albert (1998) and Lee et al. (2005), Korean large firms in the
ICT field have adopted a new pattern of innovation - development of original products by
rapidly commercialising emerging technology from abroad (as we can see on the exam-
ples of CDMA mobile technologies and digital TV) (as citet in Lim, 2008).
4.2.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of NSI
As regards the strengths of the Korean NSI (based on Lim (2008)), its main advantage
is its large firms that are capable of rapidly developing and producing commercial prod-
ucts from emerging technologies due to their access to local and international sources of
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knowledge and markets. The second strength is Korea’s heavy investment in IT infras-
tructure and high diffusion rate of IT devices that contributed to development of Internet
businesses and transformation of the Korean service sector. Korea’s third advantage is
its capability for rapid commercialisation in fast growing new industries such as IT and
electronics. And the fourth strength of the Korean NSI is its skilled and hard-working
labour force.
Lim (2008) also names the following weaknesses of the Korean NSI. First, its corpo-
rate sector (the chaebols) have been rather reluctant to adopt the reforms and large firms
affiliated to them might continue to be a major burden on the Korean economy. The sec-
ond weakness is the prevalence of non-competitive small firms - while Korea, similarly
to Sweden, has to face the problem of the bipolarised economy, in Korea the situation is
quite the opposite, with strong large firms and weak small firms. The third disadvantage
of the Korean NSI, according to Lim (2008), is its weak science base, and the fourth - the
poor competitiveness and innovativeness of its service sector that is likely to be a barrier to
further economic growth. Fifth, despite a large amount of highly educated labour forces,
their quality of education does not satisfy the needs of large firms. Furthermore, Koreans’
preference for work in closed networks (e.g. informal regional networks, networks of
alumni etc.) reduces information flow and flexible work organisation required for inno-
vation process. Another weakness is that the Korean financial system is new and banks
and other organisations are reluctant to to take risks in making loans to firms. Finally,
Lim (2008, p. 147) suggests that the Korean business environment might not be stable
enough and that ”Korean government practices are bureaucratic and follow a top-down
approach to policy”.
4.2.6 Innovation Policies
Lim (2008) argues that because science and technology policies in Korea have ignored
the economic and social aspects involved in the innovation process (S&T policy has been
distinct from economic and industrial policies), the policies for the previously discussed
activities - R&D input, competence building, the financial system, labour relations and
incubation - have not worked together to encourage innovation. To correct this lack of
coordination, the Korean government announced in 2004 ”A Plan to Construct a National
Innovation System” reflecting the country’s commitment to become an innovation-based
economy with S&T policy as a major national priority (ibid.).
According to Lim (2008, p. 148), the goals of this plan reflect the direction of Ko-
rea’s future innovation policy in, first, ”enhancing the innovation capability of three core
innovation actors (universities, firms and GRIs)”; second, ”increasing R&D expendi-
ture and enhancing its effectiveness”; third, searching for and developing future strategic
technologies that could become drivers of industrial growth; fourth, ”reinforcing link-
ages and cooperation among both domestic and foreign innovation actors (universities-
industry-GRIs)”; and finally, ”organising the system for coordination and planning of
technological innovation policy, and information networks in S&T”.
In order to achieve these ambitious goals, as discussed by Lim (2008), there is a need
for a system for measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of government policy pro-
grammes at the NSI level, which should be continuously revised and improved. Another
measure required to facilitate innovation activities is ”removing barriers to networking
among actors” and ”removing barriers to investment by nurturing technological com-
petences” (Lim, 2008, p. 149). And finally, taking into consideration the increasing
78 Olga Syraya
4.3. CONCLUSIONS
vulnerability of Korean small firms to international competition, enhancing the techno-
logical capabilities of small firms and their networking with domestic and international
actors will be crucially important for future innovation policy in Korea (ibid.).
4.3 Conclusions
The analysis of the Swedish and Korean systems of innovation has shown that these coun-
tries went through the industrialisation process in different ways and at different times.
For example, in the 1950s, Swedish engineering industry was surpassed only by the USA
in terms of percentage of total exports, while Korea still had to build its infrastructure and
production facilities almost from scratch. Today, their national systems of innovation still
display several differences, such as high labour productivity with hardly any growth in
Sweden vs. still growing labour productivity in Korea, or strong service sector in Sweden
vs. rather weak service sector in Korea.
Nevertheless, we have seen that Sweden and Korea also share many features and
challenges: the lack of ”new-to-the-world” products despite high R&D investment; high
spending on education the quality of which does not always satisfy the needs of high-
tech firms; the dominance of large firms in the NSI and the important role of multina-
tional companies; and the fact that both countries have early recognised new technolog-
ical trends and now boast very strong ICT sectors. All this implies that certain policy
measures that apply to both countries, such as more support for SMEs in order to increase
their competitiveness in the global economy, or enhancing collaboration and networking
over institutional and country borders, might also be a solution to other countries in a
similar situation.
The results of the analysis also indicate that Korea has a potential of a lead market
for mobile communications. For example, compared to other OECD countries, Korean
companies boast high innovation intensity (in part due to Korea’s high specialisation in
ICT), and Korea’s total spending on education in 2012 is surpassed only by Iceland. In
addition, Korea’s remarkable performance in broadband Internet adoption was largely due
to targeted governmental policies. Notably, it is suggested that the adoption of CDMA
as a national mobile standard by Korean government in the early 1990s contributed to
the success of Samsung Electronics today. All this indeed implies that Korea is a likely
candidate for a 3G lead market, and not a mere early adopter.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Analysis: What Affects the
Diffusion of 3G Mobile Technologies?
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of factors that influenced the adoption of third
generation mobile technologies in selected OECD countries. It will contribute to a better
understanding of innovation diffusion processes in mobile communications and its results
will hopefully serve as guidelines for policy decisions for 4G and further technologies in
the mobile communications market.
5.1 Literature Review
Due to the importance of the problem, over the past years, quite a few national and in-
ternational empirical studies have been devoted to the analysis of factors influencing the
adoption of mobile communications technologies (and 3G in particular) from different
perspectives.
On the firm level, Islam and Meade (2013) try to explain the differences in the tech-
nology diffusion of 3G mobile phones in companies, using non-linear mixed modelling
on pooled multi-country data from 123 firms in 40 countries. From the national perspec-
tive, Chong et al. (2012) examine the factors that affect Chinese consumers’ intention
to adopt 3G and demonstrate that social influence, service quality and perceived ease of
use have a direct and significant influence on perceived usefulness of 3G. The empirical
analysis of factors for 3G adoption in Japan conducted by Akematsu et al. (2012) re-
vealed that the launch of the iPhone 3G, FeliCa (a contactless RFID smart card system
from Sony, primarily used in electronic money cards), data roaming, full music down-
loads, and the flat rate have affected the rapid diffusion of the 3G mobile in Japan. Teng
et al. (2009) conducted an empirical study of the mass adoption of 3G mobile phones
in Taiwan, demonstrating that perceived utility of a new mobile service (along with the
perceived utility of a new handset) was a key factor of mass adoption. Also, Lin (2013)
applies Grey system theory to predict the diffusion of mobile cellular broadband and fixed
broadband in Taiwan and shows that mobile cellular broadband and fixed broadband have
a complementary relationship. At the same time, the results of the study by Srinuan et al.
(2012) suggest that in Sweden mobile broadband substitutes to fixed broadband.
On the macroeconomic level, Lee and Brown (2008) conducted both nonlinear (lo-
gistic model of technology diffusion) and linear regression analysis of factors influencing
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the diffusion of fixed broadband. The results suggest that different types of local loop
unbundling (LLU) policies and previous fixed broadband penetration are significant fac-
tors of fixed broadband deployment. As regards mobile broadband diffusion, econometric
analysis conducted by Zaber and Sirbu (2012) over a multi-country panel dataset shows
that regulatory policies regarding spectrum management have significant influence on the
take-up of 3G and suggests that the presence of multiple technologies for the previous
generation is associated with rollout delay of 3G. Further, an international study by Islam
and Meade (2012), aiming to discover differences in technology diffusion of 3G mobile
phones across countries, found a significant impact of competitive fractionalisation on the
likelihood of 3G adoption, as well as a significant impact of economic globalisation on
3G market growth.
From the lead market perspective, Lehrer (2004) argued that the UK and Germany had
the potential to become national ”lead markets” for m-commerce and other applications
of 3G despite being relative laggards in mobile telephony.
My empirical analysis can be seen to a certain extent as a follow-up of the study
conducted by Lee et al. (2011), which is devoted to factors of both mobile and fixed
broadband diffusion. Lee et al. (2011) adopt the logistic diffusion model to estimate the
diffusion of broadband technologies because, as they argue, the logistic diffusion model
is one of the most commonly used models for the estimation of new communication tech-
nologies (e.g. Botelho and Pinto (2004), Singh (2008)) and it also can capture the ex-
istence of network externalities (Gruber and Verboven, 2001). For their study they use
annual data (years from 2000 to 2008) for 30 OECD countries for the fixed broadband
diffusion model and annual data (years from 2003 to 2008) for 26 OECD countries for
the mobile broadband diffusion model. The analysed factors of mobile broadband de-
ployment included income (GDP per capita, PPP), population density, education (UNDP
Education index), fixed broadband price (monthly fixed broadband price (Mbps) as a per-
centage of monthly income (USD)), standardisation policy, and mobile broadband price
(monthly mobile broadband price (Mbps) as a percentage of monthly income (USD)).
For the estimation of mobile broadband diffusion, Lee et al. (2011) employed the coun-
try fixed effects model. As a result of the data analysis, multiple standardisation policy,
population density, and fixed broadband price were statistically significant. Thus, Lee
et al. (2011, p. 14) argue that these results imply ”the importance of market-mediated,
multiple standards when a new technology evolves into a different stage of development”,
and that ”higher population density contributes to mobile broadband deployment”. In
addition, according to the authors, the results of this mobile broadband diffusion study
suggest the complementarity of mobile services and fixed broadband services in many
OECD countries. However, although the logistic diffusion model proved to work well for
2G technologies, I doubt its superiority over a linear regression model in the special case
of 3G adoption. To be more specific, Lee et al. (2011) used the available data from 2003-
2008, but when we have a look at the diffusion curves in Figure 3.12, for most countries
the penetration curve for this period (early stage of 3G adoption) is still close to a linear
function. This and our methodology choice will be discussed in more detail later on.
5.2 Variables
It was decided to base our empirical model on the framework of lead market theory dis-
cussed by Beise (2004) and Beise (2006), which deals with the global diffusion of in-
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novations. As discussed in Section 3.4, according to the lead market approach, certain
countries or regions possess special attributes (lead market factors) that make the locally
preferred innovation design successful worldwide. The lead market theory applies very
well to the mobile communications market as it aims to explain the worldwide success of
the cellular mobile telephony and why it prevailed over rival innovation designs, such as
pagers and satellite telephony. Beise (2004) and Beise (2006) suggest that mobile tele-
phony (and 2G in particular) became so popular worldwide because it enjoyed tremendous
success in the Nordic countries from its very beginning, which possess such lead market
factors as for example high competition among telecom providers and subsequently low
prices, the pan-European and non-proprietary character of the GSM standard, traditional
export orientation of the Nordic countries, and the average population density in these
countries.
However, as already discussed in the theoretical chapter, although the approach de-
veloped by Beise (2004) and Beise (2006) works well for 2G (GSM), the adoption of
3G mobile technologies in the European countries did not follow the same pattern as that
of 2G. 3G penetration curves in Figure 3.12 suggest that Nordic countries were rapidly
overtaken by Korea, Japan and Slovenia. Based on this results, a decision was taken to
conduct a more detailed analysis of the factors that might have contributed to the 3G
adoption in the OECD countries. Hence, our dependant variable is 3G penetration rate
that was calculated based on the most recent data on 3G subscriptions from OECD (2013,
Table 4.9) and OECD population statistics for respective years.
As the first 3G commercial network was launched in 2001 and the latest data available
were for 2011, we will be dealing with an unbalanced panel dataset with data on 23
countries (for a complete list of countries see Appendix A) over 11 years (N = 23,
T = 11). The number of countries is also limited by the data on 3G subscriptions available
from the OECD.
The independent variables were chosen as approximation of the lead market factors
discussed by Beise (2004) and Beise (2006). Therefore, the novelty of this analysis is that
it aimed to establish ex-post the influence of at least a part of suggested lead market fac-
tors on the 3G penetration rate. The data available from OECD, ITU, EUROSTAT, World
Bank, UN Comtrade and EU Comext databases were classified into five lead market fac-
tors as summarised in Table 5.1 (for a complete list of data sources see Appendix A). In
many cases it was not possible to find the data referring only to mobile communications
technologies and therefore they were substituted with more general data on ICT.
As regards the first lead market factor - the demand advantage - we will check the
influence of income, which, Beise (2004, p. 1003) argues, is ”one of the fundamental
determinants that shapes the consumption pattern”. Transfer advantage - the ability of a
country to shape other countries’ preferences - is more difficult to quantify and we con-
sider the 2G mobile penetration rate 10 years ago as well as the current fixed broadband
penetration rate as an indicator of the sophistication of a country’s users, their openness
for new communication technologies. Also, the share of young population and its educa-
tion level might influence the reputation of a country’s users and their level of technical
sophistication.
Price advantage that according to Beise (2004) is expected to be one of the most
important lead market drivers, could best be quantified by the costs of mobile Internet
usage. However, neither OECD nor ITU did dispose of such yearly data. The mobile
cellular price of 3 minutes local call (available from ITU) did not work as a proxy because
of too many missing values in the data, which made their use impossible in a statistical
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Table 5.1: Independent variables
Lead market factor Variable Data Source
Demand advantage Gross adjusted disposable income per capita
(GADI) (USD, current prices, current PPPs)
OECD
Transfer advantage Mobile cellular penetration rate 10 years ago (sub-
scriptions per 100 inhabitants)
ITU
Fixed (wired) broadband Internet subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants
OECD
Students enrolled into tertiary education per 100
population
OECD
Young population (15-34 years) per 100 popula-
tion
OECD
Market structure advantage ICT patent applications filed under the PCT 3
years ago (inventor’s country of residence, prior-
ity date, per million population)
OECD
Export advantage Urban population (% of total) World Bank
Population density (people per sq. km of land
area)
World Bank
Telecommunications equipment export unit value
(USD/kg)
UN Comtrade,
EU Comext
Source: Own illustration based on Beise 2004 and 2006.
analysis.
Evaluation of the market structure advantage also posed a challenge because the data
on the competition (i.e. the number of mobile operators for each year) in the mobile com-
munications market in selected countries were not complete and thus not suitable for this
analysis. Therefore, alternatives were required. In this case ICT patent applications filed
under the PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) were used, which reflect the level of inno-
vation activity in the national mobile communications and ICT market. A time lag of 3
years was taken because, according to WIPO (2013), in many cases the entire procedure
from patent application to grant takes over 18 months, and the implementation of the in-
vention also usually takes certain time, an average lag of at least 3 years is required for an
invention to actually influence the market. Unfortunately, the OECD data on investment
in cellular mobile infrastructure turned out to be too incomplete for the purpose of this
statistical analysis.
Finally, export advantage is in this case characterised by the percentage of urban pop-
ulation and by the population density (allowing to compare the similarity of local market
conditions), as well as by telecommunications equipment export unit value (the higher the
ratio, the more high-tech telecommunications equipment the country exports).
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Although much time and effort was invested in data collection, for many countries and
variables it was impossible to find more yearly data and consequently we have to deal
with an unbalanced panel with 147 observations for each variable as shown in Table 5.2.
The biggest differences across panels can be observed in variables that characterise
the countries’ innovation activity and exports: ICT patent applications and telecommuni-
cations equipment export unit value. Export unit value has a mean of approximately 301
USD/kg and standard deviation of just over 1804 USD/kg and ICT patent applications dis-
play a mean of approximately 35 and standard deviation of almost 39. This suggests that
although significant convergence has occurred with respect to mobile penetration rates,
the innovation and export performance of selected countries is still very different.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations Cross
sections
3G penetration 1 25.48513 31.37748 0 105.6542 147 23
GADI 2 21799.43 5357.022 9700.855 37809.58 147 23
Mobile penetration
10 years ago 3
23.54714 24.44652 0 89.59213 147 23
Fixed broadband 4 17.20923 10.9642 .0078067 39.46478 147 23
Students 5 4.168578 1.009632 2.530597 6.741761 147 23
Young population 6 26.7696 2.475253 21.91481 32.69896 147 23
ICT patent applica-
tions 7
34.67713 38.5611 0.0886268 172.904 147 23
Export unit value 8 301.3357 1804.471 13.4923 21720.13 147 23
Urban population 9 71.48547 10.30665 49.9294 88.7158 147 23
Population density 10 150.3553 119.8007 17.03276 512.6571 147 23
1 3G subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
2 in USD, current prices, current PPPs
3 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
4 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
5 enrolled into tertiary education, per 100 population
6 15-34 years, per 100 population
7 per million population, filed 3 years ago
8 in USD/kg
9 in % of total population
10 people per sq. km of land area
Source: Own calculations.
Further, correlation analysis was conducted and Table 5.3 displays some interesting
results. For example, 3G penetration rate is highly positively correlated with mobile pen-
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etration rate 10 years ago, and modestly correlated with fixed broadband penetration rate
as well as with the number of students enrolled into tertiary education (per 100 pop-
ulation). This suggests that technical sophistication of users and their familiarity with
previous mobile technologies (2G) and fixed broadband positively affects the adoption of
3G technologies (mobile broadband). On the other hand, the low Pearson’s r signifies a
weak positive correlation of 3G penetration with gross adjusted disposable income and
with population density.
Table 5.3 also suggests that some of our independent variables are moderately to
highly correlated. For example, fixed broadband is highly positively correlated with mo-
bile penetration rate ten years ago, again suggesting that the development of mobile and
fixed communication technologies goes hand in hand. Gross adjusted disposable income
shows a moderate negative correlation with percentage of young population, and ICT
patent applications are moderately positively correlated with percentage of urban pop-
ulation. Percentage of young population displays a negative correlation with most other
variables - indeed, more economically developed countries tend to have an ageing popula-
tion. Our correlation analysis shows that, in accordance with the 0.80 Pearson correlation
criterion (see for example Lee and Brown (2008, p. 28)), no variables displayed very high
correlation with other independent variables that could lead to multicollinearity problems.
Table 5.3: Correlation matrix, Pearson’s r
3G pen GADI mob pen fix BB stud young ICT pat exp pop urb
3G pen 1.0000
GADI 0.2535 1.0000
mob pen 0.6864 0.3765 1.0000
fix BB 0.5629 0.4741 0.7005 1.0000
stud 0.3839 -0.3086 0.1461 0.1511 1.0000
young -0.1644 -0.6224 -0.3781 -0.4138 0.2685 1.0000
ICT pat 0.0666 0.3763 0.1616 0.3489 0.1248 -0.4141 1.0000
exp -0.0298 0.1356 0.0932 0.1234 -0.0361 -0.0885 0.0046 1.0000
pop urb -0.1502 0.3149 0.0823 0.3540 -0.0790 -0.4089 0.6536 0.1009 1.0000
pop d 0.2108 0.1695 0.0461 0.2635 -0.1362 -0.1425 0.1309 -0.0342 0.2808
Source: Own calculations.
In order to further access multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) were cal-
culated (see Table 5.4). Although there is no formal test decision for this indicator, in
applied regression analysis V IF > 10 is usually considered as a sign of high multi-
collinearity (see Kleinbaum et al. (1998)). Indeed, only two of the independent variables
(mobile penetration 10 years ago and export unit value) had V IF < 5, while GADI, per-
centage of urban population and population density displayed very high multicollinearity
with V IF > 30. High multicollinearity is a problem because it increases the standard
errors of the coefficients and thus leads to imprecise estimates for highly correlated vari-
ables (see Baltagi (2011, p. 75)). Therefore, we will have to take high multicollinearity
into account for future model estimation. One of the solutions would be, for instance,
to drop variables with extremely high VIF. However, because multicollinearity does not
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affect the coefficients themselves and is very common in panel data models, we will only
eliminate population density - the variable with the highest VIF.
Table 5.4: Variance inflation factors
Variable VIF
GADI 44.71
mob pen 4.06
fix BB 12.56
stud 20.38
young 23.40
ICT pat 30.02
exp 1.27
pop urb 238.93
pop d 5435.39
Source: Own calculations.
In addition, an attempt was made to establish if Slovenia and Korea (leaders in 3G
adoption) displayed any similarities and interesting patterns. It turned out that although
on some indicators the countries are indeed very similar, the are hardly comparable on the
others. For example, Figures 5.1 and 5.7 show that Slovenia and Korea have had a very
rapid 3G uptake despite their lower than average gross adjusted disposable income and
telecommunications equipment export unit value. On the other hand, as measured by per-
centage of young population and students enrolled into tertiary eduction, both countries
have similar higher-than-average performance (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). At the same time,
Korea has a much better than Slovenia performance in both 2G mobile and fixed broad-
band penetration rates (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3), as well as in ICT patent applications
where Korea even exceeds the average after 2006 (Korean successful telecom producers
such as Samsung have no doubt contributed to this improvement) (see Figure 5.6). These
first results suggest that despite sharing some similarities, both 3G leaders seem to be very
different, especially with regard to ICT development.
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Figure 5.1: Relation between GADI and 3G penetration rate, 2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD.
Figure 5.2: Relation between mobile penetration rate 10 years ago and 3G penetration
rate, 2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD.
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Figure 5.3: Relation between fixed broadband penetration rate and 3G penetration rate,
2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD.
Figure 5.4: Relation between students enrolled into tertiary education and 3G penetration
rate, 2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD.
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Figure 5.5: Relation between young population and 3G penetration rate, 2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD.
Figure 5.6: Relation between the number of ICT patents and 3G penetration rate, 2001-
2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD.
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Figure 5.7: Relation between between telecommunications equipment export unit value
and 3G penetration rate, 2001-2011
Source: Own calculations based on OECD, UN Comtrade, EU Comext.
5.4 Model and Hypotheses
The model is based on the framework of lead market theory developed by Beise (2004)
and Beise (2006) and devoted to the global diffusion of innovations, and independent
variables were carefully chosen in accordance with the lead market factors. After a careful
analysis of the available 3G penetration curves (see Appendix B), a decision was made
to step away from the commonly used logistic diffusion model employed for example by
Lee et al. (2011) in their analysis of factors of fixed and mobile broadband deployment.
The main reason for this choice was that by far not all available data on 3G penetration
show the signs of a logistic diffusion pattern. Only eight out of 23 countries seem to be
in the lower part of the logistic curve (sometimes also called S-curve), and our leaders
Slovenia, Korea and Japan are already in the saturation phase (although Japan displays a
very smooth S-curve close to a linear trend), while the penetration curves of 13 countries
are still clearly linear (in some cases due to lack of data). Moreover, this model choice
is justified by the fact that Lee and Brown (2008) also used a linear model (multiple
regression analysis) in addition to the logistic model in order to examine the influences of
quantifiable variables on the diffusion patterns of fixed-broadband.
At the same time, we must take into account that 3G adoption is clearly a dynamic
process in which the penetration rate of every subsequent year depends on the penetration
rate in the previous period. Hence, it requires a dynamic panel data model. Therefore, we
act on the assumption of a dynamic linear dependence and consider that penetration rate
of 3G mobile technologies is driven by eight factors: GADI, mobile penetration 10 years
ago, fixed broadband Internet penetration, students, young population, ICT patent appli-
cations, telecommunications equipment export unit value and urban population (popula-
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tion density was dropped because of extremely high VIF). Hence, the regression equation
looks as follows:
3Gpenetrationit = δ3Gpenetrationi,t−1 + β1GADI′it + β2MobilePenetration′it
+ β3FixedBroadband′it + β4Students′it + β5Y oungPopulation′it
+ β6ICTPatents′it + β7ExportUnitV alue′it
+ β8UrbanPopulation′it + µi + νit
(5.1)
where index i denotes the country, t represents time (year in this case), µi is the
unobservable individual specific effect (such as country-specific policy measures that are
hard to quantify) and νit denotes the remainder disturbance (see Baltagi (2010)). As
already mentioned, here we deal with a dynamic panel data model characterised by the
presence of a lagged dependant variable 3Gpenetration among the regressors (ibid.).
In addition, the variables fixed broadband Internet penetration and telecommunications
equipment export unit value are apparently endogenous because, first, fixed broadband
adoption might be influenced by 3G penetration, and, second, wide adoption of mobile
technologies (and ICT in general) is likely to improve the export performance of a country
in this sector.
As regards the influence of each single factor, first, it can be expected that with in-
creasing income, the users adopt new (often more expensive) technologies more eagerly.
Second, we assume a strong positive influence of penetration rate of previous mobile tech-
nologies (2G) and of fixed broadband penetration on 3G penetration rate, because more
experienced and more technology-friendly users are also more likely to adopt new tech-
nologies. Moreover, we expect to show if fixed broadband Internet and mobile Internet
are complementary or substitute technologies. Third, countries with higher percentage of
young population and more students are expected to adopt 3G faster because younger and
better educated part of population would follow mobile trends first.
In addition, it is logical to assume that 3G penetration rate should be higher in mar-
kets where more R&D in ICT (with more ICT patents) was conducted. And finally, there
should also be positive correlation between the last two factors characterising export ad-
vantage and 3G penetration rate. However, the role of urban population is not entirely
clear because it is also sometimes suggested that users in rural areas, on the contrary,
adopt mobile technologies more eagerly if they do not have good fixed Internet access.
5.5 Methodology and Regression Results
As regards model estimation method, we stopped on Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond lin-
ear dynamic panel-data estimation with a system estimator that uses additional moment
conditions (see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998)). The GMM (generalised method of moments) estimation method developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is based on the first difference of the model and eliminates
the individual effects µi. In addition, the system GMM estimator with additional moment
conditions developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) building on the work of Arellano and
Bover (1995), is more efficient for panels with short T because it reduces the finite sam-
ple bias as compared to the standard first-differences estimator (see also Baltagi (2010)).
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Also, Soto (2009) was able to demonstrate through Monte Carlo simulations that a small
number of individuals (which is typically the case in country growth studies) does not
seem to have important effects on the properties of the system GMM estimator, which
displays the best features in terms of small sample bias and precision (compared to OLS,
the fixed effects and the difference GMM). Therefore, the system GMM can be seen as
the best estimation method for our case - dynamic panel model with endogenous variables
(fixed broadband penetration and telecommunications equipment export unit value), short
T (T = 11) and small N (N = 23).
The results of postestimation specification (Sagran) test confirmed that model and
overidentifying conditions are correctly specified and that there is no serial correlation in
the first-differenced disturbances. The results of the regression are presented in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: System dynamic panel-data estimation with endogenous variables
Dependent variable: 3G penetration One-step results
3G penetration L1. 0.7200763∗∗∗
(0.0962526)
GADI per capita 0.0022808∗∗∗
(0.000596)
Mobile penetration 10 years ago 0.1441716∗∗
(0.0719534)
Fixed broadband penetration −0.0417728
(0.2427129)
Students enrolled into tertiary education 5.964504∗∗
(2.71067)
Young population (15-34 years) 2.321677∗∗
(0.9571797)
ICT patent applications filed under the PCT 3 years ago 0.0055213
(0.0626032)
Telecommunications equipment export unit value −0.0003873
(0.0027504)
Urban population −0.6454981∗∗
(0.3177512)
Constant −82.07959∗∗
(41.14552)
Wald chi2(9) 713.65∗∗∗
Instruments 102
Observations 109
Notes:
***, **, * denotes significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Standard errors are given under the coefficients.
As anticipated, these results indeed indicate positive influence of income on 3G pen-
etration rate in selected OECD countries, confirming the role of demand advantage in the
case of 3G diffusion, as suggested by the lead market theory by Beise (2004) and Beise
(2006). By contrast, the income variable (as measured by GDP per capita, PPP) in the
study previously conducted by Lee et al. (2011) was not statistically significant - possibly
due to less data (their T = 6).
Further, the regression results indicate a strong positive role of mobile penetration rate
10 years ago (i.e. previous 2G adoption) on 3G adoption. Hence, our second hypothesis
is also confirmed - the users’ familiarity with the previous generation of mobile technolo-
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gies seems indeed to have had an important positive influence on 3G diffusion. These
results are similar to the findings by Lee and Brown (2008) regarding the fixed broadband
penetration - the results of their study suggest that previous fixed broadband penetration
is an influential factor for fixed-broadband diffusion in the 30 OECD countries that were
considered.
On the other hand, we cannot say if fixed broadband and 3G (i.e. mobile broadband)
are complementary or substitute technologies because the negative coefficient is not sta-
tistically significant. Thus, we are not able to confirm the findings of Lee et al. (2011, p.
15) who argue that ”in many OECD countries, mobile service is a complement to fixed
broadband services”.
As regards the percentage of students and young population, the role of these two
variables is also strongly positive, suggesting that young and better educated users follow
new mobile trends more eagerly. To go back to the study by Lee et al. (2011, p. 13),
although their education variable (as measured by UNDP Education index) was not sta-
tistically significant for mobile broadband penetration, their results for fixed broadband
penetration were similar to ours, implying that higher levels of education ”are important
drivers of fixed broadband diffusion in many OECD countries”. This indicates a similar
positive role of education for both mobile and fixed broadband diffusion.
Both patent applications and telecommunications export unit value are not statistically
significant, which suggests that conducting R&D in telecommunications and exporting
high-tech telecommunications equipment are not among the main factors that have influ-
enced 3G adoption. These findings are in line with the lead market theory as Beise (2006)
argues that it is the society that shapes the technological path through its choices, and not
technical superiority of an innovation design.
Finally, the regression results indicate a strong negative correlation between the per-
centage of urban population and 3G penetration rate, suggesting that in selected OECD
countries rural population uses 3G technologies more intensively, maybe because fixed
broadband is less accessible. These results are not directly comparable with findings by
Lee et al. (2011, pp. 14-15) who take population density as an explanatory variable in
their model and suggest that ”higher population density contributes to mobile broadband
deployment” and that ”less densely populated countries are indeed at a disadvantage
when it comes to the deployment of mobile broadband communications”. Hence, further
research is needed to clarify this issue.
5.6 Conclusions
The results of this analysis have confirmed several of the previously formulated hypothe-
ses and some earlier findings by Lee et al. (2011). For example, there was a positive
effect of mobile penetration rates ten years ago that indicates the level of users’ technical
sophistication and expertise. In addition, demand advantage as expressed by gross ad-
justed disposable income has also positively influenced 3G adoption, as did young and
better educated (and thus more technology friendly) population in selected countries. On
the other hand, our results suggest that it is not urban but rather rural population that
adopted 3G technologies more eagerly.
These results help to explain et least in part why Slovenia has managed to achieve such
impressive 3G penetration rates despite its poor telecommunications export and R&D per-
formance - simply because the role of these factors was not important. At the same time,
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Slovenia (and Korea) have a young and well-educated population - factors that, as our
results suggest, must have been among the strongest determinants of 3G success in se-
lected countries. Detailed case studies on Slovenian and Korean mobile communications
markets should help shed light on further factors that contributed to such an impressive
success of 3G in these two countries.
It is clear that our sample was not very big due to lack of data on 3G penetration and
other factors for many countries. Nevertheless, the results of this analysis have confirmed
some suggestions of the lead market theory, such as for example an important role of
users’ reputation and technical sophistication. More data should be collected in the future
for 3G and 4G mobile technologies in order to confirm these first findings and also to
identify the measures that contribute to the development of technical sophistication and
innovativeness.
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Policy Measures and Recommendations
In this chapter we will first get an overview of existing policy measures aiming to promote
innovation activities and mobile communications development in the European Union. In
the second part we will develop policy recommendations for European countries based on
the results of empirical analysis.
6.1 European Union Policy
The Europe 2020 strategy, agreed by Member States at the June 2010 European Coun-
cil, focuses on investments in education, research and innovation as the key to achiev-
ing smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission, 2010b). It includes
seven ”flagship” initiatives: Innovation Union, Digital Agenda, Industrial Policy for the
Globalisation Era, Youth on the Move, the Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, Resource
Efficient Europe, and the Single Market Act. In conjunction with the Innovation Union,
these flagships are expected to improve conditions for innovation in the EU, including by
accelerating the roll-out of high speed internet and its applications, by securing a strong
industrial base, by promoting excellent education systems, modern labour markets, and
the right skills mix for Europe’s future labour force, and by ensuring effective competition
policy and better access to third country markets (European Commission, 2010b). More-
over, in order to implement the Innovation Union, the European Commission introduced
a special financial instrument - Horizon 2020 programme, which is currently the biggest
EU Research and Innovation programme with nearly EUR 80 billion of funding available
over 7 years (2014 to 2020). In this part we will consider the first two EU flagship ini-
tiatives concerning the promotion of innovation and ICT in the European Union, Horizon
2020 programme and its sections with ICT focus, as well as the separate Lead Market
Initiative.
6.1.1 Innovation Union
The Innovation Union is the European Union strategy to create an innovation-friendly
environment. A stressed by the European Commission (2013i, p. 2), its aim is ”creating
a vibrant, innovation-based economy fuelled by ideas and creativity, capable of linking
into global value chains, seizing opportunities, capturing new markets and creating high-
quality jobs”. In order to develop even further the strengths and tackle the weaknesses of
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the European economy, such as under-investment in our knowledge foundation, unsatis-
factory framework conditions (e.g. poor access to finance), and too much fragmentation
and costly duplication, the European Commission (2010b, p. 3) suggested ten strategic
measures:
1. The EU and Member States need to continue to invest in education, R&D, innova-
tion and ICTs, despite fiscal constraints.
2. This should go together with reforms in order to get more value for money and
tackle fragmentation. EU and national research and innovation systems need to be
better linked up with each other and their performance improved.
3. European education systems at all levels need to be modernised as the EU needs
more world-class universities. We should raise skill levels and attract top talent
from abroad.
4. Researchers and innovators must be able to work and cooperate across the European
Union as easily as within national borders.
5. Access to EU programmes must be simplified and their leverage effect on private
sector investment enhanced, the role of the European Research Council should be
reinforced. The framework programme’s contribution to nurturing fast-growing
SMEs must be boosted. The European Regional Development Fund should be fully
exploited to develop research and innovation capacities across Europe, based on
smart regional specialisation strategies.
6. Europe needs to get more innovation out of its research, cooperation between the
worlds of science and the world of business must be enhanced.
7. Remaining barriers for entrepreneurs to bring ”ideas to market” must be removed,
i.e. ensuring better access to finance, particularly for SMEs, affordable Intellectual
Property Rights, smarter and more ambitious regulation and targets, faster setting
of interoperable standards and strategic use of our massive procurement budgets.
8. European Innovation Partnerships should be launched to accelerate research, devel-
opment and market deployment of innovations to tackle major societal challenges
(starting with the area of healthy ageing), pool expertise and resources and boost
the competitiveness of EU industry.
9. European strengths in design and creativity must be better exploited. We must
champion social innovation and develop a better understanding of public sector
innovation.
10. We need to work better with our international partners, which means opening access
to EU R&D programmes, while ensuring comparable conditions abroad.
The European Commission (2010b) argues that the benefits of the Innovation Union
will be significant. For example, today Europe is under-investing in its knowledge base,
spending every year 0.8 per cent of GDP less than the US and 1.5 per cent less than Japan
in R&D (European Commission, 2010b, p. 6). According to recent estimates by Zagame´
(2010), achieving the target of spending 3 per cent of EU GDP on R&D by 2020 could
create 3.7 million jobs and increase annual GDP by close to EUR 800 billion by 2025.
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We will further consider in more detail the key strategic measures of the Innovation Union
flagship and the progress achieved in these fields by the end of 2012.
Investing for the Future
European Commission (2013i) stresses that public and private investment in R&D is cru-
cial to enable Europe to take advantage of any rebound in the economy. For example, the
recovery in 2010 was substantially stronger in countries which had previously invested the
most in R&D and innovation, such as Germany, Finland and Sweden (European Commis-
sion, 2011b). In the EU, public and private investment in R&D was growing before the
economic crisis. After the outbreak of the crisis, a majority of Member States maintained
or increased their R&D investments, in spite of fiscal constraints, and overall R&D spend-
ing over GDP increased from 1.85 per cent in 2007 to 2.03 per cent in 2011. However, in
eleven Member States it has grown less than GDP since the beginning of the crisis (see
Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Government investment in the future: The difference in percentage points
between real growth (1) in Government budgets for R&D (GBAORD (2)) and real growth
(1) in GDP, 2008-2012 (3)
Notes:
1. Real growth was calculated from values in PPS EUR at constant 2000 prices and exchange
rates.
2. Foregone tax revenues resulting from R&D tax incentives are not included.
3. EL: 2007-2008; PL: 2009-2011; BE, BG, DE, IE, ES, FR, CY, LV, LT, HU, SI, SK, SE, UK,
EU: 2008-2011.
4. Data for 2012 are provisional.
Source: European Commission, 2013c, p. 4.
As regards R&D investment in private sector, according to European Commission
(2013i), businesses in the EU also increased their expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP
from 1.18 per cent int 2007 to 1.27 per cent in 2011. This is in part due to sustained
R&D investment by European firms, but also because foreign firms consider Europe to
be an attractive place to invest in R&D (ibid.). Moreover, the results of The 2012 EU
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Survey on R&D Investment Business Trends suggest that in Member States where the
business sector is knowledge-intensive and internationally competitive, the governments’
strategy to protect R&D spending helped maintain the level of private investment (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2012a). However, on the downside, protecting R&D investment
proved more difficult for EU countries suffering from sovereign debt crisis, where liq-
uidity constraints combined with an insufficiently innovation-friendly environment and
a lower level of business demand for knowledge undermined the effectiveness of the
counter-cyclic efforts to stimulate business investment (ibid.). This experience shows
that investing in knowledge must be accompanied by reforms in the research and innova-
tion system including creating innovation-friendly framework conditions for innovative
businesses (European Commission, 2013i).
Reforms to Raise Efficiency and Effectiveness
As regards the goal of raising efficiency and effectiveness, European Commission (2010b)
stresses that while action at the European Union level is important, the quality of national
research and innovation systems remains crucial for promoting business and citizens’
capacity and willingness to invest. Especially in times of fiscal constraint, significant re-
forms to national and regional policies are required in order to get the most out of the
money invested (European Commission, 2013i). Figure 6.2 shows that there are still con-
siderable differences between Member States in terms of their research and innovation
efficiency - for a given amount of public investment, some countries achieve more excel-
lence in science and technology than the others.
Many EU Member States have launched ambitious policy reforms in order to make
their research and innovation system more efficient. For example, in Sweden, a new
bill on research and research-based innovation as well as a new innovation strategy were
launched in autumn 2012 (European Commission, 2013g). They increase public funding
for R&D and foster the growth of firms in innovative sectors. Moreover, Sweden aims at
enhancing service and product innovation by orienting innovation more closely towards
global societal challenges. As this strategy is implemented, Sweden’s supply-side poli-
cies (in particular to fund testing, demonstration infrastructure and reinforce incubators of
new research-based products) will be matched more closely with policies enhancing the
demand for innovation (i.e. introducing a new procurement law fostering innovation-
friendly procurement) (ibid.). According to European Commission (2013g), over the
last five years, several initiatives have been launched to enhance the effectiveness of the
Swedish innovation system, with a special focus on innovation in SMEs through rein-
forced public-private cooperation with universities and better access to seed funding and
venture capital. For example, Industrial Research Institutes have been created that would
play the role of specific innovation intermediaries and act as an interface between aca-
demic research and product development in the business sector. The idea behind it is that
the private business sector buys R&D services from the Institutes, while the state funds
their facilities and skills development. Additionally, the bill established innovation offices
to foster the commercialisation of research results. The commercialisation of research in
seven Swedish universities was encouraged by additional state funding (SEK 150 million
per year). Access to funding, particularly early stage seed financing, for innovative SMEs
is enhanced through business incubators and venture funds (ibid.). Moreover, as part of
the Europe 2020 process, Sweden received a recommendation to foster cooperation be-
tween the technology and innovation demands of larger multinational companies with the
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Figure 6.2: Investment and research excellence
Notes:
1. Average public R&D intensity (public Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as percentage
of GDP).
2. EL: 2004-2007; SE, IT: 2005-2010; DK: 2007-2010, LU: 2009-2010.
3. Composite indicator on Research excellence (feasibility study of JRC).
Source: European Commission, 2013c, p. 7.
innovative products and services produced by local firms (ibid.). The new EU Structural
Funds for 2014-2020 also provide an opportunity to enhance clusters and infrastructures
for the testing and demonstration of new technology-based innovation in Sweden (ibid.).
Slovenia, one of the EU leaders in public R&D investment growth (see Figure 6.1) has
significantly increased its overall R&D intensity over the last decade and reached the value
2.47 per cent of GDP in 2011, which was above the EU average of 2.3 per cent (European
Commission, 2013f). This suggests that Slovenia regards investment in R&D as a prior-
ity for the development of medium-high-tech, high-tech and competitive enterprises and
for increased and sustainable economic growth (ibid.). European Commission (2013f)
stresses that, in order to reach its R&D intensity target of 3 per cent by 2020, Slovenia is
mobilising incentives and resources from its public and private sources (human, financial,
infrastructural) and providing smooth paths for more technological innovation. Simul-
taneously, it needs to upgrade the effectiveness and efficiency of its innovation system,
notably through improved governance and higher dynamics in the knowledge triangle.
In order to deal with these challenges, a new National Research and Innovation Strategy
2011-2020 (RISS) was prepared and approved in 2011 (ibid.). Its aim is a to create a
high-performance research and innovation system which will improve the quality of life.
RISS sets out the following main priorities:
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1. Better integration of research and innovation;
2. Increasing scientific excellence by increasing competitiveness within S&T stake-
holders and by providing necessary resources, both human and financial;
3. Promoting closer cooperation between universities, research institutions and the
business sector;
4. Strengthening the capacity of research in order to contribute to economic and social
development (ibid.).
Within RISS, a special section is devoted to the issue of research infrastructure - Slove-
nian Research Infrastructure Roadmap (2011-2020). Its key objectives are, first, a better
exploitation of the existing national research infrastructure, second, upgrade and construc-
tion of new research infrastructure in priority areas, and, third, international integration
based on access to large research infrastructures. In addition, the National Programme
2011-2020 for Higher Education (NHEP) in Slovenia points to improved efficiency of the
system and better articulation with skills required, especially in science and engineering
(ibid). Besides these two major programmes, Slovenia has several smaller programmes
and instruments to support research and innovation, such as the innovation voucher, the
mentorship voucher, the mentorship of young researchers, calls for basic and applied
projects, financial assistance to institutions that support innovation, the strengthening of
development units in the business sector and the transfer of technologies from the public
sector (ibid.).
Promoting Excellence in Education and Skills Development
According to European Commission (2013i, p. 11), ”current skills mismatches and short-
ages of scientists and engineers present a threat to Europe’s innovation capacity, precisely
at a time of increasing technological needs”. In order to reach the R&D target of 3 per
cent, the EU will need at least one million new research jobs (European Commission,
2010b). Taking this into consideration, European Commission (2010b, p. 8) warns that
the European Union must ensure it has ”a sufficient supply of highly qualified workers,
who should be offered attractive careers and easy mobility across sectors and countries;
otherwise innovative investments and talent will move elsewhere”. Hence, the starting
point for the Innovation Union is to create an excellent education system in all Member
States (ibid.). Although Europe has a good basic education system compared to many
parts of the world, science teaching remains weak in some Member States, and there
are still too few girls taking science to an advanced level (ibid.). European Commission
(2010b) explicitly states the urgent need for higher education reform in Europe, because
most European universities do not attract enough top global talent, and relatively few
of them are in leading positions in existing international rankings. In order to become
more competitive, European universities should be freed from over-regulation and micro-
management in return for full institutional accountability. European Commission (2010b)
also suggests that universities in the EU need more diversity in their missions and outlook,
with smarter specialisation across different fields.
The first steps have already been made in order to resolve these problems. For ex-
ample in 2012 the Commission presented the Rethinking Education Communication that
focuses on the need to develop transversal skills such as critical thinking, problem solving,
team-working and entrepreneurial skills and to enhance academia-business partnerships
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(European Commission, 2013i). In addition, the first Knowledge Alliances projects are
under way. Their aim is to set up cross-sector partnerships between employers and ed-
ucational bodies in order to address skills mismatches, for example in the audio-visual
industry (CIAKL project), in manufacturing by integrating factory and classroom envi-
ronments (KNOW-FACT project) and by fostering an entrepreneurial spirit in students
and staff (EUEN project) (ibid.). From 2014 onwards Knowledge Alliances should be-
come part of the new Erasmus for All programme. Besides, an implementation of multi-
dimensional and international ranking of higher education institutions has started in 2012
(ibid.).
Towards the European Research Area
European Commission (2013i) suggests that full deployment of the European Research
Area (ERA), one of the key structural reforms to drive growth in Europe, would trigger
substantial efficiency gains in knowledge and technology capacities. The essence of the
reform is creating a reinforced partnership, under which the Member States, stakeholder
organisations and the Commission will work together in order to enhance the effective-
ness and efficiency of the European public research system. They will achieve this goal
by encouraging more openness and competition, greater mobility for researchers, more
cross-border cooperation and an optimal circulation of knowledge (ibid.).
The main issues of ERA framework, as suggested by the European Commission
(2010b), are:
• quality of doctoral training, attractive employment conditions and gender balance
in research careers in the EU;
• mobility of researchers across EU countries and sectors;
• cross-border operation of research performing organisations, funding agencies and
foundations, including by ensuring simplicity and mutual coherence of funding
rules and procedures;
• dissemination, transfer and use of research results in the EU, including through
open access to publications and data from publicly funded research;
• opening of Member State operated research infrastructures to the full European user
community;
• consistency of EU and national strategies and actions for international cooperation
in science and technology.
Bringing Innovative Ideas to Market
European Commission (2013i) emphasises that the aim of Innovation Union is to remove
obstacles that prevent innovators from translating ideas into new products and services
that can be sold on world markets. In this context, Europe urgently needs to unleash
its innovative potential by faster standard-setting, cheaper ways to obtain patent protec-
tion, smarter public procurement of innovative products and services, and better access
to finance for innovators and SMEs. European Commission (2010b) and European Com-
mission (2013i) sees three key areas where adequate policy measures are required:
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1. Financing innovation
Although Europe has no shortage of innovative ideas waiting to be converted into
successful business models, the first obstacle on their way is often access to fi-
nance. For example, as suggested by European Commission (2010b), innovative
companies with the potential to expand into international markets have limited ac-
cess to growth finance from venture capital because most venture capital funds in
Europe are too small to support the continued growth of innovative companies and
do not have the critical mass to specialise and operate transnationally. In order
to solve these and other related problems, a number of policy instruments and pro-
grammes have been introduced in the past years. First, to remove obstacles to cross-
border investment, two legislative proposals on ”Social Entrepreneurship Funds”
and ”Venture Capital Funds” were agreed in 2012. Second, the Programme for the
Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME) and Horizon 2020 will jointly
support an equity and a debt financial instrument from 2014 onwards. Third, the
Risk-Sharing Instrument (RSI) was launched as part of the Risk-Sharing Finance
Facility (RSFF) in early 2012 in the form of a guarantee scheme to encourage banks
to provide more loans to innovative SMEs and small midcaps. And finally, in 2013,
the European Investment Bank started channelling additional EUR 10-15 billion to
innovation and skills via a new Growth & Employment facility, thus generating up
to EUR 65 billion of additional investment (ibid.).
2. Shaping demand for innovative products and services
European Commission (2013i) stresses that innovative companies can only be suc-
cessful if there is a market for their goods and services, and consumers willing to
buy them. Two key milestones towards helping innovative products and services
reach the market faster are the new standardisation package, effective from 1 Jan-
uary 2013, and the proposal for the modernisation of the EU public procurement
law. Thanks to the former, a European standard should be developed twice as fast
by 2020, while the latter should enable public procurers to use a special procedure
for buying innovative goods and services, to buy jointly with procurers from other
Member States to share risks and costs, and to include the innovative character in
the award criteria (ibid.).
3. Capitalising on intellectual property and creativity
As underlined by European Commission (2013i), Intellectual Property Rights regimes
have a crucial impact on how new knowledge and creations are owned, shared and
used, and therefore constitute a key component of the framework conditions for
research and innovation. To address the issue of European patent regime, the his-
toric agreement on the unitary patent was reached in December 2012. According
to European Commission (2013i), this should allow the first European patent with
unitary effect to be granted and registered in spring 2014. In addition, a tool named
Patent Translate, a machine translation service, is being developed by the European
Patent Office in cooperation with Google. It went live in March 2012 and already
offers translations from, and into, English for fourteen languages, and will gradu-
ally extend coverage to 32 languages by 2014. This free of charge service should
make the content of patents and patent-related documents published anywhere in
the world easily accessible for everyone (ibid.).
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Spreading the Benefits of Innovation Across the Union
European Commission (2010b) emphasises that the Innovation Union must involve all
regions and Europe must avoid an ”innovation divide” between the strongest innovating
regions and the others. So far, the country performance analysis (European Commission,
2013i) and the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2012 (European Commission, 2012e) (see
Figure 6.3) show that regional innovation divergences persist and risk to grow even more
with the crisis.
Figure 6.3: Innovation performance by EU regions
Source: European Commission, 2012a, p. 6.
Due to this regional diversity, better tailoring of innovation policies to the relative
strengths of individual regions is required (European Commission, 2013i). This should
be encouraged under the future Cohesion Policy 2014-2020. Moreover, in the near fu-
ture, Member States will have to develop research and innovation strategies for smart
specialisation of their regions focused on a limited number of priorities. The Smart Spe-
cialisation Platform is already helping public authorities to design such strategies through
peer-reviews, guidelines, and workshops across Europe (ibid.).
Another important priority in the European Union is social innovation. As European
Commission (2010b, p. 21) puts it, social innovation is ”about tapping into the ingenuity
of charities, associations and social entrepreneurs to find new ways of meeting social
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needs which are not adequately met by the market or the public sector”. The aim of social
innovation is also to bring about the behavioural changes which are needed to deal with
the major societal challenges, such as climate change (ibid.). However social innovations
are not yet producing the impact that they should and more support for experimentation
is required. In this respect, the infrastructure for social innovation is not yet as well
developed as that for business innovation.
In February 2013, the ”Social Investment Package” was presented aiming, among
others, to find innovative ways of financing social innovation and to support the mod-
ernisation of social protection (European Commission, 2013i). It focuses on increasing
the sustainability and adequacy of budget and social policies: first, activating social poli-
cies and services; second, investing in children and youth; and, third, streamlining EU
governance for social policies, monitoring and communicating with citizens. Besides,
the future 2014-2020 programming period of the European Social Fund (ESF), European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the new Programme for Social Change and In-
novation (PSCI) will reinforce such support of social innovation and social policy exper-
imentation (ibid.). Furthermore, since 2011, through its Seventh Framework Programme
for Research (FP7), the EU has supported about EUR 30 million worth research projects
on social innovation and it is currently funding two networks of incubators to nurture and
scale up successful social innovations (ibid.).
6.1.2 Horizon 2020 Programme
On 11 December 2013, the European Commission presented calls for projects for the
first round of its Horizon 2020 programme with the total budget of over EUR 80 billion.
The funding of over EUR 15 billion in the first two years (2014-2015) aims ”to help
boost Europe’s knowledge-driven economy, and tackle issues that will make a difference
in people’s lives” (European Commission, 2013c). As communicated by the European
Commission (2011a), Horizon 2020 was planned as a key tool in implementing the Inno-
vation Union flagship initiative that brings together all existing European Union research
and innovation funding. Horizon 2020 is expected to help promote growth and deal with
societal challenges more efficiently than ever before because it is different from other
funding programmes in several ways (see European Commission (2011a, pp. 3-4)):
• Horizon 2020 has a simplified programme architecture with a single set of rules, an
easy to use cost reimbursement model, a single point of access for participants, less
paperwork in preparing proposals, fewer controls and audits;
• Horizon 2020 adopts an inclusive approach open to new participants, which should
ensure that excellent researchers and innovators from across Europe and beyond
participate in the programme;
• Horizon 2020’s goal is integration of research and innovation by providing seamless
and coherent funding from idea to market;
• Horizon 2020 offers more support for innovation and activities close to the market,
providing a direct economic stimulus;
• Horizon 2020 focuses strongly on creating business opportunities out of our re-
sponse to the major societal challenges faced by people in Europe and beyond;
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• Horizon 2020 offers more possibilities for new entrants and young, promising sci-
entists to put forward their ideas and receive funding.
Horizon 2020 programme builds on three key distinct, yet mutually reinforcing, prior-
ities, which are especially important for the European Union (see European Commission
(2011a, pp. 4-5)):
1. Excellent Science
The first goal is to ”raise the level of excellence in Europe’s science base and en-
sure a steady stream of world-class research to secure Europe’s long-term compet-
itiveness”. This should be achieved by supporting the best ideas, developing talent
within Europe, providing researchers with access to priority research infrastructure,
and turning Europe into an attractive location for the world’s best researchers. In the
2014 budget alone, around EUR 3 billion of funding is available, including EUR
1.7 billion for grants from the European Research Council for top scientists and
EUR 800 million for Marie Sklodowska-Curie fellowships for younger researchers.
2. Industrial Leadership
The second pillar aims at ”making Europe a more attractive location to invest in
research and innovation (including eco-innovation), by promoting activities where
businesses set the agenda”. In this context, Horizon 2020 will help to provide ma-
jor investment in key industrial technologies and help innovative SMEs in Europe
to grow into world leading companies. For 2014, EUR 1.8 billion is available to
support Europe’s industrial leadership in ICT, nanotechnologies, advanced manu-
facturing, robotics, biotechnologies and space.
3. Societal challenges
The third target of Horizon 2020 is to address major concerns shared by citizens in
Europe and elsewhere by bringing together resources and knowledge across differ-
ent fields, technologies and disciplines, including social sciences and humanities.
For this area, EUR 2.8 billion is planned in 2014 for innovative projects addressing
seven societal challenges: health; agriculture, maritime and bioeconomy; energy;
transport; climate action, environment, resource efficiency and raw materials; re-
flective societies; and security.
Funding opportunities under Horizon 2020 are published on the European Commis-
sion’s Participant Portal for research funding. Among the current calls for proposals, at
least six are directly related to Information and Communications Technologies and digital
economy (for full list of calls by area see Table C.1 in Appendix C):
1. e-Infrastructures
The aim of this action is, first, to stimulate development of service-driven data e-
infrastructure that responds to general and specific requirements of researchers and
research organisations for open access to scientific information; second, to help
develop new services in support of open science (e.g. new forms of publishing,
new forms of peer review etc.); and third, to support the global interoperability of
open access data e-infrastructures.
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2. Digital Security, Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust
First, this action aims to support solutions to protect individuals’ privacy by default
while empowering the users to set the desired level of privacy and giving them
control over how their data will be used by service providers. Second, the focus
of the action is also on development and testing of usable, economic and privacy
preserving access control platforms based on the use of biometrics, smart cards, or
other devices. Finally, the third focus is on supporting the development of state-of-
the-art risk management frameworks.
3. FET Proactive - Towards Exascale High Performance Computing (HPC)
This call aims to support the implementation of a common European HPC strategy
and to boost European research excellence on the key challenges towards the next
generations of high-performance computing systems (such as energy efficiency,
complexity etc.).
4. EU-Japan Research and Development Cooperation in Net Futures
This call includes several ICT-related topics: Technologies combining big data, in-
ternet of things in the cloud; Optical communications; Access networks for densely
located users; Experimentation and development on federated Japan - EU testbeds.
5. Capitalising the Full Potential of Online Collaboration
The action aims to support the development and testing of new online services that
would enable better online collaboration for innovation for SMEs in diverse sectors
(such as accessing a broader range of potential innovation partners, training material
available online etc.)
6. ICT
This call includes a number of important IT and communications technologies top-
ics that will shape the future development of this sector:
• Advanced 5G Network Infrastructure for the Future Internet
• Smart Cyber-Physical Systems
• Smart System Integration
• Advanced Thin, Organic and Large Area Electronics (TOLAE) Technologies
• Smart Networks and Novel Internet Architectures
• Smart Optical and Wireless Network Technologies
• Advanced Cloud Infrastructures and Services
• Tools and Methods for Software Development
• FIRE+ (Future Internet Research and Experimentation)
• Web Entrepreneurship
• Big Data and Open Data Innovation and Take-up
• Cracking the Language Barrier
• Support the Growth of ICT Innovative Creative Industries SMEs
• Advanced Digital Gaming/Gamification Technologies
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• Multimodal and Natural Computer Interaction
• Robotics
• Photonics KET
• Development of Novel Materials and Systems for OLED Lighting
• Human-centric Digital Age
• Cybersecurity, Trustworthy ICT
• Trans-national Cooperation among National Contact Points
• Innovation and Entrepreneurship Support
The ICT call for proposals includes two topics that are extremely important for the
future development of mobile communications and we therefore will consider them in
more detail.
Smart Optical and Wireless Network Technologies
Over the coming years, network traffic is expected to keep on showing two-digits annual
growth rates in all network segments (European Commission, 2013h). While the limits of
existing technological approaches for both optical and wireless technologies are about to
be reached, the cost of current solutions represents a barrier on the way to the universal
coverage with ultra-high speed. The European Commission (2013h) stresses that in the
wireless domain, spectrum is a scarce public resource and its usage must be optimised
in view of the expected exponential traffic and usage growth. Moreover, as regards the
environmental impact, communication networks represented about 22 per cent of the total
ICT carbon footprint in 2011, and this is expected to almost double by 2020 if underlying
network technologies are not significantly improved (ibid.).
This action addresses, among others, the following challenges in the field of mobile
technologies: optimised spectrum use, energy efficiency and new usages, and second, hy-
brid combination of terrestrial and satellite infrastructures to achieve complete coverage.
Some of the expected positive developments as a result of this call are (see European
Commission (2013h)):
• Europe should maintain its state of the art industrial capability on optical network
technology with at least 20 per cent of the global market share.
• The strong European capabilities in wireless systems should be diversified through
emergence of novel technologies and spectrum usage patterns.
• The cost efficient emergence of novel classes of network services and applications
should be supported by avoiding the ”capacity crunch”.
• Energy consumption of basic infrastructures should be reduced by a factor of about
10.
• Higher spectrum efficiency should be reached - the target is its 10 fold increase.
• New applications should be enabled through spectrum efficient use of higher fre-
quency bands little used today.
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• Ubiquitous access to critical/societal applications should be achieved.
• Availability of new interoperability open standards for wireless and optical com-
munications should be ensured. Japan and Korea and the US may be considered as
priority countries where international cooperation may be achieved on a win-win
basis.
Advanced 5G Network Infrastructure for the Future Internet
With the increase of mobile Internet usage, communications networks face new shortcom-
ings. First, the European Commission (2013a) emphasises that in 2020, mobile networks
will have to support mobile traffic volumes 1000 times larger than today. Second, be-
cause today wireless access rates are significantly lower than those of fixed access, the
emergence of ubiquitous low cost integrated access continuum with context independent
operational characteristics is hindered. At the same time, communication networks en-
ergy consumption is growing rapidly, especially in the radio part of mobile networks.
Fourth, the proliferation of connected devices makes maintaining similar performance
characteristics over an ever larger portfolio of technologies and requirements very diffi-
cult. In addition, network infrastructure openness is still limited. These and other issues
should be solved on the way to future 5G integrated, ubiquitous and ultra-high capacity
networks.
European Commission (2013a) expects the following impacts of these solutions on
various levels:
1. At macro level, the main aim is to keep and reinforce a strong EU industrial base
in the domain of network technologies, that is seen as strategic industry worldwide.
In this context, the strategic goal is to retain in Europe at least 35 per cent of the
global market share for future network equipment.
2. At societal level, the goal is supporting a ubiquitous access to a wider spectrum
of applications and services offered at lower cost, while reducing network energy
consumption.
3. At operational level, following impacts are targeted:
• 1000 times higher mobile data volume per geographical area;
• 10 times to 100 times higher number of connected devices;
• 10 times to 100 times higher typical user data rate;
• 10 times lower energy consumption for low power Machine type communica-
tion;
• 5 times reduced End-to-End latency (for 4G-LTE it is 5 ms);
• Ubiquitous 5G access including in low density areas;
• European industry driving the development of 5G standards, at least for the
radio part, and retaining control of 5G standards essential patents (SEP) (20
per cent as a minimum). At the same time, international cooperation with
countries having bold R&D initiatives in this field (Korea, Japan, the US,
China) may be considered on a win-win basis.
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• Availability of a scalable management framework enabling deployment of
novel applications, including sensor based applications, as well as availability
of security/authentication metrics across multi domain virtualised networks.
6.1.3 The Lead Market Initiative
By launching the Lead Market Initiative in December 2007, the European Commission
(2007b) has acknowledged the importance of the lead market approach discussed in the
theoretical chapter of my dissertation. The concept of lead markets used by the European
Commission (2005) is based on the lead market approach discussed by Beise and Cleff
(2004) and is formulated as follows:
A lead market is the market of a product or service in a given geographical
area, where the diffusion process of an internationally successful innovation
(technological or non-technological) first took off and is sustained and ex-
panded through a wide range of different services.
The idea of the Lead Market Initiative for the European Union was born when it was
recognised that targeting specific, innovative areas of the economy through strengthened
demand side policies would lead to greater impacts not only for the sectors in question
but also for society as a whole (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2011). After
consultation with stakeholders and European Technology Platforms, the following criteria
for lead markets were identified by the European Commission (2005):
• Demand driven instead of technology push;
• Broad market segment (i.e. a range of interconnected products and services are
offered simultaneously);
• Strategic societal and economic interest (i.e. public health, environment and climate
protection, security or employment);
• Added value of prospective, concerted and targeted, but flexible policy instruments
(i.e. only a combination of different public measures and incentives can make a
difference);
• No ”picking of the winners” (i.e. no de facto favouring of specific companies to
ensure fair and open competition and to avoid dictating the technological choices)
On this basis, the European Commission (2005) has identified six markets for the
Lead Market Initiative: eHealth, protective textiles, sustainable construction, recycling,
bio-based products and renewable energies (see Table C.2 in Appendix B). They ful-
fil best the selection criteria because ”they are highly innovative, respond to customers’
needs, have a strong technological and industrial base in Europe and depend more than
other markets on the creation of favourable framework conditions through public policy
actions” (European Commission, 2005, p. 4). Although mobile communications mar-
ket was not a part of this initiative (maybe, in part due to the fact that these markets are
younger than mobile communications and innovators need more public support), it offers
one of the key enabling technologies for these new markets.
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Policy Instruments
In order to facilitate the emergence of lead markets in these six areas, the European Com-
mission (2010b) decided upon the following set of policy instruments:
1. Standardisation, labelling and certification
The current standardisation process in the six selected markets is fragmented. This
leads to competing standards that prevent interoperable solutions, and the lack of
interoperability, in turn, complicates the incorporation of knowledge and various
components into complex new products and services. Thus, more consistent tech-
nical, performance and product standards along the whole production chain, from
raw materials to end products can facilitate the development of lead markets. In the
context of the Lead Market Initiative, the choices between such standards should be
made in an inclusive manner and preferably at EU level, while avoiding to exclude
competing technologies. Also, standards should preferably be performance-based,
but technology-neutral. One of the solutions is also development of new approaches
to self-certification, building on experiences within the industry. Finally, labels can
push the market through minimum requirements by banning the worst performing
products, while benchmarks can provide predictability and dynamism for industry.
Mandatory performance labels (e.g. Energy star and Eco-labels) to be displayed at
the point of sales are essential to allow consumers make informed choices.
2. Legislation
Legislation also needs to be designed to foster innovation while at the same time it
should avoid imposing burdens on innovative business and other organisations. The
regulatory measures in the Lead Market Initiative action include proposals for new
legislation as well as modifications, revisions or abolitions. This will help create
reliable, lean and well designed legislative and jurisdictional environments, which
are essential for business to invest and for consumers to take up new products and
services. For example, the Recycling Lead Market Initiative action plan focuses
on providing support measures in synergy with specific EU regulations, in particu-
lar the Electrical and Electronic Waste (WEEE) and End-of-life of vehicles (ELV)
directives.
3. Public procurement
Public procurement accounts for some 19 per cent of GDP (as of November 2013)
in the European Union and offers n big potential market for innovative products
and services (European Commission, 2013e). For spending on construction this
figure reaches 40 per cent and for defence, civil security and emergency operations
almost 100 per cent. However, there is also ”market failure” because, on the one
hand, the demand is not able to encourage the market to answer to its needs (i.e.
it is not giving the right signals), and on the other hand, the offer is not known.
Because improved public procurement practices can help foster market uptake of
innovative products and services, it is important to mobilise public authorities to
act as ”launching customers” by promoting the use of innovation-friendly public
procurement practices.
4. Complementary actions
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The European Commission (2010b) suggests that there are other actions that could
accelerate and improve the interactive flow of information between suppliers and
users, thus improving market transparency. In certain market areas, additional mea-
sures are required, such as, first, business and innovation support services, training
and communication, and, second, financial support and incentives. As regards the
former, especially young innovative enterprises in some market segments would
benefit from activities to facilitate knowledge-transfer, incubation and access to fi-
nance through consultancy services or training. As regards the latter, public action
can facilitate access to finance, for example by using public R&D and Innovation
funds at EU or Member State level to help prove the feasibility of certain product
cycles. As an example can serve JEREMIE, a joint initiative established by the
Commission with the European Investment Fund (EIF) and the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB), that can provide improved access to finance for SMEs, such as
micro credit, venture capital, loans or guarantees.
Expected Results and Final Evaluation
As a result of the Lead Market Initiative, the European Commission (2007a) expected
significant market and employment growth in these six sectors by 2020, especially in
sustainable construction and renewable energies (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). It remains to be
seen if these ambitious goals will be reached by 2020.
Since none of the selected potential lead markets comprises the object of my current
research, we will further briefly consider the overall effectiveness of the Lead Market
Initiative without getting into detail on each of the six markets. Centre for Strategy &
Evaluation Services (2011, p. 167) suggests in its final evaluation that although ”the
Lead Market Initiative has been at the forefront of an important shift in innovation policy
at a European level”, there is a feeling that some of the rhetoric surrounding this initiative
”raised expectations of quite significant changes in policy that have not been realised”.
The degree of success of Lead Market Strategy has varied across the different markets
and depended on how ”busy” in policy terms the particular sector is (Centre for Strategy
& Evaluation Services, 2011). For example, in the renewable energy or the recycling
areas there are so many other developments taking place that there has been no room for
specific lead market actions, whereas in eHealth or in sustainable construction the lead
market framework offered the possibility of continuity and development.
Another important issue is the involvement of the Member States in the Lead Mar-
ket Initiative. Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (2011, p. 168) stresses that ”in
contrast to the successful involvement in a number of the sectors of the relevant indus-
trial representative associations”, the engagement of the Member State authorities in the
Lead Market Initiative has been relatively restricted in spite of the fact that Member State
involvement was seen to be ”essential” from the very beginning. Despite the fact that
initially some Member States expressed reservations about the whole idea and some still
regard it as a low priority, there has been increasing recognition of the significance of such
demand-side approaches. As a result, many Member States now make reference to sim-
ilar measures in their own national innovation strategies, while some had such strategies
prior to their development at a European level (ibid.). Moreover, Centre for Strategy &
Evaluation Services (2011, p. 168) suggests that there is now generally a willingness to
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recognise the need and usefulness of demand-orientated measures.
Table 6.1: Expected market growth of the identified emerging market areas, 2006-2020
Volume of the
new markets
prod-
ucts/services
in the EU in
2006, EUR
million
Volume of the
new markets
prod-
ucts/services
in the EU in
2020, EUR
million
Growth in
volume
resulting from
market
development
and policy
initiatives,
2006-2020,
EUR million
Growth share
attributed to
the Lead
Market
Initiative and
related
policies in
2020, EUR
million
Cumulated
growth share
attributed to
Lead Market
Initiative and
related
policies,
2006-2020,
EUR million
eHealth 21000 30000 9000 1800 12600
Sustainable
construction
24000 87000 63000 12600 88200
Protective
textiles
8800 15200 6400 1280 8960
Bio-based
products
19000 57000 38000 7600 53200
Recycling 24000 36000 12000 2400 16800
Renewable
energies
25000 79000 54000 38000 266000
Source: European Commission, 2007b.
It should also be mentioned that due to budget and other constraints the actual objec-
tives set for the Initiative in the Action Plans were relatively focused and short-term, with
a short duration. Consequently, as argued by Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services
(2011), in many instances the actions led to a better understanding of the problems of the
market rather than their resolution. Besides, the absence of a dedicated operational budget
clearly restricted the initial scope of the Initiative and thus meant that actions were not as
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effective as they might have been (ibid.).
Table 6.2: Expected job creation in the identified emerging market areas, 2006-2020
Jobs dependent
on the new
products/services
in the EU in
2006, thousand
jobs
Jobs dependent
on the new
products/services
in the EU in
2020, thousand
jobs
Growth in jobs
resulting from
market
development and
policy initiatives,
2006-2020,
thousands jobs
Growth in jobs
attributed to the
Lead Market
Initiative and
related policies in
2006-2020,
thousand jobs
eHealth 250 360 110 22
Sustainable
construction
500 870 370 74
Protective
textiles
205 228 23 5
Bio-based
products
120 380 260 52
Recycling 500 535 35 7
Renewable
energies
300 634 334 34
Source: European Commission, 2007b.
Finally, Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (2011) suggests in its final eval-
uation that where the Lead Market Initiative approach worked, it brought distinctive ad-
vantages, among others because it was able to address a targeted set of interrelated issues
for the market in question. It should not be forgotten that many of the actions require
follow-up to have their desired effect and much depends on future policy priorities both at
the European Union and at national levels. Also, other promising potential lead markets
could be supported at a national or even a regional level (ibid.).
6.1.4 Digital Agenda for Europe
Digital Agenda for Europe is the first of seven flagship initiatives under Europe 2020
strategy aiming to to reboot European economy and help EU citizens and businesses to
get the most out of digital technologies (i.e. fast and ultra fast internet and interoperable
applications). The ICT sector has received such a big recognition on the EU level because
it is directly responsible for 5 per cent of European GDP, with a market value of around
EUR 660 billion annually (European Commission, 2010a). Moreover, by delivering many
of the key enabling technologies it contributes far more to overall productivity growth -
20 per cent directly from the ICT sector and 30 per cent from ICT investments (ibid.). The
European Commission (2010a) suggests that the great potential of ICT can be mobilised
through a well-functioning virtuous cycle of activity (the outer ring in Figure 6.4). The
availability of attractive content and services in an interoperable and borderless internet
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environment stimulates demand for higher speeds and capacity. This in turn creates the
business case for investments in faster networks, while the deployment and take-up of
faster networks opens the way for innovative services based on higher speeds.
Figure 6.4: Virtuous cycle of the digital economy
Source: European Commission, 2010a, p. 4.
The European Commission (2010a) stresses that although this flow of activity can
be largely self-reinforcing, the European digital economy currently faces seven major
challenges (inner circle in Figure 6.4) that prevent us from harnessing all power of ICT
technologies. Thus, launched in May 2010 and revised in December 2012, the Digital
Agenda for Europe now contains 132 actions (for full list see Table C.3 in Appendix
C), grouped around these seven priority areas (see European Commission (2010a) and
European Commission (2012b)):
1. Digital single market
”It is time for a new single market to deliver the benefits of the digital era”.
2. Interoperability and standards
”We need effective interoperability between IT products and services to build a truly
digital society”.
3. Trust and security
”Europeans will not embrace technology they do not trust - the digital age is neither
”big brother” nor ”cyber wild west”.
4. Fast and ultra fast internet access
”We need very fast Internet for the economy to grow strongly and to create jobs and
prosperity, and to ensure citizens can access the content and services they want”.
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5. Research and innovation
”Europe must invest more in R&D and ensure our best ideas reach the market”.
6. Enhancing digital literacy, skills and inclusion
”The digital era should be about empowerment and emancipation; background or
skills should not be a barrier to accessing this potential”.
7. ICT-enabled benefits for EU society
”Smart use of technology and exploitation of information will help us to address
the challenges facing society like climate change and the ageing population”.
The Digital Agenda for Europe sets the following 13 specific goals reflecting the fu-
ture of the European digital economy (see European Commission (2014a)):
• The entire European Union should be covered by broadband by 2013;
• The entire EU should be covered by broadband above 30 Mbps by 2020;
• 50 per cent of the EU should subscribe to broadband above 100 Mbps by 2020;
• 50 per cent of the population should buy online by 2015;
• 20 per cent of the population should buy online cross-border by 2015;
• 33 per cent of SMEs should make online sales by 2015;
• The difference between roaming and national tariffs should approach zero by 2015;
• Regular internet usage should be increased from 60 per cent to 75 per cent by 2015,
and from 41 per cent to 60 per cent among disadvantaged people;
• The proportion of the population that has never used the internet should drop from
30 per cent to 15 per cent by 2015;
• 50 per cent of citizens should use eGovernment by 2015, with more than half re-
turning completed forms;
• All key cross-border public services, agreed by Member States in 2011, should be
available online by 2015;
• Public investment in ICT R&D should double by 2020, reaching EUR 11 billion;
• Energy use of lighting should be reduced by 20 per cent by 2020.
The European Commission (2014c) expects that full implementation of updated Dig-
ital Agenda would increase European GDP by 5 per cent, or EUR 1500 per person, over
the next eight years. By 2015, up to one million digital jobs risk going unfilled without
pan-European action, while 1.2 million jobs could be created through infrastructure con-
struction (ibid.). In the long term, this would rise to 3.8 million new jobs throughout the
European economy (ibid.).
We will further obtain a more detailed overview of Digital Agenda topics and policies
directly relevant for mobile communications market.
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Roaming Regulation for the Single Market for Telecoms Services
The issue of high mobile roaming prices in the EU has been acute for quite a long time
and its solution is essential for the establishment of the single European digital market.
The European Commission (2014b) stresses that ”there is no justification in a compet-
itive market for charging customers considerably higher prices for roaming services”.
Therefore, the aim of this regulation is to effectively eliminate all extra roaming charges
by 2015 (i.e. a zero difference between national tariffs and roaming charges). According
to the latest Roaming Regulation adopted in June 2012 (see European Parliament and the
Counsil (2012)), the EUR 0.14 per minute limit for wholesale charges for the making
of regulated roaming calls established on 1 July 2012 dropped to EUR 0.10 on 1 July
2013, and will decrease to EUR 0.05 on 1 July 2014. Wholesale prices for data roaming
have also decreased from EUR 0.25 safeguard limit established in July 2012 to EUR 0.15
per megabyte of data transmitted on 1 July 2013, and will further drop to EUR 0.05 per
megabyte of data transmitted on 1 July 2014. As regards SMS, the maximum retail charge
(excluding VAT) for an euro-SMS tariff has decreased from EUR 0.09 to EUR 0.08 on 1
July 2013 and will further drop to EUR 0.06 on 1 July 2014.
Moreover, the ”Connected Continent” legislation package proposed by the European
Commission in September 2013 aims to ban incoming call charges while travelling in
the EU from 1 July 2014 (see European Commission (2013b)). Companies would have
the choice to either, first, offer phone plans that apply everywhere in the European Union
(”roam like at home”), the price of which will be driven by domestic competition, or,
second, allow their customers to ”decouple” (i.e. opt for a separate roaming provider
offering cheaper rates without having to buy a new SIM card).
Thanks to the European Roaming Regulation, data roaming became up to 91 per cent
cheaper in 2013 compared to 2007. The European Union boasts retail price reductions
across calls, SMS and data of over 80 per cent since 2007. The European Commission
(2013d) estimates that during this period the volume of the data roaming market has grown
630 per cent and both consumers and mobile operators benefit from these EU efforts.
European Radio Spectrum Policy Programme
Radio spectrum is a very valuable but increasingly scarce resource, especially with the
rise of wireless services such as mobile broadband. It was predicted that global mobile
data traffic would increase by 26 per cent annually by 2015 and by that time over 7 billion
phones, tablets and other mobile devices would be connectable to the Internet (European
Commission, 2012c). Hence, exploding wireless data traffic requires a smarter approach
to spectrum management, which must include better utilisation of spectrum bands already
in use, for example through removing technology restrictions and spectrum sharing. In
the past, radio spectrum policy has already enabled the development of UMTS when the
paired terrestrial 2 GHz band (1920-1980 MHz paired with 2110-2170 MHz) has been
allocated for UMTS communications (3G networks) as a result of the so-called UMTS
Decision adopted in 1999. This launched the coordinated and progressive introduction of
UMTS across the EU by 1 January 2002.
In order to solve urgent spectrum policy issues, on 14 March 2012, the European
Parliament and the Council approved the first Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP),
which covers all types of radio spectrum use that affect the internal European market and
sets general regulatory principles, policy objectives and priorities. One of the targets of
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the programme is to ensure that at least 1200 MHz spectrum are identified to address
increasing demand for wireless data traffic.
On 5 November 2012, the European Commission decided to add another 120 MHz
(1920-1980 MHz and 2110-2170 MHz) to the radio spectrum portfolio for 4G technolo-
gies (LTE) around the 2 GHz band, which was previously only used for UMTS (3G)
wireless communications. The decision makes it mandatory for Member States to open
the relevant spectrum by 30 June 2014 at the latest, and lays down harmonised techni-
cal conditions to allow coexistence between different generations of mobile technologies.
The European Commission (2012c) expects that this measure will boost the take up of
LTE and further advanced technologies in Europe as the EU will enjoy up to twice the
amount of spectrum for high speed wireless broadband than in the United States, where
it is around 1000 MHz. This Commission’s decision means that mobile operators will
have more opportunities to invest in improved mobile networks, and consumers will con-
sequently enjoy faster data transfers and more broadband services at competitive prices.
As a follow-up measure, the European Commission (2012c) is also considering to deal
with the unpaired terrestrial 2 GHz spectrum (1900-1920 MHz and 2010-2025 MHz) that
is currently allocated to use by UMTS networks but remains unused throughout the EU.
6.2 Policy Recommendations and Future Prospects
Based on the results of the empirical analysis and taking into consideration the relevant
EU policy measures, we will further give policy recommendations aiming to promote the
development of new mobile technologies. We will also consider further research questions
that should be answered in order to receive a better understanding of the current and future
mobile communications market.
6.2.1 Policy Measures for the European Lead Market in Mobile Tech-
nologies
Revise Mobile Data Pricing
Due to the lack of data, mobile data prices could not be included into the regression model.
Nevertheless, the most recent OECD data on mobile baskets including mobile Internet
charges (see Figure 6.5) suggest that countries with higher mobile basket prices tend
to have lower 3G penetration rates (one exception is Japan which, according to OECD
(2013), focuses on delivering unlimited Internet and where ”small” (in Japanese terms) 1
GB mobile baskets are relatively more expensive than unlimited plans).
This suggests the importance of price advantage from the lead market perspective - a
country with too high prices cannot expect to be a lead market. Therefore, when setting
mobile data tariffs, mobile operators should focus on long-term benefits from wide 3G,
4G and further generation technologies adoption for mobile operators themselves as well
as for the national and European economy as a whole. Major mobile providers, like
Telekom and Vodafone in Germany, should realise that by pursuing short-term profits and
setting very high prices for tariffs with LTE (Telekom in Germany currently charges a
monthly fee of over EUR 60 for its Complete L tariff including only 1 GB LTE, while
A1 in Austria offers up to 5 GB LTE with its A1 Go! L tariff for just under EUR 55 per
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Figure 6.5: Relation between mobile basket price and 3G penetration rate
Source: Own illustration based on OECD, 2013.
month, and it makes 1 GB LTE available from 35 EUR per month) they might be loosing
an opportunity to acquire a broad subscriber base more quickly and to benefit from their
intensive mobile internet usage. As we have discussed in the theoretical chapter, this has
already happened before with GSM (2G) and UMTS (3G): the GSM uptake was much
faster in Sweden due to lower prices, and the adoption of UMTS in Europe was hindered
by the focus on a business-segment with higher prices instead of on young technologically
advanced people. Form this perspective, the current pricing trends in Germany (which is
far from being a 3G leader) are an alarming sign.
In this respect, the European Commission with its Roaming Regulation made a very
important contribution to the widespread use of mobile technologies in Europe. Now
it is the turn of governments to support competitive mobile markets in their countries,
while mobile providers not only in Germany but Europe-wide should acknowledge the
important role of intelligent pricing and to think strategically. Mobile providers should
really lower the prices instead of creating even less transparent tariffs. For example, I had
an impression this was the case prior to introduction of roaming pricing caps for SMS in
summer 2009, when mobile provides were trying to hide from German subscribers that
after the implementation of the Regulation, to send SMS within Germany would actually
be more expensive than to send SMS with roaming within Europe. Lower mobile Internet
prices is an important step towards a truly European digital economy - this instrument
cannot be neglected.
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Nurture Technically Sophisticated Users
An important result of our analysis was the significant role of technically sophisticated
users that are not afraid of adopting new mobile technologies if they are familiar with their
previous generations. This empirical evidence supports the importance of all the European
and national policy measures to achieve the goals of Digital Agenda, especially as regards
better broadband coverage and enhancing digital literacy. Europe should remember that
it is never too early to think about the future Internet technologies and it is now that we
should pave the way for them and nurture our own lead markets. In this respect, the
launch of the first LTE network in Sweden and Norway in December 2009 might be a
sign that Nordic countries (and Europe) are regaining their role of lead markets in mobile
communications.
Support R&D in Future Mobile Technologies
Although our empirical analysis did not confirm the role of R&D (as measured by patent
applications) in the field of mobile communications for the uptake of 3G in selected
OECD countries, the development of future mobile technologies is impossible without
intensive R&D in this sector. For example, we have established that Korea’s performance
as measured by the number of ICT patents per million population by far exceeds the aver-
age. And we have seen that according to these and other data, Korea is the best candidate
for the 3G lead market. It is therefore advisable to launch more measures on the national
and European levels in order to support (including financially) research and innovation
in this field. The EU has already acknowledged the importance of such measures by in-
troducing an impressive number of proposals for the ICT sector within the framework of
its Horizon 2020 programme, especially concerning the development of smart wireless
network technologies and 5G ubiquitous, ultra high-capacity networks. Moreover, the
European Commission apparently aims at Europe becoming a lead market for 5G mobile
technologies as it sets the goal for the European industry to drive the developments of 5G
standards. However, these measures are still at their beginning and it should be assured
that innovative European companies capable of becoming technological leaders in mobile
communications do receive all the necessary support on the national and European levels.
Support Efficient System of Innovation
Despite the importance of R&D, one should not forget that not all R&D is automatically
transformed into innovation that becomes successful on the market. This is where the
theory of innovation system comes into play, which we have discussed earlier in much
detail, especially with regard to the Swedish and Korean national systems of innovation.
The problem of Sweden was, for example, that it had relatively low innovation output
compared to its big investment into R&D. High general innovativeness, in turn, does not
per se lead to the rapid adoption of 3G technologies, as suggested by the results of our
empirical analysis. Furthermore, Figures 6.6 and 6.7 also show that not all countries that
perform well in terms of innovation have an equally good performance in 3G penetration
(for more detail on innovativeness assessment see European Commission (2012d) and
INSEAD (2011)). For instance, Slovenia has managed to become an OECD leader in
adoption of 3G mobile communications technologies despite its average innovation per-
formance, while the European innovation leader Germany has a very poor 3G penetration
rate.
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Figure 6.6: Relation between innovation performance (as measured by Innovation Union
Scoreboard) and 3G penetration rate, 2011
Source: Own illustration based on OECD, 2013 and European Commission, 2012e.
These results imply that, on one hand, countries should not underestimate other fac-
tors beside R&D and innovation intensity (i.e. pricing) that have contributed to faster 3G
adoption in some countries and should diagnose the existing problems and remedy them.
On the other hand, countries should still adopt adequate policy measures to promote more
efficient transformation of R&D into innovation, especially in the ICT sector that has
become the key enabling technology nowadays. This can be done, for example, through
support of innovative SMEs, by facilitating knowledge transfer from universities to SMEs
and creation of high-tech start-ups (e.g. the German EXIST programme supporting inno-
vative entrepreneurs coming from universities and research organisations).
6.2.2 Further Research Tasks
This research was focused on the adoption of 3G technologies in selected OECD countries
and despite its important findings, many more inspiring and important questions had to
currently remain unanswered due to the lack of statistical data and to volume limitation.
Here are some tasks that are considered to be very important for the future development
of mobile communications market.
First, it was established that based on the penetration curves Slovenia and Korea were
leaders in 3G adoption. However, while Korea possesses certain important characteristics
of a lead market (e.g. high R&D intensity and export orientation in ICT), Slovenia is
rather a special case as it does not boast a high innovation performance in the ICT sec-
tor. Hence, a detailed case study (including consumer preferences, government measures,
price policy) would help reveal how Slovenia managed to achieve such impressive results
in a such a short time and establish if it is indeed a new lead market or a mere early adopter
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Figure 6.7: Relation between innovation performance (as measured by Global Innovation
Index) and 3G penetration rate, 2011
Source: Own illustration based on OECD, 2013 and INSEAD, 2011.
of 3G mobile technologies (the same applies to Korea). This, in turn, could be used as a
guidance for other countries that need to boost their mobile market development.
Second, by now, four years have already elapsed since the introduction of LTE in late
2009 and yearly data on 4G penetration rates should reveal what country or a group of
countries has a potential of becoming a lead market for LTE. This market can further be
used by companies as a testing ground for innovative mobile devices, services and other
solutions.
Third, it is advisable to collect European data on mobile tariffs including data roaming
(most of which now also include LTE) and make it available online - this should make
mobile pricing more transparent for users and exercise at least some pressure on mobile
providers to lower their prices.
Fourth, a Europe-wide survey among the companies from ICT sector would help as-
sess the effectiveness of the current EU policy measures aiming to increase innovativeness
and promote digital economy in Europe. The main goal of the survey would be to deter-
mine if and to which extent the companies (especially SMEs) benefit from these measures.
This feedback should be used for developing policy measures that are better adopted to
specific needs of companies.
Fifth, a European survey of mobile users would help shed light on their preferences
and guide companies trying to bring new products and services into the mobile commu-
nications market.
Furthermore, due to the data availability, our empirical analysis was focused on the
network side of 3G technologies (i.e. share of subscribers using the 3G network) and
the leaders (Slovenia, Korea and Japan) were identified based on this criterion. However,
as argued for example by Lehrer (2004), countries that are currently behind in terms of
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3G network access could still be lead markets in other branches of the mobile communi-
cations market, such as mobile digital services (e.g. m-commerce, connected cars) and
handsets. Further research should try to identify these lead markets and factors contribut-
ing to their success.
Finally, the lead market theory itself might need revision because the results of our
analysis suggest that countries that were once lead markets do not necessary stay lead
markets for next generation technologies, as GSM (2G) lead markets Nordic countries
have lost their leadership and Slovenia, Korea and Japan became leaders in 3G adoption.
Thus, it is important not only to consider the lead market factors, but also the ”ex-lead
market” factors that made the country lose its leading position. This will help avoid such
mistakes in the future and be prepared for the challenges of new generation technologies.
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Conclusions
Taking into consideration the importance of ICT (and especially of mobile communica-
tions) as a major enabling technology in the age of Internet Economy, this PhD thesis was
devoted to an extensive overview of recent trends in the OECD mobile communications
market.
The first part of this work dealt with the current development of the mobile network
itself, especially with respect to the transition from 3G to 4G (LTE), which enables even
higher mobile Internet speeds and wider range of mobile applications for ever more so-
phisticated mobile devices (notably smartphones and tablets). It was also established that
even more devices (such as cars or even entire houses) can now be connected to the global
network, thus contributing to the further development of the ubiquitous Internet society.
Therefore, there can be no doubt about the innovativeness of the mobile communications
market and about the crucial role it plays for the development of the European and global
Digital Economy.
In the second part we have obtained an overview of the theory of innovation system
and of the lead market approach. Both of them have contributed to a better understanding
of innovation generation and diffusion in the mobile communications market, especially
as regards transition from the first to the third generation mobile technologies. As a result,
we have established the crucial role of the European cooperation in standard setting for
the international success of GSM standard. This, in turn, justifies the importance of the
EU effort in supporting the joint standard development for future 5G mobile technologies.
As regards the lead market theory, it suggests that Nordic countries were lead markets
for 2G mobile technologies, which does not stand for 3G anymore, as we were able to
show. Whether new leaders in 3G adoption (Slovenia, Korea and Japan) can be consid-
ered real lead markets should be revealed by detailed case studies in the future research.
Moreover, as worldwide success of 4G continues, it will be crucial to establish leaders
and potential lead markets for this mobile technology. The current and future analysis
should help countries to better promote the development of their mobile communications
markets.
The third part was devoted to case studies on the Swedish and Korean national sys-
tems of innovation. This analysis suggested that despite many differences, both countries
share certain similarities, especially with regard to high R&D intensity, the importance of
multinational companies and the strong role of ICT sector in their economy. These results
support the idea that Korea has characteristics of a lead market for 3G mobile technologies
and a potential of becoming a lead market for future mobile technologies.
125
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS
The results of the empirical analysis conducted in the fifth part suggest that 3G adop-
tion in selected OECD countries was positively influenced by income, familiarity with
the previous generation mobile technologies, the percentage of young population and the
level of education of population. At the same time, countries with higher urban popula-
tion have adopted 3G less eagerly, while against expectations, the number of ICT patent
applications and telecommunications export unit value did not have any statistically sig-
nificant influence on 3G adoption. These results in part explain that Slovenia, which does
not boast any significant ICT exports or R&D, managed to achieve high 3G penetration
due to other factors.
In the sixth part of this PhD thesis, we have first obtained an overview of the most
important EU policy measures aiming to improve Europe’s innovation performance in
general and the development of its Digital Economy in particular. It was established that
mobile communications occupy an important place in the European strategy and that they
are recognised as a key enabling technology. Further, we have derived policy recommen-
dations based on the results of our empirical analysis. Intelligent pricing policy, nurturing
of technically sophisticated users and support of efficient innovation system that channels
its R&D into innovation are considered to be key policy measures. Finally, among future
research tasks, we underline the importance of a detailed case study on Slovenian mobile
communications market that should help understand how it managed to achieve such a
high 3G performance and if it has the necessary characteristics of a lead market.
To conclude, this research can not only be considered an important contribution to a
better understanding of current trends and drivers in the mobile communications market,
but also a guideline for further more in-depth studies devoted to this innovative and ever-
changing sector of ICT.
126 Olga Syraya
Bibliography
Akematsu, Y., Shinohara, S., Tsuji, M., 2012. Empirical analysis of factors promoting the
Japanese 3G mobile phone. Telecommunications Policy 36 (3), 175–186.
Andonova, V., 2006. Mobile phones, the Internet and the institutional environment.
Telecommunications Policy 30, 29–45.
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies
58, 277–297.
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of
error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29–51.
Baltagi, B. H., 2010. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John Wiley and Sons Ltd.:
Chichester.
Baltagi, B. H., 2011. Econometrics. Springer: Heidelberg.
Beise, M., 2004. Lead markets: Country-specific drivers of the global diffusion of inno-
vations. Research Policy 33, 997–1018.
Beise, M., 2006. Die Lead-Markt-Strategie: Das Geheimnis weltweit erfolgreicher Inno-
vationen. Springer: Berlin.
Beise, M., Cleff, T., 2004. Assessing the lead market potential of countries for innovation
projects. Journal of International Management 10, 453–477.
Bekkers, R., Duysters, G., Verspagen, B., 2000. Intellectual Property Rights, Strategic
Technology Agreements and Market Structure: The Case of GSM. ECIS: Eindhoven.
Bitard, P., Edquist, C., Hommen, L., Rickne, A., 2008. Reconsidering the paradox of high
R&D input and low innovation: Sweden. In: Edquist, C., Hommen, L. (Eds.), Small
Country Innovation Systems: Globalization, Change and Policy in Asia and Europe.
Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, pp. 237–280.
Bloomberg, March 2014. Blackberry leads in connected-cars market Google covets.
URL http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-27/blackberry-leads-in-connected-
cars-market-google-covets.html
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel
data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–143.
127
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Botelho, A., Pinto, L. C., 2004. The diffusion of cellular phones in Portugal. Telecommu-
nications Policy 28, 427–437.
Breschi, S., Malerba, F., 1997. Sectoral innovation systems: Technological regimes,
Schumpeterian dynamics and spatial boundaries. In: Edquist, C. (Ed.), Systems of In-
novation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations. Printer: London, pp. 130–155.
Carlsson, B., 1995. Technological Systems and Economic Performance: The Case of
Factory Automation. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.
Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, July 2011. Final evaluation of the Lead
Market Initiative.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-market-initiative/
files/final-eval-lmi en.pdf
Chong, A. Y.-L., Ooi, K.-B., Lin, B., Bao, H., 2012. An empirical analysis of the deter-
minants of 3G adoption in China. Computers in Human Behavior 28 (2), 360–369.
comScore, March 2014. comScore reports January 2014 U.S. smartphone subscriber
market share.
URL http://www.comscore.com/ger/Insights/Press Releases/2014/3/comScore
Reports January 2014 US Smartphone Subscriber Market Share
Dosi, G., 1988. The nature of the innovative process. In: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson,
R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (Eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory. Printer:
London, pp. 221–238.
Edquist, C., 1997a. Introduction. In: Edquist, C. (Ed.), Systems of Innovation: Technolo-
gies, Institutions and Organisations. Printer: London.
Edquist, C., 1997b. Systems of innovation approaches - their emergence and character-
istics. In: Edquist, C. (Ed.), Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and
Organisations. Printer: London, pp. 1–35.
Edquist, C., 2001. Innovation policy in the systems of innovation approach: Some basic
principles. In: Fischer, M. M., Fro¨hlich, J. (Eds.), Knowledge Complexity and Innova-
tion Systems. Springer: Berlin.
Edquist, C., 2003. The fixed Internet and mobile telecommunications sectoral system of
innovation: Equipment, access and content. In: Edquist, C. (Ed.), The Internet and Mo-
bile Telecommunications System of Innovation: Developments in Equipment, Access
and Content. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, pp. 1–39.
Edquist, C., 2004. Systems of innovation: perspectives and challenges. In: Fagerberg,
J., Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford
University Press: Oxford, pp. 181–208.
Edquist, C., Chaminade, C., 2006. Industrial policy from a systems-of-innovation per-
spective. European Investment Bank Papers 11 (1), 108–132.
Edquist, C., Hommen, L., 1999. Systems of innovation: Theory and policy for the demand
side. Technology In Society 21, 63–79.
128 Olga Syraya
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Edquist, C., Hommen, L., 2000. Public technology procurement and innovation theory.
In: Edquist, C., Hommen, L., Tsipouri, L. (Eds.), Public Technology Procurement and
Innovation. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, pp. 5–70.
Edquist, C., Hommen, L., 2008. Comparing national systems of innovation in Asia and
Europe: Theory and comparative framework. In: Edquist, C., Hommen, L. (Eds.),
Small Country Innovation Systems: Globalization, Change and Policy in Asia and Eu-
rope. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, pp. 1–28.
Edquist, C., Johnson, B., 1997. Institutions and organisations in systems of innovation. In:
Edquist, C. (Ed.), Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organisations.
Printer: London.
Edquist, C., Lundvall, B.-A., 1993. Comparing the Danish and Swedish systems of inno-
vation. In: Nelson, R. R. (Ed.), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis.
Oxford University Press: New York, pp. 265–298.
EION Wireless, 18 November 2011. Eion Wireless expands investment in Slovenia.
URL http://www.eionwireless.com/about-us/news-and-events/259-eion-wireless-
expands-investment-in-slovenia
ETSI, 2014. GSM.
URL http://www.etsi.org/index.php/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile/gsm
European Commission, 2003. 3rd European Report on Science and Technology Indica-
tors: Towards a Knowledge-Based Economy, EUR 20025 EN. European Commission:
Brussels.
European Commission, 2004. Innovation in Europe. European Commission: Brussels.
European Commission, October 2005. Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme:
A policy framework to strengthen EU manufacturing - towards amore integrated ap-
proach for industrial policy, Communication from the Commission, COM(2005) 474.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0474:FIN:
en:PDF
European Commission, 2007a. A Lead Market Initiative for Europe - explanatory pa-
per on the European Lead Market approach: Methodology and rationale, Annex II to
the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
COM(2007) 860.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007SC1730:
EN:HTML
European Commission, December 2007b. A Lead Market Initiative for Europe, Commu-
nication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 860.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0860:FIN:
EN:PDF
Olga Syraya 129
BIBLIOGRAPHY
European Commission, August 2010a. A Digital Agenda for Europe, Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 245.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri\unhbox\
voidb@x\bgroup\let\unhbox\voidb@x\setbox\@tempboxa\hbox{C\global\
mathchardef\accent@spacefactor\spacefactor}\accent22C\egroup\spacefactor\
accent@spacefactorOM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF
European Commission, October 2010b. Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative: Innovation
Union, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 546.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/innovation-union-
communication en.pdf
European Commission, November 2011a. Horizon 2020 - the framework programme for
research and innovation, Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions,
COM(2011) 808.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0808:FIN:
EN:PDF
European Commission, December 2011b. State of the Innovation Union 2011.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0849:FIN:
en:PDF
European Commission, 2012a. The 2012 survey on R&D investment business trends.
URL http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/survey12.html
European Commission, December 2012b. The Digita Agenda for Europe - driving Eu-
ropean growth digitally, Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions,
COM(2012) 784.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/digital-do-list-new-digital-priorities-
2013-2014
European Commission, November 2012c. Digital Agenda: Commission Decision paves
the way for 4G in Europe.
URL http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-1170 en.htm
European Commission, 2012d. Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011. European Union:
Brussels.
European Commission, 2012e. Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2012.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ris-2012 en.pdf
European Commission, December 2013a. Advanced 5G network infrastructure for the
future Internet, ICT 2014 - Information and Communictions Technologies, call for pro-
posals.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/
topics/77-ict-14-2014.html#tab1
130 Olga Syraya
BIBLIOGRAPHY
European Commission, September 2013b. Commission proposes major step forward for
telecoms single market.
URL http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-13-828 en.htm
European Commission, 11 December 2013c. Horizon 2020 launched with EUR 15 billion
over first two years.
URL http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-13-1232 en.htm
European Commission, June 2013d. New lower price caps for mobile roaming from 1
July: Data 36 per cent cheaper; roaming in Croatia 15 times cheaper.
URL http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-13-611 en.htm
European Commission, 2013e. Public procurement - public purchasers as first customers.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-market-initiative/
public-proc en.htm
European Commission, 2013f. Research and innovation performance in Slovenia:
Country profile 2013.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/state-of-the-union/2012/
countries/slovenia 2013.pdf
European Commission, 2013g. Research and innovation performance in Sweden:
Country profile 2013.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/state-of-the-union/2012/
countries/sweden 2013.pdf
European Commission, December 2013h. Smart optical and wireless network technolo-
gies, ICT 2014 - Information and Communications Technologies, call for proposals.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/
topics/82-ict-06-2014.html
European Commission, March 2013i. State of the Innovation Union 2012 - accelerating
change, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, COM(2013) 149.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0149:FIN:
en:PDF
European Commission, 2014a. About our goals.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/about-our-goals
European Commission, 2014b. Action 101: Look for durable solutions for voice and data
roaming by 2012.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-i-digital-single-market/action-101-
look-durable-solutions-voice-and-data-roaming-2012
European Commission, 2014c. Digital Agenda for Europe.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/digital-agenda-europe
European Parliament, the Counsil, June 2012. Regulation (EU) No. 531/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 on roaming on public mobile
communications networks within the Union.
URL http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:172:0010:
0035:EN:PDF
Olga Syraya 131
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Freeman, C., 1987. Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan.
Printer: London.
Freeman, C., Louca, F., 2001. As Time Goes By: From the Industrial Revolution to the
Information Revolution. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Freeman, C., Perez, C., 1988. Structural crises of adjustment, business cycles, and invest-
ment behaviour. In: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (Eds.),
Technical Change and Economic Theory. Printer: London.
Funk, J. L., 2002. Global Competition Between and Within Standards. The Case of Mo-
bile Phones. Palgrave: New York.
Funk, J. L., 2007. Solving the startup problem in Western mobile Internet markets.
Telecommunications Policy 31, 14–30.
Garrard, G. A., 1998. Cellular Communications: Worldwide Market Development.
Artech House: Boston.
Gartner, February 2014. Gartner says annual smartphone sales surpassed sales of feature
phones for the first time in 2013.
URL http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2665715
Goel, V. K., Koryukin, E., Bhatia, M., Agarwal, P., 2004. Innovation Systems: World
Bank Support of Science and Technology Development. World Bank Working Paper
No. 32. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank:
New York.
Google, 2012. Our mobile planet, dataset and country reports, smartphone research.
URL www.thinkwithgoogle.com/mobileplanet/en/downloads/
Gruber, H., Verboven, F., 2001. The evolution of markets under entry and standards regu-
lation: The case of global mobile telecommunications. International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization 19, 1189–1212.
Grupp, H., 1997. Messung und Erkla¨rung des technischen Wandels: Grundzu¨ge einer
empirischen Innovationso¨konomik. Springer: Berlin.
Grupp, H., Maital, S., 2001. Managing New Product Development and Innovation: A
Microeconomic Toolbox. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham.
Grupp, H., Schmoch, U., 1999. Patent statistics in the age of globalisation: New legal
procedures, new analytical methods, new economic interpretation. Research Policy 28,
377–396.
GSA, 5 January 2012. Evolution to LTE report.
URL http://www.gsacom.com/downloads/pdf/GSA evolution to lte report
050112.php4
GSA, 31 March 2014. Evolution to LTE report.
URL http://www.gsacom.com/downloads/pdf/GSA Evolution to LTE report
310314.php4
132 Olga Syraya
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gu, S., Lundvall, B.-A., 2006. Policy learning as a key process in the transformation
of the Chinese innovation systems. In: Lundvall, B.-A., Intarakumnerd, P., Vang, J.
(Eds.), Asias Innovation Systems in Transition. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham,
pp. 293–312.
Hipp, C., Grupp, H., 2005. Innovation in the service sector: The demand for service-
specific innovation measurement concepts and typologies. Research Policy 34, 517–
535.
Hommen, L., 2002. The Global System for Mobile Telecommunications (GSM) - second
generation. In: Study ”Fixed Internet and Mobile Telecommunications Sectoral System
of Innovation” carried out within the EU-financed TSER project ”Sectoral Systems in
Europe - Innovation, Competitiveness and Growth (ESSY)”.
Hommen, L., Manninen, E., 2003. The Global System for Mobile Telecommunications
(GSM): Second generation. In: Edquist, C. (Ed.), The Internet and Mobile Telecom-
munications System of Innovation: Developments in Equipment, Access and Content.
Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, pp. 71–129.
INSEAD, 2011. The Global Innovation Index 2011: Accelerating Growth and Develop-
ment. INSEAD: Fontainebleau.
Islam, T., Meade, N., 2012. The impact of competition, and economic globalisation on
the multinational diffusion of 3G mobile phones. Technological Forecasting and Social
Change 79 (5), 843–850.
Islam, T., Meade, N., 8 November 2013. Firm level innovation diffusion of 3G mobile
connections in international context. International Journal of Forecasting.
Kim, L., 1993. National system of industrial innovation: Dynamics of capability build-
ing in Korea. In: National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Richard R.
Nelson, pp. 357–383.
Kleinbaum, D. G., Kupper, L. L., Muller, K. E., Nizam, A., 1998. Applied Regression
Analysis and Other Multivariate Methods. Duxbury Press: Pacific Grove.
Klodt, H., 2003. Die neue O¨konomie: Erscheinungsformen, Ursachen und Auswirkun-
gen. In: Kiel Studies 321. Springer: Berlin Heidelberg.
Klodt, H., Maurer, R., Schimmelpfennig, A., 1997. Tertiarisierung in der deutschen
Wirtschaft. In: Kiel Studies 283. Mohr Siebeck: Tu¨bingen.
Lee, S., Brown, J. S., September 2008. The diffusion of fixed broadband: An empirical
analysis, Working Paper 08-19. NET Institute Working Paper.
Lee, S., Marcu, M., Lee, S., 2011. An empirical analysis of fixed and mobile broadband
diffusion. Information Economics and Policy 23 (3-4), 227–233.
Lehrer, M., 2004. National lead markets and the design competition for 3G network ap-
plications. Journal of Business Research 57 (12), 1397–1401.
Lim, C., 2008. Towards knowledge generation with bipolarised NSI: Korea. In: Edquist,
C., Hommen, L. (Eds.), Small Country Innovation Systems: Globalization, Change and
Policy in Asia and Europe. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, pp. 113–155.
Olga Syraya 133
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lin, C.-S., 2013. Forecasting and analysing the competitive diffusion of mobile cellu-
lar broadband and fixed broadband in Taiwan with limited historical data. Economic
Modelling 35, 207–213.
Lindmark, S., Granstrand, O., 1995. Technology and systems competition in mobile com-
munications. In: Lamberton, D. (Ed.), Beyond Competition: The Future of Telecom-
munications. Elsevier Science: London.
Lundvall, B.-A., 1988. Innovation as an interactive process: From user-producer inter-
action to the national system of innovation. In: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R.,
Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (Eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory. Printer: Lon-
don.
Lundvall, B.-A., 1992. National Systems of Innovation. Printer: London.
Malerba, F., 2002. Sectoral systems of innovation and production. Research Policy 31,
247–264.
McKelvey, M., Texier, F., Alm, H., 1998. The dynamics of high tech industry: Swedish
firms developing mobile telecommunications systems. Department of Technology and
Social Change Working Paper No. 187. Linko¨ping University.
McKnight, L. W., Boroumand, J., 2000. Pricing Internet services: After flat rate. Telecom-
munications Policy 24 (6-7), 565–590.
Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R., 1999. The Sources of Industrial Leadership. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge.
Nelson, R. R., 1988. Institutions supporting technical change in the United States. In:
Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L. (Eds.), Technical Change
and Economic Theory. Printer: London.
Nelson, R. R., 1993. National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford Uni-
versity Press: New York.
Nelson, R. R., 2008. What enables rapid economic progress: What are the needed institu-
tions? Research Policy 37, 1–11.
Nelson, R. R., Nelson, K., 2002. Technology, institutions, and innovation systems. Re-
search Policy 31, 265–272.
Nelson, R. R., Rosenberg, N., 1993. Technical innovation and national systems. In: Nel-
son, R. R. (Ed.), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford Uni-
versity Press: New York, pp. 3–21.
Nielsen, March 2014. An era of growth. The cross-platform report.
URL http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2014%
20Reports/nielsen-cross-platform-report-march-2014.pdf
OECD, 1995. Education at a Glance 1995. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 1998. Human Capital Investment. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 1999a. Managing National Innovation Systems. OECD Publishing: Paris.
134 Olga Syraya
BIBLIOGRAPHY
OECD, 1999b. OECD Communications Outlook 1999. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2000. Economic Survey - Korea. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2002. Education at A Glance 2002. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2003. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2003. OECD Pub-
lishing: Paris.
OECD, 2005. Governance of Innovation Systems. Volume 1: Synthesis Report. OECD
Publishing: Paris.
OECD, January 2007. Mobile multiple play: New service pricing and policy implications.
URL http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/19/38057443.pdf
OECD, 2009. OECD Communications Outlook 2009. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2010. Mobile communication developments in the OECD area.
URL http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/59/48459973.pdf
OECD, 2011a. OECD Communications Outlook 2011. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2011b. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011. OECD Pub-
lishing: Paris.
OECD, 2012a. Education at a Glance 2012. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2012b. Main Science and Technology Indicators. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2012c. OECD Internet Economy Outlook 2012. OECD Publishing: Paris.
OECD, 2013. OECD Communications Outlook 2013. OECD Publishing: Paris.
Pisjak, P., 1994. Interdependance between regulation and technological innovation in
the telecommunications sector. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 6 (3),
289–303.
Rosenberg, N., 1976. Perspectives on Technology. Cambridge University Press: Cam-
bridge.
Rosenberg, N., 1982. Inside the Black Box. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Schumpeter, J. A., 1911. The Theory of Economic Development, 1934th Edition. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge.
Singh, S. K., 2008. The diffusion of mobile phones in India. Telecommunications Policy
32, 642–651.
Soto, M., 2009. System GMM estimation with a small sample, Working Paper No. 395.
Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series.
Srinuan, P., Srinuan, C., Bohlin, E., 2012. Fixed and mobile broadband substitution in
Sweden. Telecommunications Policy 36 (3), 237251.
Syraya, O., 2008. Expansion of Mobile Digital Services: Dynamics, Theory and Policy
Options. GRIN Verlag: Mu¨nchen.
Olga Syraya 135
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Tee, R., 2007. Innovation in the European and Japanese mobile telecommunications in-
dustry. In: Welfens, P. J., Weske, M. (Eds.), Digital Economic Dynamics. Innovations,
Networks and Regulations. Springer: Berlin, pp. 129–139.
Teng, W., Lub, H.-P., Yu, H., 2009. Exploring the mass adoption of third-generation (3G)
mobile phones in Taiwan. Telecommunications Policy 33 (10-11), 628–641.
Vision Mobile, March 2014a. Apps for connected cars? Your mileage may vary. The state
of atomotive developer programs in 2014.
URL http://www.visionmobile.com/product/apps-for-cars-mileage-may-vary/
Vision Mobile, February 2014b. Developer economics Q1 2014. State of the developer
nation.
URL http://www.developereconomics.com/reports/q1-2014/
Welfens, P. J., Zoche, P., Jungmittag, A., Beckert, B., Joisten, M., 2005. Internetwirtschaft
2010: Perspektiven und Auswirkungen. Physica: Heidelberg.
WIPO, 2013. How long does it take to obtain a patent?
URL www.wipo.int/sme/en/faq/pat faqs q4.html
Zaber, M., Sirbu, M., 2012. Impact of spectrum management policy on the penetration of
3G technology. Telecommunications Policy 36 (9), 762–782.
Zagame´, P., September 2010. The costs of a non-innovative Europe: What can we learn
and what can we expect from the simulation works.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/demeter-costs-non-innovative-
europe-zagame en.pdf
136 Olga Syraya
Appendices
137

Appendix A
Data Sources
Table A.1: OECD countries selected for the empirical analysis
Austria Hungary Slovak Republic
Czech Republic Ireland Slovenia
Denmark Italy Spain
Estonia Japan Sweden
Finland Korea Switzerland
France Netherlands United Kingdom
Germany Poland United States
Greece Portugal
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Table A.2: Data sources used in the empirical analysis
Statistics Period Source
3G cellular mobile subscriptions in the OECD area 2001-2011 OECD Communications Out-
look 2011 and 2013
Population 2001-2011 OECD.Stat database
Gross adjusted disposable income per capita (GADI),
USD, current prices, current PPPs
2001-2011 OECD.Stat database
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabi-
tants
1991-2001 ITU Database 2011
Total fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 2001-2011 OECD Communications Out-
look 2013
Students enrolled by type of institution, tertiary education 2001-2011 OECD.Stat database
Population, 15-34 years 2001-2011 OECD.Stat database
ICT patent applications filed under the PCT, inventor’s
country of residence, priority date
1998-2008 OECD.Stat database
Urban population, % of total 2001-2011 The World Bank database
Population density, people per sq. km of land area 2001-2011 The World Bank database
World telecommunications equipment exports, commod-
ity code 764: Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s., and
parts, n.e.s., and accessories of apparatus falling within
division 76, value in EUR
2001-2011 EU Comext database
World telecommunications equipment exports, commod-
ity code 764: Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s., and
parts, n.e.s., and accessories of apparatus falling within
division 76, quantity in 100 kg
2001-2011 EU Comext database
World telecommunications equipment exports, commod-
ity code 764: Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s., and
parts, n.e.s., and accessories of apparatus falling within
division 76 (Japan, Korea, Switzerland, US), value in
USD
2007-2011 UN Comtrade database
World telecommunications equipment exports, commod-
ity code 764: Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s., and
parts, n.e.s., and accessories of apparatus falling within
division 76 (Japan, Korea, Switzerland, US), quantity in
kg
2007-2011 UN Comtrade database
Annual foreign exchange rates 2007-2011 Federal Reserve Statistical Re-
lease
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Appendix B
3G Penetration Curves for Selected
OECD Countries, 2001-2011
Figure B.1: Linear trend
Source: Own illustration based on OECD, 2013.
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APPENDIX B. 3G PENETRATION CURVES FOR SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES,
2001-2011
Figure B.2: Exponential growth - lower part of S-curve
Source: Own illustration based on OECD, 2013.
Figure B.3: Market saturation - upper part of S-curve
Source: Own illustration based on OECD, 2013.
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Table C.1: Calls for proposals under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2015
Excellent Science Industrial Leadership Societal Challenges Science with and for
Society
Other Actions
e-Infrastructures Applications in Satellite
Navigation - Galileo
Blue Growth: Unlocking
the potential of Seas and
Oceans
Call for Developing
Governance for the
Advancement of
Responsible research and
Innovation
EURATOM Fission
Trans-National Cooperation
among Marie
Sklodowska-Curie National
Contact Points (NCP)
Biotechnology Border Security and
External Security
Call for Integrating Society
in Science and Innovation
Prize - Innovation SOFT
Support to Innovation,
Human Resources, Policy
and International
Cooperation
Boosting the
Investment-Readiness of
SMEs and Small Midcaps
Call for Competitive
Low-Carbon Energy
Call for Making Science
Education and Careers
Attractive for Young People
WIDESPREAD ERA
Chairs
. . .
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Table C.1: Calls for proposals under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2015 - Continuation
Excellent Science Industrial Leadership Societal Challenges Science with and for
Society
Other Actions
Marie Sklodowska-Curie
Research and Innovation
Staff Exchange (RISE)
Call for Energy-Efficient
Buildings
Smart Cities and
Communities
Call for Promoting Gender
Equality in Research and
Innovation
WIDESPREAD
Transnational Network of
National Contact Points
(NCP)
Integrating and Opening
Research Infrastructures of
European Interest
Call for Factories of the
Future
Digital Security:
Cybersecurity, Privacy and
Trust
WIDESPREAD TEAMING
Marie Sklodowska-Curie
Action: Innovative Training
Networks (ITN)
Call for Nanotechnologies,
Advances Materials and
Production
Disaster-Resilience:
Safeguarding and Securing
Society
European Researchers’
Night (NIGHT)
Call for SPIRE -
Sustainable Process
Industries
Energy Efficiency - Market
Uptake
. . .
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Table C.1: Calls for proposals under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2015 - Continuation
Excellent Science Industrial Leadership Societal Challenges Science with and for
Society
Other Actions
FET Flagships - Tackling
Grand Interdisciplinary
Science and Technology
Challenges
Capacity-Building in
Technology Transfer
Energy Efficiency Research
and Innovation
FET-Open - Novel Ideas for
Radically New
Technologies
Capitalising the Full
Potential of Online
Collaboration
Energy Efficiency - PPP
EeB and SPIRE Topics
FET-Proactive - Emerging
Themes and Communities
Cluster Facilitated Projects
for New Industrial Chains
Europe as a Global Actor
FET-Proactive - Towards
Exascale High Performance
Computing
EU-Japan research and
Development Cooperation
in Net Futures
Fight Against Crime and
Terrorism
Developing New
World-Class Research
Infrastructures
Earth Observation - LEIT
SPACE
Green Vehicles
. . .
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Table C.1: Calls for proposals under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2015 - Continuation
Excellent Science Industrial Leadership Societal Challenges Science with and for
Society
Other Actions
Calls for Proposals for ERC
Proof of Concept Grant
Enhancing SME Innovation
Capacity by Providing
Better Innovation Support
Health Co-ordination
Activities
Calls for Proposals for ERC
Consolidator Grant
European Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR)
Helpdesk
Growing a Low-Carbon,
Resource Efficient
Economy with a Sustainable
Supply of Raw Materials
Calls for Proposals for ERC
Starting Grant
European Label for
Innovation Voucher
Innovative, Sustainable and
Inclusive Bioeconomy
H2020-LEIT-Space-
Competitiveness of the
European Space Sector
Mobility for Growth
Horizon 2020 dedicated
SME Instrument
New Forms of Innovation
. . .
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Table C.1: Calls for proposals under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2015 - Continuation
Excellent Science Industrial Leadership Societal Challenges Science with and for
Society
Other Actions
ICT - Information and
Communications
Technologies
Overcoming the Crisis:
New Ideas, Strategies and
Governance Structures for
Europe
IPorta 2 Personalising health and
care
Peer Learning of Innovation
Agencies
Reflective Societies:
Cultural Heritage and
European Identities
Protection of European
Assets in and from Space -
LEIT SPACE
Sustainable Food Security
The Young Generation in an
Innovative, Inclusive and
Sustainable Europe
. . .
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Table C.1: Calls for proposals under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2015 - Continuation
Excellent Science Industrial Leadership Societal Challenges Science with and for
Society
Other Actions
Waste: A Resource to
Recycle, Reuse and Recover
Raw Materials
Water Innovation: Boosting
Its Value for Europe
Source: European Commission.
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TTable C.2: Policy tools by lead market area
Standardisation, labelling,
certification
Legislation Public procurement Complementary actions
eHealth EU Recommendation for
interoperability
Exchange of best practices Call for network of
procurers
EU Patient Smart Open
Services pilot founded
Sustainable construction 2nd generation Eurocodes Screening of national
building regulations
Network Contracting
Authorities
Upgrading of skills of
construction workers
Protective textiles SME involvement in
standardisation
Technical Harmonisation Network Contracting
Authorities
7 research projects selected
for funding
Bio-based products Product performance
standards
Inventory of legislation
affecting the sector
Encourage Green Public
Procurement
Advisory Group for
Bio-based Products
Recycling CEN Packaging Standards Waste Framework directive Encourage Green Public
Procurement
Eco-innovation observatory
Renewable energies Minimum energy
performance standards
Mandatory national targets
for 2020
Improve knowledge on
demand barriers
Overview of all
programmes and funds
Source: European Commission.
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 1:
Simplifying
pan-European
licensing for online
works
Action 21: Propose
legislation on ICT
interoperability
Action 28:
Reinforced Network
and Information
Security Policy
Action 42: Adopt an
EU broadband
communication
Action 50: Leverage
more private
investment for ICT
research and
innovation
Action 57: Prioritize
digital literacy and
competences for the
European Social
Fund
Action 69: Assess
whether the ICT
sector has complied
with common energy
and emmission
measures
Action 2: Preserving
orphan works and
out of print works
Action 22: Promote
standard-setting
rules
Action 29: Combat
cyber-attacks against
information systems
Action 43: Funding
for high-speed
broadband
Action 51: Reinforce
the coordination and
pooling of resources
Action 58: Develop
a framework to
recognise ICT skills
Action 70: Support
partnerships between
the ICT sector and
major emitting
sectors
. . .
O
lga
Syraya
151
A
PPE
N
D
IX
C
.
E
U
R
O
PE
A
N
U
N
IO
N
PO
L
IC
Y
M
E
A
SU
R
E
S
FO
R
IN
N
O
VA
T
IO
N
A
N
D
IC
T
Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 3: Open up
public data resources
for re-use
Action 23: Provide
guidance on ICT
standardisation and
public procurement
Action 30: Establish
a European
cybercrime platform
Action 44: European
Spectrum Policy
Programme
Action 52: Propose
measures for ”light
and fast” access to
EU research funds in
ICT
Action 59: Prioritise
digital literacy and
skills in the ’New
skills for jobs’
flagship
Action 71: Assess
contribution of smart
grids and define
minimum
functionalities to
promote
interoperability
Action 4: Wide
stakeholder debate
on further measures
to stimulate a
European online
content market
Action 24: Adopt a
European
Interoperability
Strategy and
Framework
Action 31: Analyse
the usefulness of
creating a European
cybercrime centre
Action 45: Foster the
deployment of NGA
networks
Action 53:
Financially support
joint ICT research
infrastructures and
innovation clusters
Action 60: Increase
participation of
women in the ICT
workforce
Action 72: Launch
Green Paper on Solid
State Lighting (SSL)
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 5:
Simplifying the
distribution of
creative content
Action 25: Identify
and assess means of
requesting
significant market
players to licence
information about
their products or
services
Action 32:
Strengthen the fight
against cybercrime
and cyber-attacks at
international level
Action 46: Member
States to develop
national broadband
plans
Action 54: Develop
a new generation of
web-based
applications and
services
Action 61: Educate
consumers on the
new media
Action 73: Member
States to agree
common additional
functionalities for
smart meters
Action 6: Protecting
intellectual property
rights online
Action 26: MS to
implement European
Interoperability
Framework
Action 33: Support
EU-wide
cyber-security
preparedness
Action 47: Member
States to facilitate
broadband
investment
Action 55: Member
States to double
annual public
spending on ICT
research and
development
Action 62: EU-wide
indicators of digital
competences
Action 74: Member
States to include
specifications for
total lifetime costs
for public lighting in
public procurement
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 7: Fix a date
for migration to
Single European
Payment
Action 27: Member
States to implement
Malmo¨ and Granada
declarations
Action 34: Explore
the extension of
security breach
notification
provisions
Action 48: Use
structural funds to
finance the roll-out
of high-speed
networks
Action 56: Member
States to Engage in
large-scale pilots
financed by the
Competitiveness and
Innovation
Programme
Action 63: Evaluate
accessibility in
legislation
Action 75: Give
Europeans secure
online access to their
medical health data
and achieve
widespread
telemedicine
deployment
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 8: Revision
of the eSignature
directive
Action 35: Guidance
on implementation
of Telecoms rules on
privacy
Action 49:
Implementing the
European Radio
Spectrum Policy
Programme in
Member States
Action 120: Key
Transformative
Action:
Establishment of the
European Cloud
Partnership to
harness public
buying power to
accelerate the
development of the
market for cloud
computing
Action 64: Ensure
the accessibility of
public sector
websites
Action 76: Propose a
recommendation to
define a minimum
common set of
patient data
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 9: Updating
the eCommerce
Directive
Action 36: Support
reporting of illegal
content online and
awareness
campaigns on online
safety for children
Action 112: Durable
regulatory measures
on
non-discrimination
and wholesale
pricing to promote
investment and
competition
Action 121: Follow
up of the European
Cloud Computing
Strategy
Action 65: Helping
disabled people to
access content
Action 77: Foster
EU-wide standards,
interoperability
testing and
certification of
eHealth
Action 10: Member
States to implement
laws to support the
digital single market
Action 37: Foster
self-regulation in the
use of online
services
Actions 113 and
114: Regulatory
measures to promote
competition and
enhance the
broadband
investment
environment
Action 122: Launch
pilot action to
explore the
efficiency gains from
moving public
services into the
Cloud
Action 66: Member
States to implement
digital literacy
policies
Action 78: Reinforce
the Ambient
Assisted Living
(AAL) Joint
Programme
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 11: Member
States to transpose
the VAT Directive
Action 38: Member
States to establish
pan-European
Computer
Emergency
Response Teams
Action 115:
Recommendation on
safeguarding the
open Internet for
consumers
Action 127: Set up a
more
business-friendly
environment for
start-ups
Action 67: Member
States to implement
provisions on
disability
Action 79: Propose a
sustainable model
for financing the
Europeana digital
library
Action 12: Review
the EU data
protection rules
Action 39: Member
States to carry out
cyber-attack
simulations
Action 116: Update
of the 2007
Recommendation on
the list of markets
relevant for ex ante
regulation
Action 128: Web
entrepreneurs action
plan
Action 68: Member
States to mainstream
eLearning in national
policies
Action 80: Propose
measures to support
cultural and creative
industries
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 13:
Complementing the
Consumer Rights
Directive
Action 40: Member
States to implement
harmful content alert
hotlines
Action 117:
Reduction of the cost
of deploying high
speed electronic
communications
networks
Action 129: Key
Transformative
Action/ Pooling of
European public and
private resources for
micro- and
nano-electronic
behind a common
industrial strategy,
with a strengthened
Joint Undertaking at
EU level as the main
vector for R&D&I
support
Action 126: Grand
Coalition for Digital
Jobs and Skills
Action 81: Issue
recommendation on
digital film
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 14: Explore
the possibilities for
Alternative Dispute
Resolution
Action 41: Member
States to set up
national alert
platforms
Action 118: Update
of guidelines on state
aid for broadband by
end 2012
Action 130: Focus
and develop the
photonics, robotics
and Future Internet
Public Private
Partnership (PPP)
New PPP on High
Performance
Computing
Action 82:
Implement the
Audiovisual Media
Services Directive
on cultural diversity
Action 15: Consult
the stakeholders on
collective redress
Action 123: Proposal
for Directive on
network and
information security
Action 119: Pilot
project to test project
bonds for broadband
deployment
Action 131: Action
Plan for electronics
industry in Europe,
further to the 2012
strategy for Key
Enabling
Technologies
Action 83: Propose a
Council and
Parliament Decision
on mutual
recognition of e-ID
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 16: Code of
EU online rights
Action 124: EU
Cyber-security
strategy
Action 132: Invest in
High Performance
Computing
Action 84: Support
seamless
cross-border
eGovernment
services in the single
market
Action 17:
Stakeholder platform
for EU online
trustmarks
Action 125 Expand
the Global Alliance
against Child Sexual
Abuse Online
Action 85: Review
the Public access to
Environmental
Information
Directive
Action 18:
Harmonisation of
numbering regimes
Action 86:
Implement
cross-border
eEnvironment
services
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 19: Spectrum
Policy plan
Action 87: Issue
White Paper on
inter-connecting
e-procurement
capacity in EU
Action 20:
Investigate the cost
of non-Europe in the
telecoms market
Action 88: Create
and implement an
ambitious
eCommission
2011-2015 action
plan
Action 101: Look for
durable solutions for
voice and data
roaming by 2012
Action 89: Member
States to make
eGovernment
services fully
interoperable
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 102: Key
Transformative
Action 1: Copyright
the way forward
Action 90: Points of
Single Contact
should function as
fully fledged
eGovernment centres
Action 103: Adopt
and implement the
key digital single
market proposals of
the Digital Agenda
Action 91: Member
States to agree a
common list of key
cross-border public
services
Action 104: Follow
up on eCommerce
Action Plan, Green
Paper on payments
Action 92: Apply the
Intelligent Transport
System Directive in
support of
interoperability and
rapid standardisation
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 105:
Guidelines to
correctly implement
EU rules on
consumer
information
requirements
Action 93: Adopt the
Air Traffic
Management
Solutions for
(SESAR)
Action 106: VAT
reform - align tax
rates for digital
content and similar
physical goods
Action 94: Propose a
directive for the
deployment of
e-Maritime services
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 107:
Proposals to
strengthen the data
industry in Europe
Action 95: Propose a
directive setting out
technical
specifications for
telematic
applications for rail
passenger services
Action 108: Green
paper on a converged
audiovisual world
Action 96: Member
States to fulfil
obligations under
European Rail
Traffic Management
System (ERTMS)
. . .
164
O
lga
Syraya
Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 109: Develop
and implement
public service
infrastructures,
policy and support in
the framework of the
Connecting Europe
Facility
Action 110: Deploy
and roll out digital
services in key areas
of public interest
. . .
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Table C.3: Actions under Digital Agenda for Europe - Continuation
I - Digital Single
Market
II - Interoperability
and Standards
III - Trust and
Security
IV - Fast and
ultra-fast Internet
Access
V - Research and
Innovation
VI - Enhancing
digital literacy,
skills and inclusion
VII - ICT-enabled
benefits for EU
society
Action 111: Focus
and develop and
implement, as
appropriate the
Smart Cities, Active
and Healthy Ageing,
Green Cars, Energy
Efficient Buildings
PPP
Source: European Commission.
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